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DOCTORAL THESIS 1986 
UN I '·) E R ~3 I T '( 0 F [) U R HAt·1 
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY AND SOClAL POLICY 
The ~=.e11tra_l .s. i rn of this l :=: to ex.xmine i-:. lte 
mutations of capital's strategy for labour in a single 
i ndu :=.try and historical :::.on text, namely in Italy's FIAT in 
Turin circa from 1950-1980. 
It argued that the evolution of tE~chnology and 
managerial technique~=. in this context i~3 not only the 
product of a linear "scienti fie" prog-ress in these fields, 
but also of the dynamic interplay of class forces, and hence 
of a wide range of culturally and historically peculiar 
factors. 
Three main chronological periods are considered: the 
1950s, with the strongly pat.-:::rnalistic attitudes of post-
fascist Italian managerial policy in which an intensive 
exploitation of the national working class gave rise to the 
profits for mechanization at home and expansion abroad; the 
1960s, characterized by the impact of immigration from the 
t-ural South of Italy to the large scale factories of the 
North and a growing political awareness and strength of the 
woddng class, and the 1970s, in which the problem of the 
"ungovernable" giant factory run according to the basic 
principles of :3cientific management is approached with nevi 
solutions based on modular systems of work organization, 
advanced technology, a.n ab:3olu·te recluc~tion in tl1e la_1Jour 
force and plant relocation. 
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C. I.: Commic=-ione lr1terna: shop floor· grievance committee 
elect.ed by all v<orkers, including those who are not union 
members. 
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federation after the CGIL, from whi.-:;h it was born from a 
split by Christian Democrats in 1948. 
DC: Democrazia Cristiana <Christian Democracy) 
conservative and Roman Catholic, the major governmental 
party in a continual dynasty since the second world war. 
FLM: Federazione Lavoratori Metalmeccanici - united 
engineering workers' union formed in 1972 to organize 
workers of the FIOM, FIM and UILM. 
FIM: Federazione Italiana della Metallurgici the 
engineering workers' section of the CISL. 
FIOM: Federazione Impiegati Operai Metalmeccanici - the 
engineering workers' section of the CGIL. 
LLD: Liberi Lavoratori Democratici <Democratic Free Workers) 
- in fact a company union. 
PCI: Fartito Communista Italiana <Italian Communist Party). 
PSI: Fartito Socialista Italiana Citalian Socialist Party>. 
UIL: Unione Italiana del Lavoro Cltalian Union of Labour) 
the third largest union organization, including socialist, 
social democratic and republican elements. 
UILM: Unione Italiana dei Lavoratori della Metallurgia 
engineering workers' section of the OIL. 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
This thesis was begun as an attempt to give a theo-
retical and above all material context to the changing 
nature of the I abour process in a big factory in a 
crucial industrial sector, the car industry. 
The labour process is conceived as that whole pro-
cess whereby capital attempts to convert the potential 
to work it has bought in the form of the commodity 
labour power into work actually done. By following this 
process in some detai 1 through an arc of about thirty 
years in one big company, Italy/s FIAT of Turin, I have 
attempted to locate its evolution directly within the 
historical and sociological reality of class relations 
and the shifting balance of power inside and outside the 
factory. In doing this I hoped to avoid some of the 
problems caused by an abstraction of the labour process 
from its context of class relations and hence to throw 
some light on the driving mechanisms behind the 
evolution of the capitalist labour process. 
By maintaining an historical continuum and relying 
on empirical evidence from the period <trade union and 
management documents, the writings of FIAT workers and 
theoriticians closely involved in the struggles, reports 
in newspapers and j ourna 1 s, persona 1 1 n terv l ews w l th 
managers, activists etc.), the precise articulation of 
these mechanisms w l thin the comp 1 ex soc i a 1 rea 1 1 t y of 
which they are a part can be more closely drawn. 
A disadvantage of such a methodology is, of course, 
that the resulting explanation is rather historically 
and culturally specific: a FIAT-centric hypothesis whose 
extrapolation to provide a description of the labour 
process in the car industry, much less in monopoly capi-
tal ism in general, would require extreme care. But this 
weakness is, I believe, the inevitable other face to the 
study/s main strength: its firm location in one histo-
rical reality more readily allows the identification and 
location of the various factors underlying the success, 
in a given situation, of one strategy for surplus value 
extraction, and the decline or demise of another. 
This study then, by its very nature, avoids the no-
ted central problem in Braverman/s important book: that 
he presents capital/s ideal strategy for labour, as this 
was conceived by its major theorist, Frederick Winslow 
Tay I or, as a more or 1 ess concrete hi stor i ca 1 event. 
Such an approach is constitutionally unable to take into 
account the contradictions implicit in this ideal when 
it is applied to a reality in which the working class is 
not the passive instrument of techno- logical and 
organizational knowledge, but is itself a force in 
history, capable of moulding and mutating, in more or 
1 ess conscious, more or 1 ess organized fashions, the 
application of capital/s scientific advancement. 
The Setting 
While the choice of theme was sparked off by a rea-
ding of Braverman and his critics, the direction even-
tua 1 1 y taken by this study was i ncreas i ngl y determined 
by a growing interest in a complex historical and socio-
logical reality, the FIAT factories of Turin, rather 
than by a more abstract intention to attempt to codify 
the I aws of the labour process in advanced industria I 
capita 1 ism. 
Many factors have gone to make the automobile in-
dustry in Italy a particularly interesting terrain for 
sociological 
First, 
of the car 
investigation. 
and in general, is the historical position 
industry as a leading sector in capitalist 
accumulation and development. The central importance of 
the car industry and the pressing need for the auto-
mobile giants to find a solution to the problems caused 
by the congregation of very 1 arge numbers of workers 
beneath the reeves of the factories, has made this 
sector, ever s i nee the advent of Scientific Management 
as the fundamental catechism of capital, the logical 
terrain for the mass experimentation and introduction of 
new strategies for the consolidation of capital~s 
control over its labour force. 
Second is the historical peculiarity of the very 
rapid growth of the Italian durable goods industry from 
the 1950s. The pressure of this Italian ~economic 
miracle/, led by the car industry and FIAT, gave rise to 
a highly uneven industrial development in Italy, concen-
trating pockets of advanced capitalist production in the 
cities and outlying districts of the Mi tan-Genoa-Turin 
~industrial triangle~ of the North, while leaving the 
great majority of the country, particularly the South, 
in a situation of /backward~ and largely agrarian 
production. 
Thirdly, and related to this, was the large scale 
use of /immigrant/ labour from the sti 11 mostly agrarian 
South. This large scale tapping of the copious pockets 
of un- or underemployed rural workers led to the forma-
tion of a labour force which, while not as yet very 
experience~ in the tradition of struggle in industrial 
society, was not so legally and culturally precarious as 
the immigrant labour forces working in other big Euro-
pean car industries. Unlike the Greeks, Turks and 
Ita I i ans working in Germany or France, the Southerners 
at FIAT constituted a culturally homogeneous labour 
force which, a 1 though subject to the appa 1 1 i ng I i vi ng 
and working conditions and forms of rae ism common to 
immigrant workers were, by reason of their legal status 
as Italians and shared language and traditions, in a far 
stronger position than their counterparts abroad. 
Fourth is the very high level of theoretical cul-
ture and political confidence attained at times by 
certain sectors of the FIAT working c I ass, a resu 1 t, 
perhaps, of the greater porousity of the 'membrane' 
separating the industrial working class from left-wing 
intellectuals in Italy. Again, numerous historically 
specific factors contributed to this greater permea-
bility to radical ideas. Here I may briefly cite the 
events of the Biennia Rosso, or 'two red years' of 
1919-1921, with the occupation of a number of large fac-
tor· i es in the North and the i nf 1 uence of Gramsc i and the 
Ordine Nuovo, the rise of the Ita! ian Communist Party 
and the dangerous years of the anti-fascist and partisan 
struggles in which, need! ess to say, the commun l sts 
played an extremely important role. For Ita! ian workers, 
then, radical thought and action remained both familiar 
and feasible, informing their approach to everyday 
problems of I ife and work. To the Italian working class 
communism was not the 1 deo I ogy of a distant and ev i I 
empire, as it has generally been to, for example, its 
angl a-saxon counterpart, but rather an acceptab I e, if 
not universal framework for action. And to this greater 
familiarity with left-wing ideas we must add the above 
noted mass arrival of the wilder and more reckless breed 
of Southerners, whose anarchistic traditions and tem-
perament seemed little susceptible to acculturation by 
staider Northerners, and whose eroding effect on the 
more cautious mentality of the North contributed 
considerably to the militant and combative attitudes 
characterizing the class struggles of the 1960s and 
1970s. 
Last in this non-exhaustive llst, and in large part 
as a result of the very high levels of combativeness in 
FIAT, is management/a very early and rapid embracement 
of the new technologies made available from the 1970s by 
progress in microelectronics. As we shall see, after the 
/hot autumn/ of 1969, FIAT utilized the new 
possibi I ities offered by automation, computerization and 
robotization for the break-up of the conventional 
production lines, which had proved to be an ideal 
environment for workers/ organization and were, 
moreover, extremely vulnerable to at I forms of conflict, 
from individual acts of /insubordination/ to more 
organized struggles. 
All these factors and others have combined to make 
FIAT a particularly interesting forum for the exami-
nation of the interplay of class forces in a large 
factory, displaying the working class in its weakness, 
submitted to maximum levels of discipline; exemplified 
by the almost military conditions in the factory of the 
1950s, to the working class in its strength; the angry, 
self-confident and informed labour force of the late 
1960s and early 70s, which was capable of imposing its 
own conditions on the employer to a surprising degree. 
And through all this we find the continuous evolutions 
of the strategies deployed by management to maintain or 
regain its often precarious control over the labour 
process, and hence over productivity and profits. 
This, then, is the framework within which the main 
proposals of this thesis wi I I unfold. 
The analysis employs basic marxist concepts, but an 
attempt is made to be as explicit as possible, in order 
to avoid the sort of eventually ideological shorthand 
which too often obscures unproven hypotheses and 
straightjackets the writer in an off-the-peg conceptual 
suit often il 1-taylored to a complex reality. 
Braverman and /The Labor Process in Monopoly Capital/ 
Although, as I have already said, this thesis is in 
no sense a strict critique of Braverman"s analysis of 
the 1 abour process in monopo 1 y capita 1 ism, s l nee this 
was its original impetus it would be well to begin with 
a brief examination of this analysis, and of some of the 
criticisms of his approach. 
The central problem for Braverman, as well as for 
this study is, as I have said, how capital converts the 
potential to work embodied in the labour power it 
purchases into work actually done. 
This problem, as Braverman recounts, emerges for 
capital at the moment of its inception, namely from the 
moment when workers were released from the legal obliga-
tions of slavery or serfdom tying them to a single 
master or lord, to the material obligation to sell the 
on 1 y thing they have their 1 abour power on the 
market. However, /free workers/, obliged by necessity to 
se 1 1 their 1 abour power to capita 1 , have a 1 so surren-
dered any irmnediate and personal interest in labour. 
Capital, then, can buy the labour power of men and wo-
men, but it also has to devise a means for the efficient 
conversion of this potential into work actually done. In 
Braverman/s words: 
"The coin of 1 abour has its obverse side: in pur-
chasing 1 abour power that can do much < the cap i-
talist employer> is at the same time purchasing an 
undefined quality and quantity. 
What he buys is infinite in potential, but in its 
realization it is 1 imited by the subjective state of 
the workers, by their previous history, by the 
general social conditions under which they work as 
wel 1 as the particular conditions of the enterprise, 
and by the techn 1 ca 1 setting of their 1 abour. The 
work actually performed will be limited by these and 
many other factors, inc 1 udi ng the organization of 
the process and the forms of supervision over it, if 
any" <1>. 
The central problem for capital, then, is to reduce 
as far as possible that limitation on the use of labour 
power posed by the obligation to use human agents, who 
bring to the workp I ace with them a who 1 e set of sub-
Jective needs and desires not coincident with capital/s 
main interest in profit maximization. 
Braverman/s important achievement in Labour and Mo-
nopoly Capital was to refocus attention on one of the 
ways in which capital has attempted to achieve this ob-
Jective in advanced capitalist industry, namely through 
the Scientific Management of workers, in which technical 
and technological interventions on the organization of 
work are used to transfer con tro 1 over the ski 11 s and 
knowledge necessary to each craft from the workers to 
capital. The workers/ day-to-day control over the pro-
cess of manufacture, previously given by their position 
as the "unique depositories" of the knowledge necessary 
for the performance of work, was thus stripped from the 
1 i vi ng worker and embedded in the instruments and or-
ganization of labour, the dead products of previous 
manual and conceptual labour. 
Braverman analyses this process of the deskilllng 
of the labour force and the transfer of control over the 
1 abour process to management in terms of the marxist 
concept of the transition from a formal subordination of 
labour to capital, given by the mere fact of the 
ownership of the means of production, to a ~ subor-
dination. The formal control of the labour process, 
which has always resided in the hands of those who own 
the means of production and hence set the conditions of 
emp 1 oyment, a 1 1 ows the extension of the working day, 
week or year and the reduction of wasted working time 
through the imposition of regulations, sanctions and 
disciplinary measures. But in order to achieve an 
increasing productivity of labour when working time has 
been extended to its human limits, that is to intensify 
rather than simp I y ex tend production, capita 1 had to 
assume the cognitive processes of design and pI ann 1 ng 
involved in work as its own responsibility, leaving the 
worker with the almost literally mindless task of the 
execution of prev 1 ous I y conceptua I i zed procedures. 
Braverman analyses in detail the two main means whereby 
capital implemented this transition from formal to real 
control over the labour process. 
On the one hand, there was a series of experiments 
on the organ 1 z at ion of the 1 abour process. The 1 abour 
force was increasingly divided into two parts; workers 
in one place executed the physical processes of pro-
duction and were segregated from others, to whom the 
des 1 gn , p 1 ann l ng, ca 1 cu 1 at 1 ng and record keep l ng 
processes were assigned. In Braverman's words: "The 
production units operate like a hand, watched corrected 
and controlled by a distant brain" <2>. 
On the other hand, there was a development of tech-
nology under the sponsorship and supervision of capital 
to provide machinery which was increasingly able to 
embody the elements of conceptual work which were still 
integral to the worker's task, by imposing a precon-
ceived order and pacing on the workforce: 
"Machinery offers to management the opportunity to 
do by who 1 1 y mechan i ca 1 means that which it had 
previously attempted to do by organizational and 
disciplinary means. The fact that many machines may 
be paced and controlled according to centralized 
decisions, and that these controls may thus be in 
the hands of management, removed from the site of 
production to the office these technical possi-
bilities are of just a great interest to management 
as the fact that the machine multiplies the 
productivity of labour" (3). 
The separation of conception and execution, the minute 
division of labour and its mechanization or automation 
hence had two main effects: the reduction of the value 
of labour power through increased work speeds and, more 
importantly sti 11, the transfer to management of control 
over day-to-day decisions at the point of production. 
The who 1 e process of p 1 ann l ng and design is 'expro-
priated' from the workers and embodied in the machinery 
or segregated in specialized departments, and the 
workers become the mere 'appendices' of the mach 1 nes, 
endlessly repeating a programme of 'parcelized' 
movements set and paced by management via the machinery. 
The Critique of Braverman 
The acclaim which greeted the publication of 'Labor 
and Monopoly Capital' is justified, even in the eyes of 
most of the book's critics, by its reinstatement of the 
analysis of the labour process as the fundamental 
process for capital accumulation, and by its demys-
tification of a mythology, to some extent still current, 
according to which technological progress has brought in 
its wake a generalized upgrading and reskilling of the 
manual labour force. The very importance of Braverman's 
study is in fact confirmed by the wide critical debate 
which it provoked. 
Nevertheless, although Braverman~s account of the 
evolution of Scientific Management provides a wealth of 
analytical detai I on the tactics employed to secure 
control over the labour process through a minute 
division of labour and the use of increasingly sophis-
ticated technology, his election to concentrate on a 
description of changes in the technical setting of 
labour precluded a wider analysis of the factors 
influencing the outcome of that basic conflict of 
interest between capital and labour which forms his, and 
our, starting point. 
To restate the problem: while the owners of capital 
must seek to defend and increase the portion of profit 
destined for capita 1 accumu 1 at ion, the work 1 ng c 1 ass 
will attempt to maximize their wage -which represents 
their ability to consume- and minimize their sacrifice 
in terms of time, energy and health. However, the arena 
in which this conflict is played out extends far beyond 
the point of production, and is influenced by factors 
far wider than the employer~s technical ability to 
rational lze the organization of labour. 
Braverman~s apparently conscious limitation of his 
field of analysis to the technical and organizational 
set tl ng of work has gl ven rise to two mal n and 1 nter-
related criticisms summarized by Elger (4) in an 
important contribution to the debate over ~"Labor and 
Monopoly Capital,.. These are that in concentrating on 
capital~s strategy for labour at the level of technology 
and the organization of work, Braverman on the one hand 
fails to show how workers/ struggles and resistance to 
work have themselves played a crucial role in the 
deve I opmen t and mutation of the capita I i st I abour 
process, and on the other ignores the implications for 
the labour process of the wider forms of social, 
political and economic domination available to capital 
for the solution of its labour problems. 
As I hinted earlier, these deficiencies seem to de-
rive directly from his selection of an abstract approach 
to the problem of control in the productive process. His 
study is based on the writing of one man, the somewhat 
idiosyncratic F.W. Taylor~ and implicitly assumes this 
author/s ideal version of the implementation of the 
theory of Scientific Management as historical reality. 
Braverman hence at tempts to demonstrate his arguments 
for the success of S.M. as a strategy for labour with 
so 1 e reference to the evidence of the very person who 
had expounded and proposed it to capital as the central 
means for the solution of its labour problems. Capital/s 
appropriation of control over the labour process is 
hence perceived by Braverman - as it was in Tay 1 or/ s 
ideal - as a 1 inear, incontrovertable and more or less 
universally successful strategy. Although he does in 
fact admit that this transfer of control is an "ideal 
realized only within definite limits and unevenly among 
industries" ( 5>, such 1 imitations are seen 1 arge 1 y as 
ephimeral anomalies: the emergence, in the wake of S.M. 
itself, of "new crafts and skills and technical 
specialities which are at first the province of labour 
rather than management" and "the displacement of labour 
into other fields", which may create a renaissance of 
era f t expertise 1 ead i ng to pockets of resistance. In 
this view, it would seem that the only elements of the 
working class to have any subjective impact as the point 
of production are the ski 1 led workers who have, at least 
temporarily, escaped the inexorable dissolution of 
conception and execution, but are eventually destined to 
extinction by the inevitable spread of S.M. In general, 
so absolute does Braverman consider this process that he 
no longer sees any place for a working class as such at 
the point of production: 
11 The unity of thought and action. concepti on and 
execution~ hand and mind, which capital ism 
threatened from its beginnings, is now attacked by a 
systematic dissolution employing alI the resources 
of science and the eng l neer i ng disci p 1 i nes based 
upon it. The subjective factor of the labour process 
is removed to a place among its inanimate objective 
factors. To the materials and instruments of pro-
duction are added a /labour force/, another /factor 
of production/ and the process is hence forth 
carried on by management as the sole subjective 
e 1 erne n t 11 < 6 ) . 
Hence Braverman is able to make, at the beginning of his 
book, the by now famous disclaimer: 
"No attempt will be made to deal with the modern 
working c I ass on the 1 eve 1 of its consc l ousness, 
organization or activities. This is a book about the 
working class as a class in itself, not as a class 
for i t se I f 11 c 7 > • 
Explicitly and deliberately, then, Braverman leaves 
aside any consideration of the interactions of the 
various forces in play at the point of production, 
preferring, for analytical convenience, to treat the 
working class as an "inanimate factor of production" or 
" a c I ass i n i t se 1 f " . 
However, what is not explicit is that he in~ 
refers to a real historical, cultural and geographical 
context, that of early 20th century America, and that 
regardless of his conscious decision not to discuss the 
particular balance of class forces at that time, this 
balance was central to the form and content, as well as 
the degree of success, of S.M. as expressed in that 
context. The cultural disorientation and lack of 
security of the predominantly immigrant labour force, 
the I arge sea 1 e unemp 1 oyment of the 30s and the po-
litical repression of left-wing dissent by capital are 
some of the factors which may have contributed to the 
formation of a culturally peculiar working class which 
was perhaps a maleable terrain for the implementation of 
Taylor"s vision; a circumstance which may, incidentally, 
have reinforced and justified Braverman"s initial 
approach to the working class as the passive object of 
capitalist strategy. 
Interrelated with Braverman"s failure to insert his 
analysis within a general context of the balance of 
class forces is his consequent silence on the eventual 
ability of capital to manipulate this balance to create 
a terrain more favourable to its strategies at the point 
of production. 
Individual capitals and combinations of capitals 
may at different historical moments exert pressure on 
the State, or the State may act /independently/ in 
favour of capital in general, to influence various 
aspects of the conditions of employment, for example 
using economic po 1 icy to modify the I abour market and 
class composition, passing laws to render trade unions 
and political dissent less effective, or changing 
immigration laws to control the availability of foreign 
labour. Obviously such sweeping, centrally generated 
strategies are unwieldy; the particular needs of 
individual capitalist enterprises at any given time are 
not necessar i 1 y co incident, and anyway the ab i 1 it y and 
desire of the State to influence such important areas of 
the economy as unemployment, for example, are subject to 
a very 1 arge number of po 1 it i ca 1 and economic 
considerations. 
However, in a more problem specific and immediate 
way, individual enterprises may also manipulate the 
political, social and cultural context of their labour 
processes. 
Individual capitals and particularly leading sec-
tors of capita 1 have used a variety of strategies to 
ensure a more compliant labour force. Subject, of 
course, to the prevailing political and economic 
condi tl ons, a company may autonomous I y i nf 1 uence the 
composition of its workforce in many ways, for example 
by selective hiring and firing procedures to control the 
influx of new workers and weed out militants; repression 
of the formation and spread of trade union and political 
organizations; identification and isolation of known 
·troublemakers/, and the imposition of a strict 
discip! inary hierarchy. 
Another strategy which has been employed widely in 
the car industry is the use of an externa I I abour force 
recruited from the countryside or /less advanced/ 
countries. However, perhaps the most exemplary policy in 
terms of the argument of this thesis is the frequent 
recourse to wholesale relocation of plants, particularly 
to /Illrd World/ countries. Here. extreme poverty and 
the lack of a working class tradition of struggle not 
only allow wages to be kept to a minimum, but facilitate 
the implementation of an extreme discipline within the 
factory which would no longer be feasible in the fac-
tories of advanced capitalist societies. These wider 
interventions by capital, intended to go beyond the mere 
technical and technological setting of labour to select 
and centro I the very subjective make-up of the work-
force, demonstrate capital/s own recognition of the 
importance of the subjective mood and experience of the 
working class. 
The practice of controlling the composition of the 
labour force, whether internally or through geographical 
relocation, is a cogent demonstration that the mani-
pulation of the technical and organizational setting of 
labour is not in itself sufficient to maximize pro-
ductivity and the extraction of surplus value. In its 
maJor strategies of the last decades capital itself has 
demonstrated that its greatest problem is precisely that 
subjectivity of the working class that Braverman elected 
to ignore. 
This thesis wi I I show that Taylor 1 s dream in fact 
became caplta1 1 s nightmare in a large factory subJect to 
an increasingly sophisticated technological and tech-
nical organization. In FIAT, as in many other leading 
European industries, the principles of Scientific 
Management time and time again proved insufficient to 
retain control in the giant factories of the 60s and 
70s, declared 1 Ungovernable 1 by an exasperated Agnel li. 
The thesis will show that living labourers subjected to 
Scientific Management and technological advance have a 
variety of tactics on hand to 1 Subvert 1 the labour 
process, whether through a withdrawal of labour or 
through more imaginative individual and group actions 
designed to thwart the seemingly most fool-proof schemes 
of modern management and time and motion men . It w l 1 1 
show how management is forced to formulate and re-
formulate its strategy for labour in the light of 
labour 1 s strategy for it. And, in conclusion, it will 
show that capita1 1 s only ultimate solution to its labour 
problem, though not yet practicable, is the eradication 
of the need for a human labour force at all. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE RABBIT YEARS: FIAT IN THE 1950s 
"It's important to understand how weak the working class was 
at that time. We used to say amongst ourselves, 'We're a load 
of rabbits'. When you went into the butcher's you didn't say, 
'Give me half a rabbit'. You said, 'Give me half a FIAT 
worker'" <1>. 
This chapter concerns the first large~scale intro-
duction in FIAT of forms of Scientific Management - a 
detailed division of labour and mechanization accompa-
nied with time and motion studies designed to maximize 
productivity within the limits of the available tech-
nology. As we shal I see this radical modification of the 
organization of work occurred, at least initially, with 
the consent and even encouragement of the Italian 
Communist Party <PC!) which had prioritized post-war 
industrial reconstruction as a precondition for the 
emergence of a communist Italy, and albeit unwittingly, 
established optimum political conditions for the experi-
mentation of the technical and organizational transi-
tion. We shal I also see, however, that the management of 
the hated collaborator Valletta <saved from the purging 
of fascistic elements from all official posts by the 
Communist Party itself, which feared' ... a stripping of 
the vital nerve centres of the nation') employed as 
adjuvants to a 'classic' Scientific Management a series 
of tactics similar to those neatly summarized by Donald 
Roy as 'Fear Stuff, Sweet Stuff and Evi 1 Stuff' (2). 
However, before going on to consider how FIAT mana-
gement sought to control its Turin work_ force, it is 
necessary to say something more generally about the si-
tuation at that time. For in Italy/s FIAT in the 1950s, 
the need to stay in competition and thus for imperialist 
expansion was combined with the opportunity provided by 
the alienation of the communist vanguard from the mass 
of workers, which weakened the ab i 1 it y of the 1 abour 
force to fight against repressive measures. It was this 
equation, expedience and opportunity, that was to be 
reso I ved by a period of deep repression in the f ac-
tories, linked with a vigorous mechanization drive using 
technology largely imported from America to increase the 
rate of exploitation and build up capital to finance the 
beginnings of FIAT/s imperialist activities. 
FIAT/s present massive involvement abroad, extend-
ing through most of Europe and Eastern Europe, South 
America and Africa, began in the early 1950s with the 
inauguration of SEAT, FIAT/s subsidiary in Spain. 
Argentina, Yugoslavia and Rumania followed in the early 
1960s and from 1965 a process of expansion in Europe was 
carried out. Since then FIAT has been responsible for 
many foreign projects: the building of the huge plant at 
Togliattigrad in Russia (1966) and the /prestige/ hydro-
electric projects in Pakistan, Turkey and Peru, to name 
just a few. 
The money to finance this expansionist policy obvi-
ously had to come from somewhere. Since the labour force 
in the Italian car industry was already subject to a 
high degree of internal discipline, speed-up etc., the 
profits gained in the period of the protectionist poll-
cies of the facist regime and during the arms race were 
used for recap ita I i za t ion to increase the rate of ex-
ploitation on a relatively unchanged number of workers. 
The conditions for a massive increase in investment 
in the car industry had been maturing for some time. In 
the period 1937-38 a new Ita! ian prosperity caused 
largely by the arms race had given the potential for an 
increased in terna 1 car market and the huge M i raf i or i 
plant, opened during the war, was planned to produce 
smal 1, popular cars in series to exploit just this 
market. Production was interrupted because of the war, 
but in the 1950s the first 'Ita! ian Volkswagens/, the 
Vetturetta Democratica, rolled off the 1 ine. 
In fact the war proved to be a very brief interrup-
tion of FIAT/s productive development; by 1948 pro-
duction in the automobile sector, greatly aided by the 
Communist Party/s pol icy of reconstruction before all 
else, was already back to pre-war levels, and they were 
able to replace war-damaged plant in the great mecha-
nization drive of the 1950s. This process really took 
off from 1953, with a very rapid renovation of plant 
associated with an extensive mechanization of the 
productive process, and an 'advanced/ technology <mostly 
imported from abroad> adapted to production in series. 
The following figures (3) demonstrate this tendency: 
CAPITAL <FIXED 
AND CIRCULATING> EMPLOYEES VEHICLES 
1947 61,539 58,000 28,490 
1948 66,714 52,016 46,795 
1949 89,168 56,321 75 000 
1955 322,112 74,885 250 :299· 
1960 571,590 92,891 530,665 
Thus the increases in investment did not give a corres-
pondingly large increase in employment but went to 
multiply the rate of exploitation putting up produc-
tivity per worker. At FIAT Mirafiori the index of 
production per worker more than tripled in the eight 
years between 1948 and 1955. 
1948 = 100 
1952 = 206 
1955 = 381 (4) 
Rea 1 wages, however increased very 1 itt 1 e during the 
1950s. 
The beginning of the 1950s thus marked the dawning 
of a new era in the history of !tal ian industrial i-
zation; one of an enormous development of the !tal ian 
car industry through a restructuring of production; a 
process of mechanization and rationalization designed to 
finance the beginnings of FIAT/s imperialist expansion. 
The new era brought with it a need for a new sort of 
work force. It had to be doc i 1 e enough to give FIAT a 
free hand with new forms of work organization. A highly 
organized and mi 1 itant working class wi 11 question and 
eventually threaten the introduction of labour-saving 
methods and machinery - hence organization at FIAT had 
to be broken. Before looking at the tactics FIAT 
employed to do this, it is first necessary to take 
account of the role played in this period by the Italian 
Communist Party CPCI), the largest worker/s party, and 
the trade unions. 
The PCI had found itself in a strange situation 
after the war. The workforce, emerging from the period 
of sabotage and anti-fascist struggle which had been an 
i mpor tan t part of the Turin Resistance was turbulent: 
with demands for a democratization of work and the 
purging of fascists from the managerial ranks at FIAT. 
But ironically it was the PCI which was to do most of 
the work of control! ing and containing the rebel! ious 
workforce and restoring order and discipline within the 
factory. The PCI, underestimating the combined power of 
the Allies and the Vatican, was trapped in the 
/paralysing 11 lusion/ that with its participation in the 
post-war tripartite government it was now at the centre 
of power. Thus of the PCI/s three imperatives: purging, 
democratization and reconstruction, the latter 
effectively overrode the former two; the PCI called for 
industrial reconstruction for a new democratic era 
before all else. 
The following quote from a PCI worker demonstrates 
some of the confusion resulting from this policy: 
"When we began to work and make it understood that 
to be a good communist you had to produce and do 
your duty, then they called us fascists! We <of the 
Commissione Interna> were linked in with the 
foremen. When the bell rang at 5.15 they;d already 
been in the cloakroom since 4.00. So I, as a member 
of the C. I. had to intervene. They cal led me fascist 
because I tried to bring in some discipline, because 
we were working for us now" ( 5). 
Luciano Parlanti, a FIAT worker of that time, talks to 
Primo Maggio about the confusion generated by the PCI/s 
ambivalent position: 
''I remenber straight after the war Tog1iatti came to 
speak in Piazza Crispi - and then De Gasper! came -
and they both argued exact 1 y the same thing; the 
need to save the economy ... We/ve got to work hard 
because Ita 1 y / s on her knees, we/ ve been bombarded 
by the Americans. . . but don/ t worry because if we 
produce, if we work hard, in a year or two we/! I al 1 
be fine ... So the PC! militants inside the factory 
set themse I ves the poI i ti ca I task of producing to 
save the national economy, and the workers were left 
without a party" <6>. 
The PCI/s obsession vlith reconstruction was appa-
rently based on the inexplicable belief of the leader-
ship that Ita I y wou 1 d come into the Russi an sphere of 
influence after the war and be allowed to retain 
communist participation in government. But this belief 
turned out to be very dangerous for the working class. 
Both the rank and file of the PCI and the labour force 
were generally weakened, because the PCI acceded to the 
management pol icy of mechanization coupled with a new 
code of disci p 1 i ne. To the new younger workers this 
strategy of the communist trade unionists was difficult 
to understand. What was the point of Joining or fighting 
for a union which appeared intent on further tightening 
factory discipline rather than leading the struggle for 
their basic needs? The rift was deepened by the 
different experience of the work force; the young men 
with their Southern peasant origins and the older men 
tempered by a long industrial experience and the 
anti-fascist struggles. In this situation communication 
between the two groups broke down and FIAT/s self-
elected task of the destruction of al 1 forms of workers/ 
organization was made that much easier. 
Industrial working class organization in Italy dif-
fered from the UK in that it never took the form of 
trade unions based on trade or category. Unions in Italy 
were primarily based on locality, linking workers in 
I oca I camere de I 1 avoro, based on the French idea of 
bourses du travail. There were a number of reasons for 
this. Firstly, the sudden and uneven development of 
Italian Capital ism which preceded the formation of 
guild-type organizations; secondly, the strong influence 
of political parties which brought with it a tendency 
towards a purely /political/ activity, as distinct from 
negotiation over specific /trade/ issues; and thirdly a 
permanent abundance of labour which had always meant a 
pressure for a general representation of labour whether 
in the factory or not (7). 
As industrialization increased a need was felt for 
an organizational form to cope with more specific 
issues. The Commissione Interna <CI), basically a 
shop-floor grievance committee, developed to fill this 
role and quickly became a general feature of the 
factories. The CI was the basis for Gramscl"s idea of 
the factory counc i I system: "Tomorrow, deve 1 oped and 
enriched" they were to become "the organs of proletarian 
power which replaces the capitalist in all his useful 
functions of management and administration" <8>. The Cis 
were more or I ess 1 inked into a nat i ona 1 trade union 
federation, the CGIL, although election to the CI did 
not necessarily ental 1 membership of the union. In 1948 
the federation split into the communist-dominated CGIL 
Cw1 th an engineering workers/ sect l on, the FIOM), the 
Christian Democratic CISL Cwith the FIM> and the largely 
white-col Jar union UIL Cwith the UILM). 
out 
This, then, 
its strategy 
is the context in which FIAT carried 
aimed at rendering a! 1 forms of 
workers/ organization in the factory innocuous. As part 
of this strategy they also encouraged the development of 
a company union, the LLD-SIDA <9>, which with the OIL 
and FIM replaced the FIOM in the CI after the electoral 
defeat of 1955. In fact after this date the CI lost 
near 1 y every function of dissent in the factory - at 
least for the time being, Gramsci/s dream had died. 
The management, headed by Valletta, justified it-
self theoretically by dividing the workers into 
/constructors/ and /destructors/. Below I itemize their 
tactics under several separate headings, though many of 
the practices cited do, of course, interlink. 
The Use of the Anti-Strike Bonus. In these years of high 
unemployment and low wages, with families often having 
only one /bread-winner/, extra money was enormously 
important. The FIAT management was thus able to use very 
successfully the premlo dl collaborazlone or 
collaboration prize. This practice started after a 
strike of 1952 when FIAT workers participated in an 
engineering workers/ strike of the whole industrial 
triangle, Milan-Turin-Genoa. Eighty-five per cent of 
FIAT workers struck. Those who didn/t were rewarded with 
a bonus of 2,000 Lire. From the end of 1953 the 
antistrike bonus was introduced as normal practice with 
sums of about 40,000 Lire annualy given to workers who 
had not participated in any form of agitation during the 
year. This bonus was never negotiated with the unions 
but was g 1 ven to the workers on the request of the 
so-called /democratic unions/: the /yellow/ SIDA; the 
Christian Democratic CISL. This practice continued unti 1 
1962, when FIAT broke the unwritten rule of nego-
tiation at a national level between the employers/ 
federation, Conflndustria, and the national union 
federations. FIAT anticipated the national contract and 
signed a separate agreement which included the 
incorporation of the anti-strike bonus as part of the 
basic wage. 
Political Sackings. The /reprisal/ sacking of mili-
tants and known union or party sympathizers began in 
October 1948. The accusations level led were: having 
struck; having led workers/ struggles; having 
distributed union or political publications, even 
outside the factory gates; having organized meetings; 
having collected subscriptions to FIOM or the PCI; 
having struck against the Iegge truffa <10). After 1955 
the FIAT management only rarely used such explicit 
antiunion wording in their dismissal of troublesome 
workers <the reasons became /loafing/ or /low 
product ion/). 
The /mass sackings/, when troublesome departments 
or entire factories were /punished/ for a high vote for 
FIOM in the elections to the CI, began in December 1954: 
In December 1954 630 
320 
1955 250 
1956 380 
" July 1957 230 
" November 1957 120 
workers were sacked from FIAT Aeri tal ia 
FIAT Grandi 
Motori 
FIAT di Modena 
FIAT Lingotto 
FIAT Marina 
dl Pisa 
Officina 
Sussidlaria 
Ricambi <11> 
In the last instance alI OSR workers were sacked and the 
department was closed: what Donald Roy would call 'fatal 
stuff 1 <12). The sackings and /internal sackings/ 
<transferals) had the desired effect. At Aeritalia, for 
example, the FIOM vote in the CI elections dropped from 
1340 votes in the 1954 to 77 in 1955 <13). Punishment 
for union sympathy did not, however, stop when the 
di smi ssa I note arrived on the doormat. Sacked workers 
were 1 blacklisted 1 and no Turin or Piedmont company 
would employ them on the pain of loss of contracts with 
the FIAT giant. Sacked FIAT workers took the most 
eclectic work - there were a large number of communist 
undertakers in this period. Most of the ful !-time 
workers at the Camera del lavoro in Turin were ex-FIAT 
men. 
The fear that the sackings inspired was not sur-
prising; few people were prepared to support the union 
at such a price. The literature on FIAT in this period 
shows that the workers were afraid to greet or even 
smi I e at a known mi 1 i tant, much I ess ta I k to one, for 
----------------------------------------------------------------------
fear that they might be seen by a foreman or /creep; . 
Workers caught talking to a militant would be cal Jed in 
to the foreman/s off ice for a gri 11 ing and warned off 
sympathy with such men. 
Even after the failure of FIOM in the CI elections 
of 1955, a systematic attempt further to weaken the 
working class was made. In the remaining years of 
repression at FIAT, 2000 men were sacked and thousands 
transferred. As I ate as 1962, when the workers/ 
resistance began to re-emerge, about 100 workers were 
sacked in repr i sa I against the first strike for nine 
years. A protest strike organized by FIOM for the 
reinstatement of the sacked men failed dismally. 
The Quarantine Departments. As Parlanti put it: "They"d 
understood that someone who rebel led at work, even if he 
wasn/t politicized, could sooner or later pass on his 
ideas, his rebel lion, to others, and from rebellion 
clearly organization could be born, and then from 
organization politics is born" <14>. FIAT"s 
understanding of this was important in their control of 
the workforce in these years. Troublesome and 
i ndi vi dua I 1 y rebe 1 I i ous workers were moved away from 
their friends and workmates to noisy or isolated 
workposts. Worse cases could be sent to the r-epar-ti 
conf i no or 'quarantine" depar-tments to stop the 
contagion. If the disease was chr-onic the worker could 
then be sacked. 
FIAT created many r-eparti confine. The best known 
was the Officina Ricambi nicknamed Officina Stella Rossa 
- /Red Star" - because of the vast number- of communists 
and mi 1 i tants who ended their working days for FIAT 
there Creal ly ended - this was the department that was 
so heavily left-wing that in 1957 all 120 workers were 
sacked and the department closed). There were many other 
such departments, including N•4 in Aerital ia and N• 24 
in Mirafiori. These departments had one common 
characteristic; they were not really designed for 
production. Workers carried out more or less unimportant 
tasks or worked with antiquated machinery, often in 
deserted hangars taken over for just this purpose. 
Racism. Yet another strategy of management in these 
'rabbit years' was the encouragement of the division of 
worker from worker, and one way to do this was through 
racism. Especially in the late 1950s and early 1960s 
FIAT ran a sort of advertising campaign in the South to 
entice workers to Turin with talk of high wages, company 
houses, and many other benefits. The Southerners - the 
Meridionali- began to arrive en masse, to Join earlier 
immigrants from the South and the Veneto who had been 
involved in building the great Mirafiori plant. 
Forms of racism against the Meridional!, who were 
largely from a poor peasant background, were and still 
are fair 1 y common in the North. The I ower manager i a I 
ranks played on this to create tension and competition 
between the Pi edmontese and Southern workers. Par 1 anti 
recalls: 
"The foremen had managed to create hatred between 
Pi edmon tese and Southerners. When work was over in 
the evenings you used to see the Piedmontese talking 
to their foreman, but there was never a Southerner 
there. In those days they counted on this hatred to 
get production figures up. /Tarrun/ (15) the 
Piedmontese would say which infuriated the 
Southerners who/ d then push up production to show 
they were better workers. In those days there was 
stil 1 that terrible concept of North and South, the 
hatred between us, and very few people realized that 
the division had been created on purpose by the 
employers" < 16). 
In this period there wasn/t even one Southern fore-
man the Southerners were treated as pure machine 
fodder with abso I u te I y no chance of promotion. However 
it was often this most il 1-used section of the workforce 
which sparked off moments of rebel 1 ion on the shop 
floor; but more of that later. 
The H l erarchy and Favouring. Rae ism was not the on I y 
tool used by management to pit worker against worker, 
hence increasing production and decreasing the chance of 
organized rebel lion. By hinting at better pay or 
workposts or more overtime in return for /cooperation/ 
some workers in a team could be persuaded to work 
harder, creating pressure for a rising production target 
for the whole team. Usually the men who most needed the 
money and most feared unemployment were picked; men with 
large families to support. Higher management encouraged 
such discriminatory policies, giving the foremen a free 
hand in the sharing out of bonuses and overtime, and 
sometimes providing a special fund to finance favouring. 
A formal hierarchy was also used both to control 
the workforce by brute force and to tempt it to greater 
efforts with the chance of promotion. There was a 
multiple grading of workers into many different levels, 
from the fuorl 1 inea <men who were 'off the I ine', 
multi-ski I led and able to substitute where needed) up to 
the capo reparto or departmental foreman. The different 
grades carried with them different levels of prestige, 
pay, responsibility and control. This hierarchy also 
worked magnificent I y as a 'spy network/ ; workers who 
/to I d/ on mi I i tan ts and union sympathizers were of ten 
rewarded with a move up the hierarchy. 
In the early post-Liberation years the workers at 
FIAT and all over the industrial triangle had fought 
desperate I y against the reintroduction of wage differ-
entials and incentive schemes. The struggle was lost 
1 arge 1 y because of the PCI / s preoccupation with 
industrial reconstruction before al 1 else <they made 
great use of Lenin/s writings on Taylorism to back up 
their arguments). Management thus had a clear road to 
use a variety of such schemes to encourage even faster 
work rhythms and create further divisions on the shop 
floor. 
The Purge on Politics. Management went to great lengths 
in this period to keep political and union material out 
of the factory, and if possible out of workers/ hands 
completely. In his diary of his days as a member of the 
CI at RIV <a FIAT subsidiary in Turin), Accornero talks 
of the struggles over the pinning up of L/Unita <the PCI 
paper): 
"At Grossa torneria L'Unita with an article on 
yesterday's strike was taken down by the foreman 
accompanied by two guards. In maintenance the paper 
was taken down by another guard, who was whistied as 
he took it away. Another copy was stuck up in the 
department. After a wh i I e the same guard came back 
but he couldn/t find the f-laper there in its usual 
place; he walked round a bit and then gave up. It 
had been stuck to a pi !Jar this time" <17). 
Accornero later recal Is how the vigilance of the foremen 
eventually meant the workers had to resort to writing up 
information on the wal Is in chalk. 
Parlanti talks of later on in the /50s, when things 
had tightened up stil 1 further: 
"The guard used to come and 1 ook in your I ocker, 
even, to see what you kept in it, if you had a 
newspaper, if you maybe had L/Unita ... but in fact 
nobody read. It was absolutely forbidden. If a 
worker brought in a comic, say Mickey Mouse, he was 
sacked straight off. It wasn/t a question of Mickey 
Mouse, but that you could one day go on to bring in 
maybe a pamphlet or a bu I 1 et in, or the paper ... they 
struck straight away so as not all ow a politi-
cization of the workers" <18). 
Election-time Harassment. FIAT/s fear tactics made it 
increasingly difficult to compile the lists of 300-odd 
names <of candidates, scrut in i zers and members of the 
electoral committee> necessary to present FIOM 
candidates in election to the CI. The election became an 
annual confrontation. As repressive and punitive 
measures hot ted up, so fewer workers were w i I 1 i ng to 
/ sl gn up for the sack/ - and those commit ted few who 
did, did not usually survive to sign again the following 
year. Even once the lists had been presented harassment 
continued: foremen would talk to individual workers 
promising promotion and favoured treatment to men with 
the /right/ political attitudes. /Good/ electoral 
behaviour was rewarded with a bonus for the department 
and /bad/ behaviour with sackings and transferals. 
Harassment extended outside the factory gates too. Wives 
and families of FIAT workers would receive visits or 
letters from management listing the evils of communism 
and the union and painting pitiful pictures of the life 
of the unemployed. 
/Soft/ Control. The Vallettian management of the 1950s 
did not, however, only use crude and repressive methods 
to control and mould the workforce. Whi 1st they were 
tightening the screws they were also creating a sort of 
FIAT hegemony in Turin, reaching into al 1 corners of the 
workers/ private lives. Propaganda about the privileged 
position of the FIAT worker was, to a certain extent, 
true. FIAT wages were considerably higher than those of 
other companies <a FIAT worker could expect from 85,000 
to 90,000 Lire as opposed to 45,000 to 60,000 in other 
factories in the engineering sector>. Side benefits, 
too, were enormous. FIAT workers/ families could 
<sometimes> live in FIAT houses, their children could be 
educated in FIAT schools and have their holidays in FIAT 
/colonies/ in the countryside; sick FIAT workers could 
be treated under the FIAT mutua scheme <a form of health 
insurance>; whi 1st healthy FIAT workers could keep 
themselves fit using FIAT sporting facilities. FIAT even 
bought its own newspaper <La Stampa) and its own 
footbal 1 team <Juventus). 
The combined effects of all the above methods of 
control were, not surprisingly, very effective. FIOM 
lost its maJority in 1955, as the voting figures in the 
following table <19) show: 
FIOM 
FIM 
UILM 
1954 
32885 <63.2%) 
13175 <25.4%) 
5889 (11.3%) 
1955 
18937 <25.4%) 
20910 ( 40. 5%) 
11628 <28.5%) 
After this defeat the CI lost virtually all independent 
character, functioning a 1 most as a body of 1 ower mana-
gement. The destruction of working class trade unionism 
at FIAT was utilized in three ways by management: 1) to 
increase profits by speeding up work rhythms to the 
physical I imit; 2> to introduce new labour-saving tech-
no logy with a free hand to experiment and to discover 
how to use it most profitably; 3) to introduce a new 
sort of labour force of /virgin/ young workers from the 
South, men who were unsk i 1 1 ed and who, at least 
initially, accepted the killing rhythms for the sake of 
higher wages and because of their 1 ack of industria 1 
experience. 
The first point is self-explanatory. As to the se-
cond in the early 1950s the ignorance and under-
estimation of the new machinery and work methods by the 
trade union organizations at FIAT much simplified their 
introduction in the early stages. And as awareness grew, 
the union was simultaneously losing power. FIAT's 
technique was systematical l y to se 1 ec t workers <on the 
basis of lack of militancy and work speed) for a long 
'experimental' phase on new equipment, a period of time 
which was never determined in advance. During this phase 
the optimum rhythms, production, labour complements and 
ski l I grading would be determined. 
Even when these had been worked out FIAT was un-
willing to disclose them. If the worker is in the dark 
about such things he may be more easily /persuaded' to 
produce more, by the simple technique of speeding up the 
line or taking a man off. In fact during the 1950s and 
1960s workers could only have access to information 
about manning and timing through a long and complicated 
process; initial I y a demand had to be put through to 
management from a worker on the Job in question, then 
this demand wou 1 d be discussed with the foreman. On 1 y 
after this could the CI be called in to support the 
worker. For most of the workers this procedure was too 
intimidating to face on their own, and anyway might 
single them out for /special attention/. The workers, to 
some extent, developed informal and spontaneous weapons 
to defend themselves against the new technology. Once 
again Parlanti recal Is: 
"In fact a comrade, a Southerner, I st i 11 remember 
it , drew a 1 i ne on the ground with a screwdriver 
(the f 1 oor of the 1 i ne was of beaten earth, that 
dark, b 1 ack, earth>. Neither the foreman nor the 
charge-hand, no one, understood what that line was. 
But it was a really strong weapon for the workers ... 
When the lines go fast, effectively the worker loses 
his sense of time and he does all the various 
operations more quickly than normal. You can/t even 
look at your watch, they could even sack you, they 
thought you were doing it intentionally so you could 
screw up the timing. The only way you could work out 
whether you were going faster than normal or not was 
by comparing the distance you trave I 1 ed up on the 
line. And that was what that line on the ground was 
used for. While he worked, the worker would keep an 
eye on this line, and when he arrived at it he got 
off the assembly line ... " <20). 
However, such span taneous rebe 11 ion was of ten eas i 1 y 
broken. Parlanti concludes the incident: "But then what 
happened? After a wh i 1 e they moved everyone around ... 
and put creeps in our places. They were afraid of the 
principle of organization which had been created". 
Accornero < 21) a 1 so demonstrates the fai I ure of 
workers/ organizations to filter and to some extent 
control the introduction of the technology, even in the 
days before the total rout of the FIOM <his diary refers 
to 1953>. In this diary he makes frequent reference to a 
struggle going on in Fuclnatura (forging plant>, where 
the men were demanding a bonus, the paga di posto (a pay 
increment for work in unhealthy or especially tiring 
posts>, as new machinery had worsened conditions in the 
department, increasing heat and fumes. Accornero first 
mentions the struggle in February 1953, remarking that 
the agitation had reduced production from 40,000 to 
25,000 piston rings per day. Throughout February there 
were several brief strikes in fucinatura, a committee of 
agitation was formed and a /chequerboard/ strike called 
the first shift struck on Monday, the second on 
Tuesday and so on for a week. <In Ita I y a fu II with-
drawal of labour was, and sti 11 is, impracticable, given 
the almost total lack of strike pay). In the last months 
of the struggle FIAT employed the tactic of fines, 
suspensions and warnings to the men involved. The 
workers were finally forced to accept management/s 
meagre of fer. The struggles had, however, cost FIAT a 
great deal in terms of lost production; they had won in 
the end, but in this period the FIOM and the CI were 
sti 1 i able to cost them time and money. 
The introduction of the new machinery was not, how-
ever, FIAT/s only preoccupation; the workforce also had 
to be adapted to the techno 1 ogy of the /new era,. . In 
other words management had to carry out a massive 
selection and deformation of its workforce in order to 
create the sort of mobile, flexible and unski 1 led labour 
force it needed to exploit the new machinery to the 
maximum. It also needed a primarily youthful workforce, 
preferab I y in their first jobs, young men who wou 1 d 
accept the monotony of the new /parcelized/ labour 
process more eas i 1 y than the o 1 der, ski 1 1 ed sections. 
Here then, we come to the third way mentioned above by 
which management sought to uti! ize the destruction of 
working class unionism. 
After the war the FIAT labour force was mostly com-
posed of older skilled men, and the labour process was 
st i 1 I I arge 1 y based on their know! edge, experience and 
skill. The war and the Resistance had contributed to 
this imba 1 ance by reducing the supp 1 y of young men to 
replace them. From 1949 the phase of rationalization, 
begun at Mirafiori, brought the first signs of a 
reorganization of work and it became necessary to phase 
out the ski I 1 ed sector. This process was anyway very 
welcome to FIAT as the older men also tended to be more 
politically conscious in that period- they were a sort 
of I abour aristocracy, i nvo 1 ved po 1 it i ca 1 1 y as we 11 as 
physically in the labour process. Many of them had been 
involved in the Resistance and earlier anti-fascist 
struggles and in the post-Liberation ,occupations, when 
the newly liberated factories were in many cases run on 
democratic principles through workers, councils. 
Valletta/s management used the powerful weapon of 
what Alquatl <22) cal Is ,internal sackings, (transferals 
and enforced mobility> to move the skilled worker off 
the line, and also reduce his political effect. Enforced 
,voluntary, early retirement, and of course the sack 
when an excuse could be found, were also used to 
liberate the factory of skilled workers and create a new 
labour force suited to the new mechanization and 
division of labour. 
Management began with the importation of 7,800 wor-
kers from auxiliary sectors and the expulsion of 2,000 
older or unwell workers through voluntary retirement. A 
huge de-ski! ling and demoting process followed, beginn-
ing with the reclassification of the majority of workers 
into the third category, a grade covering unskilled 
labour. The same package brought in a three-shift system 
to ensure twenty-four-hour-a- day exploitation. The 
whole process of de-ranking and the introduction of the 
shift system was sold to the workforce at the price of 
the reduction of the working week Cto forty-five hours 
for first and second shift workers and forty-two hours 
for night shift workers) at wage parity. 
The process of /weeding out/ of older skilled men 
was carried on through the 1950s as the sackings hit 
hard at the more politicized and militant workers. A 
survey pub! ished by Deaglio <23> is very interesting on 
this point. This enquiry was carried out in 1959 among 
sacked FIAT workers and was aimed at finding out who was 
the /vanguard/ in that period. The /typical/ sacked 
worker turned out to be a first category <skilled> man 
who had a long work experience at FIAT and had a history 
of politicization usually dating back to 1943-45. He was 
usually a member of the PCI and/or FIOM. In fact 80 per 
cent of the men in the survey had these characteristics. 
Out of 79 sacked workers, 79 were FIOM members and 74 
were PCI members. Only 16 were taken on the labour force 
after the war. 
Thus during the 1950s the composition of the labour 
force at FIAT was changed radi ca 11 y to suit the new 
technology, and contain militancy. With mechanization 
and early forms of automation the labour process became 
/parcelized/; small elements of the whole product 
produced monotonous I y and 1 a ter, equa I 1 y monotonous 1 y, 
aggregated into the whole. The skilled and politicized 
men became obso 1 ete. FIAT needed a 1 abour force which 
would accept the monotony and which had no experience of 
organizing to fight for better conditions and pay. The 
ski lied men, the communists and mi 1 itants, who were 
ironically the very people who had pushed for discipline 
and factory order in the early post-war years before the 
col lapse of communist participation in government; were 
pushed out of the mainstream of the productive process, 
transferred to isolated work posts, put to sweeping 
floors, sent to the /quarantine/ departments, forced 
into early retirement, or simply sacked. 
But even the new young workers with 1 ittle previous 
work experience to compare with FIAT and no frustrated 
pride and ski 11 in work, and who had been enticed to 
Turin by the news of high FIAT wages, housing and 
privileges, had their breaking point. FIAT had not, in 
fact, been able to provide in time an adequate super-
structure of houses and amenities; and the higher wages 
didn/t go far with the higher prices of the North and 
the added expenses of laundering and catering that young 
unmarried immigrants had to face. Gruelling conditions 
and heavy factory discipline were coupled with squalid 
living conditions. Parlanti again: 
"But the Southerners, especially, weren't really 
used to discipline 1 ike the Northerners with their 
school education. They were much more expansive, 
they talk among themselves, sometimes they didn"t 
give a shit ... they didn't understand anything- but 
precise 1 y because they didn't understand the ru 1 es 
of FIAT, it was really they who began mass 
discussions, who began to break discipline ... So I 
think it was rea 1 I y the Southerners at FIAT with 
their 'bad manners' . . . who started to discuss the 
problems" C24>. 
The young Southerners with their /bad manners/ and 
1 itt1e education to habituate them to the boredom, 
routine and discipline of factory I ife- these were the 
peop 1 e who started the movement of strikes and 
agitations in the industrial triangle in the early 
1960s. The workers of FIAT, the most powerfu 1 and the 
1 argest sector in the industria I tr l angle, wou I d not, 
however, join the sruggle until 1962; the /rabbits/ of 
FIAT had to be practically forced out on to the streets 
by the other Tur i nese workers, who had recognized how 
crucial the FIAT men were to their fight. The chronicles 
of the journal Quaderni Rossi <25) describe how, on 19th 
June 1962, FIAT workers crossed a deserted, strike-bound 
Turin on the empty trams to go to work, running a 
gauntlet of insults, bits of old bread and coins, flung 
at them by striking workers from other sectors. The FIAT 
factories were besieged by other workers trying to prod 
this /mass of molluscs" into action. But it was not 
unti I a general strike on 7th July <called as part of 
the actions centred around the renewal of contracts for 
the major sectors> that the car workers, after a "cease 
fire/ which had 1 as ted nearly nine years, entered the 
struggle with a vengeance. 
After so many years of repression, years in which 
the instinct to fight back was crippled by the 
detachment of the union leadership from the "new" rank 
and file, the struggle was almost bound to be violent. 
On the third day of strikes and picketing, the UIL 
signed a separate and wholly unsatisfactory agreement 
with management. It was the I ast straw. Workers" de-
monstrations in Turin that day turned into riots, and 
police were called in from outside to put down the 
revolt with baton charges. Symbolically, it was the UIL 
HQ in Piazza Statuto that came in for most of the 
violence. And the riots of Piazza Statuto were the first 
sign of an energetic mass rejection of the old-style 
unionism I ed by a 1 abour aristocracy which had 1 ost 
contact with the rank and file of young unskilled 
workers. 
The period of /democratization/ and the opening of 
the organization to the shop f 1 oor had, however, on 1 y 
just begun; Piazza Statuto was just the first step in 
the destruction of the legacy of post-war unionism and 
the ere at ion of a weapon more sui ted to the changed 
battle-ground. Commitment to a new form of organization 
was growing, but the working class at FIAT and all over 
Italy remained relatively weak in its confrontations 
with management right up to the great international 
cycle of struggles of 1968-69. 
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CHAPTER III 
CARDBOARD SUITCASES: 
SOUTHERN IMMIGRATION IN THE 1960s 
By the late 1950s, the period of post war construc-
tion in Italy had finished, and a period of expansion in 
the favourable market conditions of the 1960s could 
begin. 
Increasing wages in the industrialized countries 
and the tendency to spend an increasing part of them on 
durable consumer goods were the basis for the strong 
development of car production international Jy in the 
1960s. As can be seen from the following table, car 
ownership, from being almost a rarity in the early 
1950s, had by the 1970s become a common place. 
Particularly in Italy, where the combination of low 
wages and rapidly increasing productivity had allowed an 
enormous drop in the relative price of cars, car 
ownership boomed: 
Table I: World trends in car ownership from 1950 to 1970. 
N" of vehicles per 1000 population 
N. America 
W. Europe 
France 
Germany 
Italy 
U.K. 
Japan 
S. Africa 
World Total 
1950 
226 
18 
37 
11 
6 
43 
0 
34 
24 
1960 
320 
320 
58 
73 
73 
98 
3 
55 
41 
1970 
414 
414 
155 
216 
216 
210 
68 
77 
65 
Source: Code 'perspectives a long terme de l'in<i.lstrie autaaobile dans le monde' 
3.2.79. 
Throughout the 1960s, then, production figures for 
car manufacturers rose steadily: 
Table II: World trends in automobile prduction in 
compared to 1953 <in thousands of vehicles> 
N. America 
W. Europe 
World Total 
1 953 1 960 1962 1 964 1 966 
6,477 7,001 7,358 8,313 9,300 
1,514 5,048 5,770 7,218 7,941 
8 ' 130 12 , 81 0 1 4 , 11 0 1 7 , 0 70 1 9 ' 220 
Soorce: UHO 'Statistical Yearbook' 1969 and 1979 
the 1960s 
1968 
9,789 
8 653 
21:890 
Within the general context of expansion, Italy's 
FIAT was also doing well. The 'economic miracle' of the 
I ate 50s to mid 60s was under way,· with FIAT, the 
largest private industry in Italy, leading the way. In 
fact the motor vehicle sector produced one of the 
highest annual growth rates in Italy ln this period, 
rising from 10.8% for 1953 - 1958 to 24.3% for 1958 to 
1963 (1). 
The economic miracle in Italy was the fruit not 
only of the general tendency to expansion in the deve-
loped countries, but of some particular home advantages. 
First among these was the relatively low cost of labour 
and the abundant supply of 'green' labour in the largely 
agrarian South. 
It was in this favourable context, then, that FIAT 
set about its strategy of consolidating its position at 
home and prepar 1 ng i tse 1 f for the a I ready predi ctab 1 e 
increasing competition in the car sector. 
The profits gained in the years of industrial peace 
guaranteed by repression in the factories were ploughed 
back in the form of new production plants overseas <2> 
and new technology at home. It also, like its counter-
parts inside and outside Europe, accelerated the process 
of vertical integration (buying or setting up plants 
producing the necessary semi -worked rna ter i a Is and com-
ponents and thus benefitting from the elimination of the 
added value costs of these materials, ensuring supplies 
and improving economies of scale> and concentration 
<buying Lancia and a control 1 ing interest in Ferrarri). 
But despite this picture of he a I thy growth and a 
rosy future at home and abroad, FIAT was building up 
serious problems which would eventually rebound against 
i t . 
Italy in the 1960s was characterized, as it still 
is, by a strongly uneven development. In general its 
economic deve 1 opmen t was backward, st i 1 1 1 arge 1 y based 
on an agrarian and peasant economy, particularly in the 
South. However, it held within it pockets of extremely 
advanced capitalist development epitomized by such 
companies as FIAT, Olivetti etc. in the Northern indus-
trial triangle. The 1960s were, 
change in Italy. This was a 
in fact, years of great 
period of rapid moder-
n i za t ion of the industria 1 structure, and a consequent 
increased concentration of the working class in the 
industria 1 centres of the North: over these years the 
agricultural population dropped from 40 to 25.5% of the 
popu I at ion as a who 1 e ( 3 > producing, as we w i 1 1 see 
later, enormous pressures on housing and services in the 
cities. At the same time, nearly ful 1 employment and the 
resultant improved affluence <despite relatively low 
wages> had brought with them expectations of change. The 
working class, previously held in check by heavy 
repression in the factories backed up with the fear of 
the sack, began to rebel. 
After their great defeat in the factories in the 
mid /50s, the trade unions began a phase of /self cri-
ticism/. They recognized, at least in part, the problems 
inherent in their centralized structure and bargaining 
procedures and began to push for local negotiations 
between the signing of the three year inter-federation 
contracts. 
Various major strikes and struggles began to appear 
in 1960, for examp I e in the cot ton mi I 1 s of the Susa 
valley and in the electro-mechanical goods sector. The 
textile workers in particular won significant wage 
increases and, perhaps most important of all, a clause 
retracting all punitive and disciplinary measures taken 
by the employers during the strike. Throughout the early 
1960s the warning signs increased. In 1960, 29,498,000 
hours of work were lost through strikes; in 1961, 
42,840,000 and in 1962, 126,723,000. Most significant of 
alI were the new sorts of struggle which began to 
emerge, for example during the struggle at Lancia in 
1962, prefiguring the form of the unofficial or /wild 
cat/ actions typical of the 1968-69 cycle. 
The struggles at FIAT broke out slightly later; this 
was probably due not only to the greater repression wi-
thin its plants in the 1950s, but also to its policy of 
exhausting the labour market in the more /passive/ rural 
areas of Piedmont before turning to the Southerners, 
with their more violent and anarchoid origins. However, 
when the first major outbreak came in 1963 it climaxed 
in the scenes of unparalleled violence in the "riots of 
Piazza Statuto" reported in the previous chapter, 
The struggles of the early 1960s, and the later cy-
cles climaxing in 1969 were fundamentally due to 
capital/s failure to adapt its strategy for labour to 
the new conditions in the more advanced sectors, where 
thousands of workers were collected together under one 
roof, performing in series endlessly repetitive tasks. 
Wh i I st in the rest of Europe the vu 1 nerabi 1 i ty of the 
new productive system was recognized and soc i a 1 peace 
was bought with high wages and general social reformism, 
in Italy there was a persistence of cruder techniques of 
social control, more suitable to a bygone age of small 
and medium sized factories run on paternalistic and 
repressive lines. 
While profits visibly increased, lines were moder-
nized and the speed up bit in, wages were held at the 
breadline or below. According to an !stat estimate made 
in 1965, the average necessary living wage for a 
workers" family was 100,000 Lire a month; but in an 
enquiry set up by the Minister for Labour, Brodolini, 
the average take home wage turned out to be a mere 
70,000 a month (4). 
While the organization of work changed, the lines 
becoming i ncreasi ngl y comp 1 ex and interdependent, the 
o 1 d repressive methods of foremen, disci p l 1 nary codes 
and the premlo di collaborazione <collaboration bonus) 
continued to be used to get out production. Strong dis-
crimination against political and trade union activists 
continued in a period when rising expectations were 
bringing about a rebirth of generalized discussion and 
debate in the working class, 
Thus the rapid development at FIAT - as in other 
industries - left management behind the times; unable or 
unwi II ing to contain the new contradictions, caused by 
the massive concentration of the working class and the 
general deski 1 I ing of the work force, through pro-
gressive measures designed to channel the growing unrest 
in formal negotiating procedures. Reformist goverment 
policies and the concession of trade union rights might 
have provided the safety valve which would have reduced 
the pressure and avoided the explosion of 1969. But FIAT 
appeared to know only one way of getting out production: 
threats, blandishments and the inherited high-handedness 
of the padrone. 
Great Expectations: 
The Opening to the Left 
And yet, the problem was in part understood by the 
more advanced sectors of capital, including FIAT itself. 
Averted by the working class struggles of the early 
1960s, Agne 1 1 i and other "en 1 i gh tened" industria 1 i sts 
supported the "opening to the left" 
governments through the 1960s. 
in successive 
In 1962 the National Congress of the Christian De-
mocrats <DC> gave official consent to the idea of the 
Centre Left government, in which the Socialist Party 
<PSI> would participate, and in autumn 1963 the PSI 
entered the cabinet for the first time since the failure 
of the post war tri-partite government. A series of 
limited reforms were proposed, principal among which 
were plans for the development of the South through 
agrarian reform and increased investments, a programme 
for the nationalization of the electricity industry, 
educational reforms, railway development, an increase in 
minimum pensions and a fund to enable peasants to buy 
land. Some elements of the Christian Democrat government 
were by now furthermore calling for a more enlightened 
attitude towards the trade union movement with the 
recognition by Con f industria of certain basic trade 
union rights. In this, they were fu 1 1 y supported by 
advanced sectors of capita 1 , first of a 1 1 FIAT itself. 
In an interview with II Messaggero in June 1962, 
Val !etta, Managing Director of FIAT, commented: 
"The Centre Left government is a fruit of the 
development of our times. We cannot and must not try 
to turn the clock back ... It/s my impression, 
furthermore, that very soon groups within the 
employers/ organization wi 11 put pressure on those 
responsible for the policy of Confindustrla for the 
abolition of certain too rigid positions of 
principle" <5>. 
But Valletta was to be disappointed. The develop-
ment of reforms in Italy - or even of a form of benign 
conservatism - was hampered by the continued presence of 
backward /clients/ - or powerful constituents backing 
particular politicians- and there were many people that 
had more to lose than to gain from the attempt to defuse 
the growing labour tensions through the concession of 
wide reforms. Nationalization appeared, of course, as a 
profound threat to the private electrical monopolies; 
small industries would experience great problems keeping 
up with larger sectors if wages were to rise generally; 
the voices of agricultural capital were raised against 
the idea of providing loans enabling the peasants to buy 
land and so on. 
In the meantime, problems for the Italian economy 
were increasing. 
The workers/ struggles of the early 1960s had for-
ced considerable wage rises in many sectors of industry. 
Wage rises gained in 1962-63 added 25-30% to the cost of 
labour (6). The credit squeeze, begun in 1962, partially 
in response to this, resulted in 1964 in a fall in in-
vestments of 20.1%, the first fall since the beginning 
of the /economic miracle/ as investments had been rising 
by an average of 13.2% annually since 1959 <7>. The 
recession and the threat of unemp 1 oymen t added to the 
fears of conservative and moderate elements in the 
Christian Democrat government. 
When the moderate minister Pieraccini drew up a 5 
year plan for industrial development including plans for 
the nationalization of industry, increased state 
intervention, the elimination of backward forms of 
agricultural production etc., conservative forces within 
the government rebelled. In 1966 the government was 
forced to resign, and it was replaced by a far more 
rigid and conservative one. 
The growing /insubordination/ of the working class 
throughout Northern Italy in the early 1960s had in part 
been diverted and contained by the i 1 1 us ion of change 
promised by the Centre Left government. Now even that 
illusion had disappeared. But in the meantime, the 
immigrants from the South were sti l l pouring in to the 
Northern cities in search of a fortune. 
Let us turn to take a look at the growing contra-
dictions in the specific case of a city: Turin, and a 
factory: FIAT. 
Immigration and Conditions in the City 
FIAT, then, like other companies in North Italy, 
was hungry for workers to turn out the goods to satisfy 
the expanding market for durable goods. And 1 ike other 
companies it carried on a recruitment drive in the 
South, where the backward, largely agrarian economy 
formed a bottomless pool of labour into which Northern 
capital could dip. 
The sons of the impoverished peasant families of 
the South, of ten accompanied by their wives and chi 1-
dren, were drawn to the North in search of the high 
wages and city 1 ife promised by the company~s recruiting 
agents in Sicily, Calabria, Puglia and Abruzzo, to be 
met by worsening conditions in the big cities, where the 
infrastructures of housing and services were tota 11 y 
inadequate to meet the new needs being created by the 
population boom. The Financial Times summed up the 
dimensions of the problem in 1969: 
"Internal migration in Italy has leaped to pheno-
menal proportions as the poorer citizens of the 
South have travelled to the rich, industrial cities 
of the North. In the past 15 years, 450,000 from 
Sicily, 400,000 from Calabria and 400,000 from 
Puglia have been estimated to have made the treck 
northwards. 6 m i 1 I ion have made the Journey s i nee 
the war and in recent weeks a new wave of in terna 1 
migrants has created a sense of al !arm in Turin and 
Milan where vast slum areas are being created" <8>. 
Some more figures help to give an idea of the di-
mensions of the migration which turned Turin into the 
city with the highest concentration of workers in 
Europe, paralysing basic services and thrusting up ugly 
shanty towns and ghettoes. 
In 1968, 121,000 people immigrated to the North of 
Italy. They were followed in 1969 by 121,024 and in 1970 
by 121,508 <9>. Immigrants to Turin itself numbered 
2,627 in 1965; 10,328 in 1967 and 20,000 in the first 8 
months of 1968 <10>. 
The waves of immigrants to the North caused an 
enormous upward pressure on population, wel 1 above their 
abso I u te numbers, because of the resu I tant changes in 
the age structure: the immigrants were predominantly 
young and the birth rate rose sharp 1 y. By 1968 the 
population of Turin had increased from 719,300 in 1951 
to 1,145,250; an increase of 59.2% in less than 15 years 
( 1 1) • 
The population increase and the problems it caused 
were most severe in the suburban /belts/ around Turin, 
as the scare it y of non- I uxury accommodation and rising 
rents in the inner city forced the new arrivals into the 
expanding ghettoes outside the centres, far from the 
social infrastructure of schools, shops, hospitals etc. 
In fact, while the population growth between 1961 and 
1968 was 7.50% for the whole of Italy and 10.50 and 10% 
for Piedmont and Turin respectively, the population 
increase in the counc i 1 s of the /second be It/ around 
Turin was 33%, and in the /first be It/ it reached 67% 
( 12). 
The following table gives the absolute and percen-
tage population increases for the local authority areas 
making up these /be 1 ts/ around Turin between 1961 and 
1967. 
Tab l e I I I <13 > 
LOCAL COUNCIL 
BEINASCO 
NICHELINO 
GRUGLIASCO 
RIVOLI 
SETTIMO 
COLLEGNO 
1961 
5,511 
14,907 
13,664 
20,253 
18,292 
21,282 
1967 % INCREASE 
12,946 134.9 
36,186 142.7 
29,202 113.7 
36,381 79.6 
34,040 86.0 
33,936 59.4 
Virtually nothing was done to improve housing and 
services to meet the needs of the inhabitants of the new 
ghettoes. 
FIAT was the major factor behind the population ex-
pansion: although new workers at FIAT directly accounted 
for a re 1 at i ve 1 y sma 11 proportion of the increase, to 
this we must add not only the wives and the children of 
the workers- according to the council statistics every 
new worker in Turin brought with him another 3 persons 
< 14 > - but a 1 so a 1 1 the new workers in a 1 1 the pro-
ductive cycles induced by FIAT and their wives and 
children. But FIAT effectively washed its hands of the 
prob 1 em, c 1 aiming that the new workers being taken on 
were largely turn-over replacement. 
Public housing schemes, also, were entirely inade-
quate. The main government housing scheme, GESCAL 
<financed by a workers/ contribution of 0.6% of wages, 
which employers were called on to match) built a total 
of 390,000 flats in all Italy between 1949 and 1971. In 
Turin, GESCAL/s building programme of 652 flats in 1963 
was already absurdly inadequate. But by 1969 the annual 
programme had been improved only marginal Jy, to 772 
flats, for which 17,842 families were optimistic enough 
to app I y < 1 5 ) . 
" ... when the massive inflow of immigrants came from 
the South the on I y thing they found was a boss, a 
machinet a wage to be earned, a job to be done. 
That; s aIl . There were no houses, no hea 1 th ser-
vices, no schools, no nothing. There was no attempt 
to set up the facilities that would make it possible 
for these people to~ as well as work. So that, 
of course, the city exploded. You can/t have people 
working 8-10 hour shifts in the car factories and 
then sleeping rough in the railway stations at night 
without some kind of explosion" <16). 
The consequence of the combination of a sudden and 
severe population explosion and the failure to provide 
any new services and facilities are all too imaginable. 
Rents rocketed: in 1969 a family flat cost from 30 to 40 
thousand lire a month, while a room in a pensione in the 
city, shared with 5 others, would cost anything from 
15,000 lire a month. This while the average FIAT worker, 
with his 'privileged' wage, was earning around 100,000 
to 110, 000 l ire a month. 'Bed sharing' became a common 
solution: 
"In a penslone in Via Barbaroux the beds are rented 
out on the basis of work shifts; with three workers 
sleeping alternately on the same bed; one on the 6-2 
shift, a second who goes in to the factory as his 
flatmate leaves and a third who works the night 
sh i f t " < 1 7 ) . 
In theory, given wages of about 100,000 Lire per 
month for a 3rd category <unskilled) worker, rent 
accounted for about one third of wages; but in practice 
the situation was much worse. Few workers found it 
physically possible to earn a ful I month's wage. 
Absenteeism was running at about 12-13% in this period 
<against 5-6% in other industries> which means that most 
workers took about 3-4 days off a month. Thus although 
FIAT workers earned relatively higher wages than those 
in other industries, most of them found it very hard to 
cope financially. A FIAT worker talks about the problem 
he faced on arrival in Turin in 1969: 
"When we arrived in Turin my wife wasn't working and 
I was earning 135,000 Lire a month. It was a real 
drama trying to find a place to live we could afford 
on my wage: I found accommodation with one room, a 
kitchen and a bathroom at 25,000 Lire, and, with my 
money, we could only just manage to make ends meet; 
we didn't have any savings, I bought all our 
furniture second hand. . . As I cou 1 dn' t manage with 
Just one wage I 1 ooked for a second job. First I 
found part time work as a painter ... " ( 18). 
Another worker confirms this picture in an inter-
view with Luciana Castellina in 1969: 
"I get 100,000, but I just can/t work the whole 
month, so in reality I find about 80,000 Lire in my 
wage packet. At Grugl i asco, where I 1 i ve, I pay 
32,000 Lire rent for two rooms. I/ve had to get a 
moped because with public transport as it is ... it 
was alright 20 years ago. I/m 34, I work on the line 
in the 3rd category, I haven/t got a career, I can/t 
have chi 1 dren because I haven/ t got any money; I 
work to survive. If FIAT burnt down, what -wou 1 d I 
have to lose?" <19). 
And in fact for all of those who left their South-
ern smallholdings for the North with little other than 
their battered suitcases, their expectations of the high 
wages they had been promised - perhaps enough to buy a 
plot of land or help out with extra money those they had 
left behind - the story was the same. For mothers, wives 
and daughters exhausting work cooking and cleaning for 
the men; at tempting to make the best of what 1 itt 1 e 
living space the family could afford, and covering for 
the inadequate services, espec i a 11 y in hea 1 th and edu-
cation. For the men, physically and mentally exhausting 
work in the factories compensated with a wage which was 
barely adequate to meet the most basic of needs. What, 
indeed, did they have to lose? 
and in the Factory 
ln addition to the growing contradictions outside 
the factory, constituted by appal 1 ing conditions of 
housing and 
up in the 
services, 
factory in 
another contradiction was opening 
the form of rapidly worsening 
working conditions and relatively low wages in a period 
characterized by high profits, imperialist expansion and 
low unemployment. 
Italian employers, with FIAT in the lead, had begun 
to introduce Taylorian techniques of work organization 
in the 1930s, during the fascist regime. But it was not 
until the late 40s and early 50s that an extreme 
division of labour and highly mechanized plant became 
general throughout FIAT. In the 1950s, as we have seen, 
massive 1 nvestmen t l n machinery was coup I ed w l th the 
process of deskilling, and the older, more experienced 
workers were put to work on less skilled jobs or, 
particularly in the case of the more militant among 
them, sacked. At the same time a new generation of 
younger unsk i 1 1 ed workers began to be brought l n to 
operate the mechanized assembly lines. 
From the mid 50s the transition to automated pro-
cesses began. With the new automated I l nes producing 
smal I popular cars, such as the new 500 introduced in 
1958, costs per unit dropped, and the process of the 
/motorization/ of Italy began. 
But the price of cars for the people was paid in 
the factory. 
From the mid to the late 50s, then, FIAT had pur-
sued a policy of heavy investment in new automated lines 
and p 1 ant , But by about 1958-59 this process had been 
largely completed and FIAT was ready to begin a period 
of intensification of the use of the new plant. Pro-
ductivity took off sharply from the late 50s, reaching a 
high point in 1967, when the onset of the cycle of 
struggles 1968-69 led to its sharp decline. Increasing 
productivity from 1958 on cannot be explained, however, 
as it can for the preceding period, by massive increases 
in new technologies of automation. In fact, the ratio of 
fixed capital to worker remained very steady throughout 
the early sixties. 
To obtain this vast increase in production on the 
plant already existing FIAT pushed working speeds up to 
the maximum, and so called "porousity", those moments 
which workers snatch for themselves from the incessant 
rhythm of the machinery, was as far as possible eli-
minated. So strenuous was work inside FIAT that only 
young, strong workers were taken on. Luciano Par 1 anti 
talks about being taken on at FIAT in 1959: 
"It was difficult just to pass the health check: if 
you had anything, they didn"t take you on. They had 
to have healthy people if they wanted to exploit 
them really thoroughly" <20>. 
The workers now seemed powerless to resist the pace 
of the machinery, which a 1 most da i 1 y crept up. In May 
1967, workers on the 124 sports model line in shop 56 
Mirafiori produced 60 vehicles per shift. By June 1967, 
the same complement of workers was producing 112. 
Between 1965 and 1966 production at Villar Perosa had 
increased by 18.7%, while the number of workers employed 
there was reduced by 3.1% C21). 
Pauses and breaks, once an integra I part of the 
work, essential to think out the task in hand, were now 
dictated by management. The workers were governed by the 
machinery itself and by strict regulations, which were 
policed by eagle-eyed foremen. Parlanti again: 
"The discipline at FIAT was 1 ike this: once you had 
clocked on you started work, you had no contact with 
your workmates, you couldn/t talk in groups of more 
than three, you could only eat during the ten minute 
break. In those ten minutes you could eat and go to 
the toilet, but there were always huge queues at the 
toi 1 ets because they never gave you a rep 1 acement 
during working hours. They should have given you a 
replacement to go to the toilet but the foremen 
never gave you one, instead they to 1 d you to work 
harder to get ahead with the work so that they/ d 
give you maybe a quarter of an hour/s break instead 
of ten minutes. Some people pissed in the car bodies 
to save time and because they cou 1 dn / t ho 1 d it in 
any more. I had to piss in the car bodies a lot of 
times. Then the departmental foreman cal led us 
together to tell us that urine oxidized the car 
bodies and we shouldn/t urinate in them any more. So 
then we pissed into coca cola bottles" <22>. 
But apart from the increasing monotony, stress and 
alienation deriving from the speed up, the factory work-
er in this period was facing worsening health and safety 
conditions. Pressure was put on workers to work without 
basic safety pr-ecautions, operating machinery without 
safety guards etc. The machinery, squashed c 1 oser and 
closer together to save on that precious commodity 
space, produced increasing I eve Is of noise, fumes and 
vibrations. 
In this situation the workers/ only defence against 
the risk of damage to his or her own body posed by un-
guarded machinery, falling loads, flying sparks, noise, 
vibrations, toxic fumes, dust, heat, poor lighting, poor 
ventilation etc., is statutory regulation of the working 
environment. And of this in the 1960s in Italy, there 
was virtually none. The legislation that did exist was a 
legacy from the fascist period, and gave no definition 
of limits to damaging factors: it was helpfully decreed 
that, for example, machinery should be /opportunely 
spaced/ etc. Apart from regulations concerning minors, 
working hours and holidays, then, there was little or no 
preventive control of the working environment. 
Any approach to the question was almost entirely 
limited to the entitlement to monetary compensation for 
damage or injury already incurred. Thus if a worker was 
injured, incapacitated or ki !led by some work related 
factor or factors he or she could in some cases receive 
a monetary indemnity. These were anyway heavily re-
stricted by time limits and the obligation of clear 
proof of liability of the firm. 
Such proof was normally virtually impossible to 
provide, especial l y given the pressure on workers to 
work without safety precautions. For these reasons, in 
fact, statistics on industrial accidents do not reflect 
the real situation in the factory in this period. 
The callous attitude of management towards danger 
in the factory in this period is revealed in a comment 
made by a Turinese engineer, working for a medium size 
factory. When asked if it wou I dn / t be better to use a 
mechan i ca I hand for a part i cu 1 ar 1 y dangerous task he 
rep I i ed: "Yes, a mechan i ca 1 hand cou 1 d be substituted 
here for a human one, but if it got caught it"d break 
the machine" <23). 
But how were the workers made to work in these con-
ditions? Braverman has shown us how mechanization, auto-
mation and the division of labour is in itself a form of 
control, taking away from the workers the intrinsic 
cognitive element in work and hence their control over 
how a job is done. But as we sha 1 I see, mechanized 
series production, because of its rigidity, is in many 
ways more vulnerable to the collective or individual 
rebe 1 1 ion of the workers, as de I ay at one step in the 
process of assembly will result in cumulative confusion 
and delay at al 1 the succeeding steps. The imposition of 
a speed up of the 1 i ne is thus not enough a 1 one to 
ensure the cooperation of a self-confident labour force 
if the employers" political and social domination over 
the work force has weakened, as it had in Italy in the 
1960s. 
As we have seen, the employers were unable or un-
wi I ling to provide reformist solutions to their problems 
of political and social domination of the labour force, 
for example through an integration and cooptation of 
workers/ representatives. 
The control mechanisms FIAT employed in the 1960s 
were on the one hand the at tempt to cent i nue an open 
pol icy of repression of trade union and political forces 
within the factory, a strategy which had however become 
insufficient given the new climate of rebel I ion, and on 
the other the use of the variable part of wage to pri-
v i 1 ege /good/ conduct, to divide workers and to sow 
suspicion in their ranks. The worker was thus i ncen-
tivated to work first of alI by company discipline, and 
then by the promise of spec i a I payments, bonuses and 
promotion. 
The Wage and Skill Hierarchy 
The advantages to capital of bonuses and a hierar~ 
chi ca I grading system are c I ear. First I y, some of the 
dangers of an increasingly homogeneous working class 
concentrated in one work place, every day becoming more 
aware of the similarity of their situation and of their 
potential collective power, could be averted by creating 
false divisions, suspicions and rivalry. This concept is 
more vividly and simply summed up by Parlanti: 
"They used the grades to create 'sucking up'. 
In fact, when someone got the second category you 
didn/t say 'Oh, you've got the second category! How 
clever of you'. You called him a creep, because to 
get the second, he hadn't done a series of Jobs, 
he'd given a series of information to the foreman" 
(24). 
Secondly, and related to this, interminable indivi-
dua I controversies over grading cou I d disperse working 
class energy, redirecting mass struggles into individual 
ones, This has a secondary ef feet of strong! y bureau-
critizing the unions to cope with the disputes. 
In fact, wage calculation had become enormously 
complex. Lotta Continua claimed in the early i970s that 
there was only one comrade in the whole of Turin who was 
able to read the pay slips <25). This was not only 
because of the highly stratified grading system, but 
also because of the enormous importance of the variable 
element in wages, relating to production bonuses, danger 
compensation etc.: in fact, in the 1950s and 1960s only 
about 50% of pay was basic wage <26>. 
The enormous variation in wages, then, was a poli-
t i ca 1 weapon for the emp 1 oyers. It cou 1 d be used to 
punish the so called /destructive elements/, bribe the 
weaker the family men who needed every penny they 
could get - and encourage collaboration. Promotion up 
the grades, which was not automatic but required the 
production of the anachronistic capo 1 avoro or master-
piece <although this had become more or less symbolic), 
was used as a form of bribery, a prize for the /good/ 
worker. 
Thus, when the nearly full employment of the early 
1960s made the threat of the sack less effective; when 
the general political climate <with the Centre Left 
government and the rebirth of combative reformism in the 
trade union movement> wou 1 d no 1 onger permit a crude 
political domination, the wage and ski I I hierarchy could 
still provide FIAT with a point of leverage over its 
workers. 
But this weapon was under threat. As we shall 
the unsk i 1 1 ed workers brought in from the South 
see, 
in-
cceas i ngl y rejected the 1 ink between wages on the one 
hand and ski 1 1 • productivity and danger on the other. 
Throughout the 1960s the falsely scientific notions 
underlying the hierarchy were uncovered and the workers 
formulated demands aimed first and foremost at severing 
this connection. The young 
manners/ and their Jack 
immigrants, with their 
of industria I ski I 1 s 
experience, turned FIAT upside down. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE BLOCKED BRAINS OPEN UP: 
THE /HOT AUTUMN/ OF 1969 
Looking back on that explosion of anger and rebel-
1 ion climaxing in the "hot autumn" of 1969 it is 
difficult to arrive at a satisfactory description, let 
alone an analysis of the events; to distinguish fact 
from fiction, myth and prejudice in the heated debate 
among the various "camps" claiming vanguard status in 
the unravel ling of the events which were to change 
permanently the balance of power on the factory floor, 
providing that "kick in the teeth" as one manager was 
later to describe it (1) which forced the employers to 
re-think the entire organization of production in the 
factory. 
For reasons of clarity I have divided the analysis 
of the class sections and forces involved in the 
rebe 11 ion aga i nat cap 1 ta 1 in to three: the "offici a 1" 
labour movement; 
delegati and the 
the semi-official movement of the 
unofficial movement. It should of 
course be born in mind that the situation was confused 
and fluctuating: not all the various actors retained 
their roles throughout; not all of them even fell into 
one in the first place. 
The G~owth of Rebellion 
and the Official Labou~ Movement 
The union presence on the factory floor was by now 
at a low ebb. The official organizations were in fact 
more of ten than not pushed into dec 1 ar i ng industria 1 
action, rather than leading or determining the growing 
opposition in the factory. The Financial Times described 
the situation like this: 
" ... <the unions'> authority over their members has 
weakened very seriously. Six years ago unauthorized 
wild cat strikes were all but unthinkable, but are 
now an almost daily occurrence. 
The loss of authority of the unions is an ominous 
sign: in the last few months, in many caees, they 
have been ignored by their adherents. At tempts to 
recapture 1 oya 1 t y have driven the unions to I egi-
timize and justify, after the event. actions for 
which they would never have given permission and of 
which ln private the union leaders themselves have 
been highly critical. Management are often baffled 
and bewildered because they do not know who to argue 
and bargain with as the official union leaders admit 
they are not in control while they refuse to disown 
sudden claims and stoppages" <2>. 
Thus the official trade union movement was forced 
to a certain extent to radicalize. But they nevertheless 
fa l 1 ed to become a rea 1 theoret i ca 1 and organ i zat i ona 1 
point of reference for the great maJority of FIAT 
workers in this period. 
There were of course many factors which helped to 
determine the unions' weakness in the factory, but first 
of a 11 was the re 1 at i ve 'backwardness' of their theo-
retical positions and political practice in relation to 
other groups working in and around FIAT. Consciously or 
unconsciously the trade unions had seemingly accepted 
the basic capitalist premise that the exchange of labour 
power for wage is fair, and that the labour process is 
thus neutral, determined by scientific, technological 
and rational progress alone. The acceptance of this 
premise limited the unions" opposition to a re-
negotiation of the terms of this exchange wages, 
working hours, skill grades and so on. But the workers 
in 1969 were to launch a series of demands which, taken 
as a whole, called into question the /cormnon sense, 
notion that the labour process is neutral. In this 
situation the unions" politics and practice were simply 
less appropriate for many of the workers than were the 
ideas coming out of the students" movement and the 
radical groups which coagulated around the struggle in 
FIAT. 
The question thus becomes: why dl d the un i one in 
1968-69 not develop a more appropriate line? 
The genera 1 hi stor i ca 1 and structura I reasons be-
hind the development of an overcentralized and highly 
bureaucratic organizational form, insensitive to the 
changing needs and directions of the rank and file are 
treated elsewhere. But there were also some particular 
factors both reflecting and aggravating the weakness of 
the unions Inside FIAT. 
Firstly the unions at FIAT had not really recovered 
from the hammering they had received during the 1950s 
and early 1960s. As we have seen, the unions, and 
particularly the "class union" - the CGIL - had suffered 
a total defeat in the elections for the Commlselone 
Interna in 1953 <3>; and they had remained very weak at 
FIAT ever since, even in comparison to their generally 
weak pr-esence in other- companies in Ita I y. In 1969 the 
CGIL, the str-ongest union in terms of number-s, organized 
only 3000 wor-ker-s out of a total wor-kfor-ce of 140,000 
(4). This wor-ks out as less than 5%, against the 
national figur-e for- unionization in the engineer-ing 
industr-y of about 15%. At Mlrafiori, FIAT/s biggest 
plant, the Commissione Interna in 1969 numbered just 21 
members, who were supposed to protect the interests of 
56,000 workers. As well as this structural and numerical 
weakness, the older union cadres had inherited from the 
1 950s a cond i t ion i ng which had engendered a sort of 
natural caution in all their activities, which impeded 
in turn a qualitative and quantitative renaissance of 
the union movement in FIAT. 
There was a 1 so a cu 1 tura 1 reason for the unions/ 
failure in the late 60s to cr-eate a real r-appor-t with 
new, younger labour force and to shape and direct the 
growing frustrations of the wor-kers, especially the 
young Southern immigrants. 
The union federations were dominated by men fr-om 
Piedmont. The typical trade union cadre in the factory 
tended to be an older man with a long tr-adition of 
industrial work and struggle; many had been union 
mi I i tants in the factory during the resistance per-iod, 
more than 20 years before. But as we have seen, the 
composition of the labour:- force had changed enor-mously. 
Some 60% of FIAT workers were now immigrants from the 
South. They tended to be young, and lacking in any form 
of industrial experience: there cultur-e was that of the 
small agricultural village or town of the South. Most of 
them even spoke what was ef feet i ve I y another I anguage, 
as Southern dialects are often virtually unintelligible 
to the Northerner and vice versa. The political 
traditions of the Southern immigrants were furthermore 
entirely /foreign/ to the union cadres of the big 
factories of the North. As we sha I 1 see, the young 
Southerners were entire I y unused to the I anguage of 
negotiation employed by the unions with management. 
The unions, then, were numerically weak and psycho-
logically and culturally handicapped in the development 
of an immediate dialogue with the new, radicalizing 
working class at FIAT. 
The genera I weakness of the unions, and the wor-
kers/ diffidence towards them is illustrated by the 
following quotes, taken from the account by Domenico 
Norcia, a FIAT worker, of his first contacts with the 
union in 1969, on his return from Germany, where he had 
been an immigrant worker. 
"When I talked about union organization they told me 
that here in Italy the union wasn/t up to much; they 
didn/t put too much trust in it because there were 
people in the union who had /sold out/. I tried to 
explain to them that I believed we had to organize 
because if the union came into the factory certain 
problems could be resolved. They continued to 
demonstrate an enormous lack of faith in this 
argument right from those first days". 
Norcia goes on to talk about his first contact with 
the union in the factory: 
"One day I saw a group of workers talking animatedly 
with a person who was arguing more or less the same 
things I was arguing in my team. When the discussion 
calmed down I started talking with him; I told him I 
was working at FIAT, that I~'d Just arrived from 
Germany, and, seeing as he was saying similar things 
to me, I asked him /What do you have to do to Join 
the union?,. He looked at me, astonished and 
answered: ,.I,.ve been coming here for a month to talk 
about this with the workers, I"m from the union~'. 
This comrade ... was a full-timer, and now he tells 
me he was rea 1 I y surprised then, when I asked him 
that question, because there he was trying to get 
the workers to Join the union and then a worker 
asked him spontaneously" <5>. 
According to Luciano Parlanti, the Southerners not 
only did not see the unions as their organization, but 
actually seemed to treat them as a sort of Job bureau: 
"<The Southerners> still had a bit of a strange 
relationship with the workers~' organizations. I 
remember when the Commlsslone Interna went round the 
shop floors collecting subscriptions, the 
Southerners said: ,. Eh, I work too hard here, I" 1 1 
only pay the subscription if you find me a better 
Job~'. Everyone tries to use the Commlsslone Interna 
to get better conditions for themselves through 
~'recommendation,.. In fact those who took out a 
subscription, especially with the UIL- as the UIL 
was privileged by the employers in those days- were 
often given slightly lighter work. That~'s why the 
UIL won in 1960 in the elections for the Commlsslone 
Interna". 
Sti I I according to Pari anti, /recommendations/ were, 
however, about the only thing the workers/ organizations 
were able to provide in the factory: 
"But when I joined FIAT in 1959, I saw the blokes 
there working liked damned men, Christ, there was a 
vacuum, there was no one there to he I p them. When 
I'd been working there a year I st il 1 hadn / t seen 
the Commiseione Interna; you never saw a bulletin, 
you never saw anything ... " <6). 
But if the unions were unable to provide either the 
theoret i ca I weapons or organ 1 zat 1 ona 1 support for 
sustained struggle, which were the organizational nuclei 
in the late 1960s capable of collecting and distributing 
information and funds, developing debates and overseeing 
the day-to-day planning of the actions? Because of 
course such structures dl d ex 1st, a 1 though their re 1 a-
tive importance in the development of a theoretical base 
from which to draw up the demands and alternative 
strategies for their pursuit, as well as in the day-to-
day organization of the struggle, will inevitably remain 
at issue. 
The wave of anger and rebellion of the young shop 
floor workers in the late 1960s found an organizational 
and theoretical moment in two main areas: the delegati -
rough 1 y slmll ar to our shop stewards - and the assem-
bl lee and other contacts with the Students/ Movement and 
the extra-par! iamentary left in general. These /areas/ 
grew up in and with the struggles. 
I will argue that these two organizational moments 
had different, though overlapping and complementary 
roles to play in the development of the events of the 
/hot autumn". While the delegati and the conslgllone 
<the worker-delegate assemblies> were crucial in the 
dally defense of the workers inside the factory; in the 
organization of the slow down of work speeds as well as 
in the day-to-day organization and promotion of the 
struggle, the worker-student assemblies provided the 
forum for the discussion and development of a truly 
alternative line. 
The "delegati" 
The delegati were at first autonomous expressions 
of workers" self organization; neither part of an 
official workers" organization nor recognized by the 
company. Many of them were in fact union members, but 
they were not elected as representatives of one feder-
ation or another, and were frequently actually militant-
ly autonomous from the unions. This autonomy was 
expressed first of a 1 1 with their ref usa 1 to accept 
membership of a union as a valid label or guarantee of 
conduct. A reporter for La R 1 nasc ita wr i tee about a 
meeting of newly elected 1 ine delegates in June 1969: 
11 There are about 20 workers, most of whom had been 
elected as line delegati just a few days before, and 
three trade unionists, one from the FIOM and two 
from the FIM-CISL. When the draft for agreement on 
the delegati is brought up for discussion, there is 
no mention of the union affiliation of Paolo 
De 1 plano or Franco Sera£ 1 no. Nobody speaks in the 
name of their union or even bothers to mention it" 
( 7). 
The role of the delegati was first and foremost that 
of direct intervention on the organization of work in 
the factory; in the battle, that is, against the 
peremptory rhythms of the machinery. The delegati were 
needed, in fact, not so much to lead and direct the 
pol ltlcal development of the struggle as to find out the 
labour complements, timings, production targets and so 
on for each 1 ine or shop and use this information to 
improve working conditions and impose a real slow down 
of the lines: 
"The delegati were in fact born from the need to 
control the norms governing piece-rates. At FIAT, 
for example, they managed to impose a real slow down 
of production. They were also needed to control 
promotion arrangements, to impede the unilateral 
assignment of a category by management and break the 
discriminatory despotism of the company hierarchy .. 
( 8). 
However, the function of the delegati was from the 
first ambiguous, particularly in relation to their 
activities as workers" representatives in negotiations 
with management. The left groups, not completely without 
reason, viewed them with suspicion. It was held that the 
employers, given the absence of a coherent and authori-
j 
f 
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tative trade union organization, needed identifiable 
interlocutors from the shop floor who could be isolated 
in negotiations carried on behind closed doors. The 
following account of an incident in which management 
itself cal Jed for the proposal of representatives 
i I lustrates this point: 
"Monday 19th May. <The workers> strike for the whole 
of the first shift. For the first time they break 
through the barrier of the teams and the first 
all-shop assembly begins. A group of departmental 
foremen proposes talks with a delegation of workers, 
but the proposal falls. 
Thus it was management that called for the election 
of delegates. 
The assemb 1 y 
venlent for 
answered 
them if 
that 1 t wou 1 d be more 
management sent its 
con-
re-
presentatives to the workers" assemblies. This 
position was a workers" response to those who were 
proposing the e 1 ect ion of a shop f 1 cor de 1 egate: 
"the most po 1 it i ca 1 1 y consc 1 ous. the ab 1 est, most 
politicized worker on the shop floor". But 
classification is not a workers" forte. Nobody is 
more able than the boss in such matters" C9>. 
The suspicion was that the employers were hoping to 
persuade the workers back to more traditional and less 
damaging forms of struggle with the creation of 
delegati. It was hoped that the rebellious instincts of 
the young Southerners could be tamed by a renovation of 
the trade union movement based on the emergence of a new 
and more appropriate sort of representative: 
"Now, when the agreements were being negotiated in 
1969 ... the bosses wanted to put the working class, 
and particularly the new fringes of the working 
c I ass, back under the contra I of the unions. The 
main idea that they were bringing forward to do this 
was the idea of the line delegate. But the delegate 
system was completely rejected, because it had no 
material basis for existence in the struggle. It was 
something that had grown out of the Factory Council 
movement, out of the ideology of the skilled worker, 
control over the job etc. It had nothing to do with 
the traditions of a worker whose first feeling was 
to smash the machinery, and who would like to kill 
the boss if he could, the man who throws chunks of 
metal at the foreman ... the new kind of 'mass 
worker' who exists now in those factories" (10). 
In fact, although the delegati appeared as an in-
dependent response to a real need for a structure 
capable of organizing a dally resistance to working con-
ditions under the capitalist labour process, management 
was from the first aware of their potential use in the 
domestication of a struggle that was getting out of 
hand. The power ba 1 ance on the factory f 1 oor had been 
too radically upset, the workers' attack on capi tallst 
relations of production was too deeply rooted, too 
capillary and too violent to be resolved with the old 
combination of "fear stuff' and 'sweet 
gement was thus forced to resign itself 
certain degree of its unilateral power 
maximum intensification 
stuff'. Mana-
to losing a 
to impose a 
1 east unt i 1 of production, at 
such time as the workers/ movement could be brought back 
under control. Management was itself caught in a cleft 
stick. The /choice/ of favouring the development of the 
delegati was not a free one, but a decision to make the 
best of a bad job - to attempt to integrate and contain 
the real attack on managerial control of the labour 
process and to 1 ead the struggle back into the more 
familiar territory of trade union based industrial 
relations. 
The unions, too, expressly desired recognition for 
the delegati. The federations, especially the CGIL and 
the CISL, during the preceding years of reflection and 
self-criticism had recognized the growing detachment of 
the 1 eadersh i p from the rank and f i 1 e, and posed the 
/recuperation/ of their estranged base as the first 
problem to be resolved. Clearly the delegati. given 
their close contact with and sensitivity to the shop 
floor and their meaningful role in the day-to-day 
struggles of the rank and file, could help to fill the 
growing gap if they could be brought within the auspices 
of the official workers/ movement. Thus the demand for 
the delegati, to be elected from the three federations 
in proportion to their respective presences on the 
factory floor, was one of the unions~ maJor objectives 
in this period. 
Thus, before the /hot autumn~ was fully under way, 
and almost as soon as the delegati appeared as de facto 
organs of workers/ power on the factory f 1 oor, 
management conceded them a partial and limited 
recognition in the company agreement signed with the 
federations on June 26th 1969. 
The agreement conceded the nomination of on I y 56 
delegati Ccal led esperti in the agreement>, who were to 
be nominated by the trade unions in proportion to the 
respective numerical strengths of the federations on the 
factory floor. The June agreement, and others following 
it, strong! y 1 imi ted the scope of the de 1 egat i, con-
ceding them the mere /right of intervention/ in internal 
negotiations for example over production targets, 
labour complements etc. alongside of the old 
Cammisslone Interna. 
The attempt to /bureaucratize/ and integrate the 
delegati was not, however, a complete success. Even the 
officially recognized eapertl identified them- selves 
closely in the rank and file struggle, and frequently 
insisted on democratic election or at least ratification 
by the other workers: " ... I was nominated by the union, 
the FI OM. But both the union and I asked the other 
delegati if they were happy with this - if they hadn/t 
been I/d have renounced the post" <11). 
The delegati, in fact, continued to be an effec-
tive weapon in the workers/ struggle. Unof f 1 cia 1 
delegati di squadra <team stewards> continued to operate 
alongside the union nominated esperti, and in many cases 
- depending on the individuals concerned and the balance 
of class forces in any given situation - together they 
were able to organize and crystallize resistance and 
spread the struggle to more /backward/ shops, even after 
the signing of the agreement: 
"These delegati di 1 lnea ... were born more as an 
application of an agreement than as the fruit of 
J 
" 
, . 
... 
popular experience, 
reveal themselves 
structuring of the 
but they have anyway begun to 
as an element in the possible 
discontented and dlsaggregated 
col 1 ision force of the mass of workers. These 
delegati have begun, in some situations, to organize 
strikes and go-slows. Management has tried to 
transfer the more combative among them but the 
workers defended them" <12). 
However, with their new official status and partial 
integration into the historical organizations of the 
working c 1 ass, the de 1 egat i 1 ost much of their former 
effect 1 veness, an effectiveness which had been based 
precisely on their autonomy from the moribund official 
organizations. As they began to lose that autonumy, they 
a 1 so began to 1 ose the trust they had engendered in 
their work-mates and hence a 1 arge part of their 
effectiveness as shock troops in the battle for control 
on the factory floor. As one worker later cormnented: "We 
made the delegati, as a direct workers' expression. Then 
the unions turned them into their thing!" <13>. 
The Unofficial 
Wo~ke~s' and Students' Movements 
Perhaps the maJor vehicle for the generation and 
spreading of new ideas, the formulation of a platform of 
demands and the organization of the struggles should be 
looked for in the activities of the workers' and 
students~ movements working around and inside FIAT from 
the early 1960s and particularly in 1969. 
The struggle at FIAT, especially from 1968 to 1969, 
was very strongly influenced by the theories and 
practical activity of various "external" revolutionary 
groups, who debated with the workers, pub 1 i shed 
newspapers aimed at a readership within the big 
factories and helped with the preparation of leaflets 
etc. In fact, these groups were not really external. 
Many of the groups were rapidly infused with workers: 
for example, by the early 70s Lotta Continua <"the 
struggle goes on/> had about 45 members in Mirafiori, 
mostly in the body plant and press shop, and about 20-25 
members in Rivalta <14>. 
The presence of the groups and the diffusion of 
their ideas through the workers" struggles - a diffusion 
which occurred largely through the organ of the 
"worker-student assemblies" and the various newspapers-
was of an importance which could not be ignored by even 
the stiffest trade union or party member. The workers, 
as is lamented from these quarters, went as far as to 
shout "Ho Ho Ho Chi Minh", or "the people are strong and 
they will win" alongside their more traditional slogans 
on demonstrations (15>. 
The diffusion of the ideas of the students" move-
ment and left groups was organized first and foremost 
through the massive, fluid and semi-permanent organ of 
the worker-student assemblies, often held in a hospital 
which had been occupied by medical students and Junior 
doctors. 
The students and members of the left groups seemed 
to be, if anything, slightly surprised by the immediate 
success of the assemblies: 
"One time the students went down to the factory 
gates and handed out a leaflet inviting workers to 
come and participate in a meeting in the hospital, 
about the health situation of workers in factories. 
We expected that perhaps 10 workers would turn up, 
or something like that. But to our amazement, 
someth l ng I ike 200 workers turned up, a I ong with 
about 400 students. It was a very crowded meeting, 
and, of course, the workers dldn/t talk about health 
but about the struggles they were having in the 
factory, the conditions of work, the exploitation, 
what it was 1 ike working on the assembly line etc. 
And the students were completely surprised. You even 
had hospital patients coming down to the meeting to 
see what was going on ... 
As a result of this, the next day the students went 
down to the factory again, and again the day after. 
They began to make contact wl th the workers. And 
this was the first time that workers had seen 
students giving out leaflets, coming regularly to 
the factory gates at 5.00 in the morning etc. They 
knew that it was only the students who were prepared 
to do this ... since the unions were absent from 
those struggles" <16). 
The worker-student assemblies were held nearly ev-
ery day for the three months from May to July 1969. The 
assemblies were not only a forum for the transmission of 
ideas but also the centre for much of the practical and 
strategic planning of the struggle; a place where 
slogans were developed, leaflets and information 
bulletins written etc. The students help in this was 
directly requested by the workers themselves: 
"Every day the assemblies unite workers and students 
to evaluate the point the struggle has reached, to 
write the leaflets which will be distributed the 
following day and so on. 
At present, over the last few days, this external-
internal diaphragm has worn very thin, it/s 
changing. The workers have decided that organi-
zational problems - not only concerning information 
but also concerning more directly political problems 
such as decisions about the way strikes shou 1 d be 
conducted, how long they should be protracted, 
should be discussed in common. 
The workers have requested that the I eaf I ets be 
transformed from an organ of information to an organ 
which is able to supply slogans, direction and 
demands for the strikes and the struggle in general. 
In this way they have involved the students more and 
more closely in the responsibility for organization" 
(17). 
The assembly was especially important for the gene-
ration of ideas and innovations in the struggle, and the 
crystallization of the content of the demands. The mass 
discussions with the students allowed the workers to 
express what they intuitively felt and to clarify their 
ideas: 
"It was in those meetings where you heard the most 
impressive, most clear and sharp analyses of 
immigration, of deski I I ing; of the history of a new 
working class coming out from the struggles of FIAT 
workers. After a few hours of talking and dis-
cussion, we would finish the meeting and try to 
round up some of the people who had spoken, so as to 
write out a leaflet to be given out at the factory 
the next day. Then we/d go down to the factory and 
meet the second shift coming out, and we/d come back 
to the hospital and carry on the meeting, sometimes 
til I 2 or 3 o/clock in the morning! And then 
preparing another I eaf I et. This went on for the 
who! e of May, June and Ju I y 1969" <18). 
The assemblies allowed for the confluence of fresh 
ideas from outside- the students and intellectuals who 
participated often came from as far away as Plsa and 
Rome and camped outside the factory gates to take part 
in the discussions and struggles. Various different 
political groups brought to the assemblies the ideas and 
theories that in some cases they had been developing and 
discussing for more than a decade: the /scatters/ around 
journals which had largely developed from the operalsta 
<workerist> tradition; /La Classe, Potere Operalo; 
groups from the general Movlmento Studentesco <Students/ 
Movement>, born from the struggles in the schools and 
universities in 1968. Another very important tendency 
that was born from the assemblies themselves, was Lotta 
Continua which took its name and the title of its 
journal from a slogan which developed in the assemblies. 
The Italian extra-parliamentary left had developed 
an extremely rich theoretical tradition, particularly in 
the workers/ struggles of the 1960s and during the 
students/ movement of 1968; and they were able to share 
this tradition with the workers to a far greater extent 
than their French counterparts. 
The reason behind this close integration in the 
workers/ struggles was a combination of interrelated 
factors: first of a 1 1 the genera 1 appropriateness of 
their theories to the unskilled workers in the factory, 
but also a tighter psychological and physical vicinity 
to the workers in struggle. 
Most students in Italy remain to study in the area 
they were born and brought up in. The strength of family 
ties in Italy is in fact due perhaps as much to the 
general lack of grant support and social security 
benefits as to traditions of Catholicism, as living at 
home was and still is a simple economic necessity for 
many. The students were thus likely to be more in touch 
with the rea 1 it i es of the workers' 1 i ves; were more 
familiar with them as real people relatives and 
neighbours rather than 'political subjects'. Given also 
that the universities were opened to all during the 
struggles of the students' movement climaxing in 1968, 
the students were not the e 11 te that they are in many 
other countries; many were the sons and daughters of 
manual workers and themselves future workers, or at best 
unemployed 'intellectuals', given that there are not 
enough graduate jobs for all the graduates. Perhaps for 
these reasons the students were very able to mix with 
the FIAT workers at every level: 
"It was rea I 1 y i mpor tan t that the workers and 
students were able to organize social things 
together as we 1 1 . For instance, a s i 1 1 y ex amp I e ... 
the Faculty of Architecture was occupied for a 
period. It/s a very fancy place, with gardens and a 
big fountain. The students removed the fountain and 
turned it intG a swimming pool, and you/d find 
hundreds of people coming there to bathe, sit 
around, play guitars and so on" <19). 
But these factors, although they may explain why 
students in Italy neither idealized nor patronized the 
workers, do not exp I a in the importance of their theo-
retical traditions to the workers/ movement. If the 
workers, fai I ing to find a point of reference in the 
tradi tiona 1 organizations of the working c 1 ass found 
another, a 1 ternat i ve one in the organizations of the 
Students/ Movement and extra-parliamentary left, the 
exp 1 anat ion must sure 1 y be sought in the re 1 evance of 
the theories and practice of this alternative. 
The Influence of the Left G~oupe 
on the Fo~mulatlon of the Wo~ke~s~ Demands 
The left groups and the students/ movement recog-
nized far more clearly than the unions the changes that 
had come about inside the factory, both in terms of the 
influx of a new sort of worker with a different culture 
and tradi t i one, and in terms of the changes in the 
labour process, and thus in the sort of work the young 
immigrants were doing. 
The influx of young Southerners into the factories 
corresponded to capita I/ s need for a supp I y of young 
unsk i I I ed workers ab I e to stand the speed up in the 
factory and the monotony of assembly line work. In this 
context, the traditional working class notion of the 
defence of ski I I or /work pride/ were entirely foreign. 
The confrontation with capital, then, could no longer be 
based, as up to now it had been, on the claim that the 
labour power given in exchange for the wage was a rare 
and valuable commodity whose cost should be pro-
portionate to the years of training and experience 
embodied within it, as the 1 abour power the new 1 mass 
worker' had to offer no longer required years of 
training in specialist tasks. 
Once the myth of ski! 1, that traditional bargaining 
weapon of the trade union movement, had fallen, the only 
moment of power left for the worker was a direct and 
political confrontation with capital. The workers 1 
strength in this situation comes not from the possession 
of rarely available skills, but from their ability to 
organize politically and fight back. 
It was not only their objective lack of skill to 
bargain with that made the direct and confrontational 
approach of the revolutionary groups more relevant to 
the young FIAT workers, but a 1 so the fact of the more 
violent and insurrectionary political culture of the 
South, where so many of the new workers had been 
brought up. As one commentator later explained: 
11 <In the South> town ha 1 Is get tl ng burned to the 
ground is not someth 1 ng out of the ordinary. It 
happens almost every week. It/1 J happen in one 
pI ace, and a coup 1 e of weeks I ater peep I e in the 
town down the road find out what happened, and go 
right ahead and do the same thing themselves. And to 
an outsider the issues often seem really trivial 
like in one town where they burnt the town hall over 
the issue of who was to pick the strawberries that 
summer. The tradition of insurrection is very strong 
in the South. There"s one town in Sicily which had 
15 uprisings in two years, after the war. 
So that when these people come from the South the 
violence is already in their blood" <20). 
The student and left groups had understood, far 
better than the unions and parties, that the "new" 
working class in the big factory had changed in a very 
radical way. Not only did it tend, given its different 
traditions of struggle, to oppose itself to capital in 
an entirely different way, but it actually had to, given 
the failure of the rarity of skill as a moment of power 
in negotiations with capital. 
These groups, then, offered a different approach in 
the theory which can be sununar l zed as "the refusa 1 of 
work". 
The Theo~etlcal 'Offe~' 
of the Left G~oupe: the Refusal of Wo~k 
With their understanding of the 
sition in the factory, elements 
new 
of 
c 1 ass compo-
the extra-
parliamentary left working around FIAT began to develop 
the theory of the "refusal of work". In reality, this 
refusal was not of work as creative activity, but of 
work as exploitation - of the capitalist relations of 
work. 
According to this theory, the refusal of work first 
manifested itself among the young immigrant workers in 
forms of evasion of work: absenteeism, leaving work once 
enough money had been earned for a long ho l i day, poor 
and slow work, and sabotage. As early as 1962 Romola 
Gobbl wrote an article on these forms of refusal, for 
which he was arrested on the charge of /instigation to 
criminal activity". The following is an extract (the 
underlining is his): 
"In their organization 
express their refusal 
situation; that is, 
of sabotage, the workers 
to return to the previous 
their refusal of productive 
normal itv. 
For now the workers reduce their working hours by 
refusing overtime and holiday work, going off sick 
continua I l y, or refusing tasks wh l ch are not 
strictly theirs. Or else they only get out 1/3 of 
the day;s production, as happened recently at FIAT 
Grandi Motorl when the workers were told to work on 
St. John"s Day!" (21). 
This defensive and lndlviduallstlc form of there-
fusal of work developed into more organized and manifest 
forms. The struggles deve I oped pr inc i pa I 1 y around 
demands for more money and less work. Negotiations 
I aunched by the unions for readjustments of the ski I I 
grading system, or for proportionate increases in in-
cent 1 ves to make the wage /more fa 1 r ... , were met w 1 th 
genera 1 incomprehension by the workers, who began to 
extend union cal led strikes often without the for-
mulation of any claim, or with the demand for equal 
rises for all or immediate promotion up the grades for 
the whole team or shop. These claims reflected the 
underlying demand for a wage detached from all notions 
of productivity or control, which corresponded, that is, 
to the workers needs, rather than those of capital. The 
following extract from La Classe, a journal that 
developed in part from the focal point of the worker-
student assemblies, sets out this idea: 
"The working class struggle concentrates its 
wholly political -attack, aimed at the destruction 
of capital in its complexity of social relations, in 
its complexity of social and productive organi-
zation, around two tightly interconnected poles: the 
ref usa I of work and organization. The refusa I of 
work, as the highest and most general point of 
confrontation with capital; organization as a 
political form of class autonomy ... and the refusal 
of work , of fatigue, of expropr i at l on , means, in 
positive, the peremptory demand for all power, the 
appropriation of all social wealth; at this point, 
the struggle for ~a social wage~ (equal for all and 
linked to the material needs of the workers not to 
the bosses~ productivity> is something qualitatively 
totally different from the negotiation of wage as a 
fair exchange for work" (22>. 
The demands developed within and around the assem-
blies on the basis of these ideas quickly caught on 
within the factory. 
The Workers/ Demands of 1969 
The demands formulated by the workers closely re-
flected the theory of the refusal of work. 
The first and most crucial element running through 
a I 1 the specific demands was, as we have seen. the 
attempt to detach wage from productivity, fatigue, 
unhealthy working conditions and so on. The basic 
demands which developed out of the logic of the refusal 
of work and which found a fert i 1 e terrain among the 
young immigrant factory workers, were summarized in the 
slogans: 
MORE MONEY - LESS WORK 
NO TO THE NEGOTIATION OF PIECE RATES 
EQUAL RISES FOR ALL 
NO BARGAINING OF OUR HEALTH 
These demands, then, formed a direct and political 
attack on the capitalist labour process, showing the 
workers/ understanding of the real nature underlying its 
appearance as a neutral and necessary derivation from 
technological progress. 
Health Risks. As we have already said, up until this 
period safety in the factory was almost entirely a 
matter for the emp 1 oyers. Preventive care: the regu-
lation and I imitation of damaging factors in the working 
environment (noise, fumes, dusts, chemicals, heat etc.) 
was left entirely to the employers/ discretion. Only 
when an ace i dent or i 11 ness had actua 1 1 y occurred did 
the employer find himself under some legal obi igation -
to compensate the worker or his fami! y with a monetary 
/ equ iva I ent /. The emp I ayers thus bought the workers/ 
health when they bought their labour power. 
The struggle for a new approach to hea I th in the 
factory started from 1969. The notion of monetary 
compensation was entirely reJected and the workers of 
many companies, often with the help of sympathetic 
doctors or medical students, began to inform themselves 
on the health risks present in their working environment 
through mass enquiries, normally based on question-
naires. Once armed with this information, the workers 
went on to demand the abolition of the health risks. The 
keys to these demands were summarized by Grisoni and 
Portelli: 1) Health doesn/t have a price; 2) It/sup to 
the workers, not to the employers, to evaluate the risks 
involved in a Job; 3> It/sup to the employers to 
eliminate health risks; 4) It/sup to the workers to 
make sure they do (23>. 
Skill Grading. In Italy ski 11 is graded according to 
criteria roughly based on theories of Job evaluation. Up 
until 1969 the unions, rather than contesting the 
concept underlying the creation of a hierarchy of skill 
grades, had fought to make them more complex and refined 
and to improve promotion chances for individual workers. 
In 1969 the rank and file showed their understand-
ing of the arbitrary and unscientific nature of this 
hierarchy by pressing for its abolition with demands for 
automatic promotion up the categories, and 2nd category 
grading for whole shops at a time. The workers also 
demanded wage rises equal for all, independently from 
skill category. The concession of these demands led to 
the existence of shops where al 1 the workers were in the 
same category, to a genera I I eve IIi ng of pay throughout 
the factory, and its disconnection from productivity and 
health risks. 
On the question of ski 1 I grading, the tradi tiona I 
union stance was immovable. As late as May 1969, in 
fact, Bruno Trentin, the secretary of FIOM, defended the 
grading system with the words: "Skill is still an asset, 
a heritage of the working class: I don/t see why, then, 
the employers shouldn/t have to pay for it ... " <24>. 
The Organization of Work. An enormous variety of demands 
and direct actions that directly contested the 
emp 1 oyers/ un i 1 at era I control over the process of 
production arose from the rank and file in 1969 
including, of course, those set out in 1) and 2) above. 
First of all were the direct interventions by the 
delegati to reduce 1 ine speeds, production targets, 
increase the complements of workers assigned to a Job 
etc. 
Equally important were the demands centering on in-
formation. The workers recognized the importance of 
knowing the timings that had been set, the agreed labour 
complements for each Job, the number of substitutes to 
be assigned for each section, the genera 1 product l on 
targets for the department and so on. They realized that 
without such information they were even more the simple 
appendages of the mach l nery which ground on with no 
rationale which could be apparent to them; even less 
ab I e to know, and thus to some extent to control , the 
product l ve eye I e; even more at the mercy of the a.r-
bi trary decisions of management. The workers demanded 
access to information in the form of the establishment 
in each shop of notice-boards c I ear I y di sp I ay i ng the 
relevant data. 
Almost every one of the above demands was in more 
or less direct contradiction to the previous trade union 
stance. As we have seen, the national union federations 
were not sensitive to the specific shop floor concerns, 
and they remained firmly entrenched in the old faiths, 
myths and rhetoric with no adjustments for the changing 
nature of work in the factory or for the changing 
consciousness of their potential membership. While the 
factory cadres, the members of the Commlseione Interna, 
were in many cases sensitive to these changes, often to 
the point of tot a 1 immersion in the /new/ movement, the 
ideas and demands arising from the rank and file through 
the 60s took a long time to percolate up to the 
federations/ national headquarters in Rome. 
In this period, then, official union policy on the 
question of the work 1 ng environment and he a 1 th in the 
factory was almost exclusively related to increasing and 
facilitating the monetary compensation to the workers or 
their fami I ies for disabilities or death arising from 
occupational diseases or accidents at work. Thus a 
document written by FIOM towards the end of 1968 affirms 
that: 11 Compensation for health and safety risks at 
work ... now represents the only general gain that can be 
guaranteed in the work contracts in relation to problems 
of the working environment, apart from some exceptions 
regulating normative aspects (working hours, holidays 
etc. ) " < 25) . 
lt was only after the events of the /hot autumn/ 
that the federations, under pressure from the rank and 
file, began to change the official policy. Thus at the 
7th National Congress of the CGIL, for example, a motion 
was passed repudating /any monetarization of risk/ and 
recognizing that: 
"The contestation of specific risk factors must be 
strictly linked to the contestation of more general 
factors in the deterioration of health deriving from 
the organization of work <the division and speciali-
zation of tasks, monotony, intensity of production 
speeds> " < 26 > . 
I have argued, then, that the very form of the 
struggle; its autonomy and the practice of direct demo-
cracy, freed the rank and file movement from official 
dogma <the latter relating as much to the credibi 1 i ty 
problems of the Italian Communist Party as to the daily 
welfare of the workers> and allowed them to arrive 
collectively, through daily discussions in the factory 
and worker-student assemb 1 i es, 
that went beyond a piecemeal 
at a series of demands 
bargaining for specific 
improvements in this or that aspect of the organization 
of work to cha 1 1 enge the common sense notion that the 
labour process had to be organized as it is, that it is 
a neutral product of scientific progress. The workers 
were demanding that they should not be made to pay, with 
their bodies and their minds, the price of capital's 
need to accumulate. 
However, the autonomy of the workers' movement from 
the traditional organizations of the working class did 
not only free it for the development of an entirely new 
platform of demands which directly contested the basis 
of capitalist relations of production, but also allowed 
for the emergence of imaginative forms of struggle. 
The struggle for the new demands diffused rapidly 
through the pI ants. They appeared for the first time 
among the 8, 000 aux i 1 i ary workers at Mi raf i or i , whose 
claims for 
abolition 
delegati, 
of the 
equal wage rises for al 1, the 
in capolavoro or "masterpiece" 
promotion through the grades and immediate passage to 
the 2nd category for al! were typical. Even after the 
first series of agreements were signed on the 28th May, 
the struggle continued to escalate, spreading rapidly to 
other sections and plants: Grandi Motori, Spa Centro, 
Lingotto, Rivalta, Materferro etc. In the "hot autumn" 
an incredible total of 84 separate negotiations were 
opened in the FIAT group. 
Management responded on the one hand with apparent-
1 y generous concessions: as we have seen the delegati 
were quickly given official status, and many other 
workers' demands were also satisfied, and on the other 
with the old tactic of the sack. But despite heavy 
concentration of sackings on the "hot points', the waves 
of activity; strikes, pickets. road-blocks, occupations. 
sit-ins and marches, continued and increased. The use of 
the "articulated" struggles paralysed plant with only a 
minimal reduction of wages. According to a management 
communique, in one month of struggle a total of 40 
mi I liard of production was lost, while the wage bi I I was 
hardly reduced at al 1 <27>. 
The Struggles of 1969: 'Pictures' 
From the /battle of Corso Traiano/ of July 3rd, in 
which thousands of workers, students and citizens 
engaged in running battles with the police through the 
streets of Turin from the afternoon to the early morning 
of the following day; to the /kidnapping/ of managers; 
to the tense and noisy corte! lnterni around the 
factory, the struggle of 1969 in FIAT departed not only 
from the ideological control of the union organizations 
but also from their traditional battle grounds and 
choice of weapons. 
The Southerners, with - as Luciano Par 1 anti says 
"their /bad manners/ or whatever you want to ca 1 1 it" 
<28>- were a whole new concept in /industrial relations 
problems/. Their form of struggle echoed the exasperated 
/ i ndi vi dua 1 / exp I osi ons of anger which had been in-
creasingly characteristic within FIAT through the 1960s. 
The language of the strike, of the corteo, of the 
violent eruption into the administrative buildings to 
back up demands with the menace of direct force, was 
much closer to the hearts of the Southern workers than 
the more cautious negotiations dear to the Piedmontese 
union cadres; and in the last analysis, given the 
absence of real bargaining power, it was also far more 
effective. 
Another departure from union orthodoxy was the lo-
cation of the struggle increasingly firmly at the point 
of production. The workers, by remaining within the 
factory in the cortei interni, assemblies, sit-ins and 
occupations, got to know their fellow workers and the 
geographical and social lay-out of the factory, and were 
able in this way to overcome what were perhaps the major 
problems caused by their relative lack of formal organi-
zation: the spread of information and the immediate 
formulation of a collective response to new situations. 
In the belief that a strict chronology of the events 
of the 'hot autumn; would not only be tedious but would 
a 1 so add little to the reader; s understand! ng of the 
tensions which underlay them and the forces which shaped 
them, I restrict myself here to a series of ;pictures; 
of struggle: of descriptions, selected from various 
sources, of moments which illustrate the novelty not 
only of the content but of the form of the struggle of 
those years. 
These exerpts begin with three <edited> accounts of 
some of the events of the ;battle of Corso Tralano; on 
July 3rd: respectively a newspaper article, a law court 
report and the remlnlscenses of a student who par-
ticipated. This was the day of a union-backed general 
strike against housing conditions in the city of Turin. 
Perhaps frightened by the tension in the city the unions 
did not convoke demonstrations or rallies; but the 
workers, students and citizens were not prepared to wait 
the day out at home: 
"The most serious incidents occurred in the after-
noon at Miraflori. At 14.00 over two thousand 
demonstrators massed outside gates 2 Via Tazzol i and 
18 and 20 Via Settembrini. Most of the demonstrators 
were young, many of them had come from other towns 
in Piedmont, or from Milan, Rome, Pisa and Trento. 
They waved red banners with no emblem and wore red 
kerchiefs of the same colour. 
Many workers hold posters. They read: "Union and 
bosses. Rip-off agreement", "Against asssembly line 
work we use assemb 1 y I i ne strikes" , "Against the 
bosses, no production", "All power to the workers", 
"What do we want? We want everything". The pol ice 
take over the entrances. The demonstrators, arrayed 
on the other side of the road, throw stones at the 
police. A group of about 40 men attempts to disperse 
the shouting crowd, but fails. Reinforcements arrive 
and the order to fire tear gas is given ... 
<In Corso Unione Sovietica>, momentarily cleared, a 
car transporter loaded with 12 cars arrives. The 
demonstrators sudden I y reappear, many of them 
stripped to the waist, and block the transporter. 
The driver, hit with a stick, is forced to run away. 
Some demonstrators get into the transporter and move 
it to block the road. A heavy rain of stones falls 
on the vehicles. A "500" is destroyed, other cars 
are serious I y damaged. A I 1 have their w l ndscreens 
broken ... 
The battle continues. Corso Unione Sovletica is 
b I ocked for a few tens of metres at the 1 eve I of 
Corso Giambone with cement pipes, equipment from a 
nearby bu i 1 ding site and the posts of road signs. 
Further up, at the corner of V l a La Loggia. some 
workers are spreading the road surface with tar. The 
demonstrators arrive on the run, set fire to the 
material and block the road. At 19.30 the battle is 
still raging. In Corso Traiano police race down the 
road in vans and wagons, s l rens wa i I i ng. The cars 
run up onto the pavements, racing up and down the 
two lanes in a rotary movement. The zone is 
saturated with tear gas. Tension rises to a maximum. 
The Carabinieri send a helicopter which flies around 
above the furious guerr i 11 a war ... 11 < 29). 
The next account of the same day is taken from a 
report to the Turin law courts: 
11 In the ear 1 y afternoon of 3rd Ju I y 1969 sever a 1 
thousand people gathered in the vicinity of gate 2 
of the FIAT Mlrafiorl plant in Corso Tazzoli. On the 
same day in Turin a strike was proclaimed by al 1 the 
trade union federations <CGIL, CISL, UIL, SIDA, 
CISNAL> to call the authority;s attention to the 
housing crisis, a problem which was particularly 
felt by a large number of Turinese workers and which 
had led to a massive adhesion to the strike by all 
categories of workers. 
The union federations had not foreseen a march, but 
numerous groups of workers and students, extraneous 
to the parties and the tradi tiona I union organ 1-
zations, had by means of leaflets and posters 
invited the citizens of Turin to gather in Corso 
Tazzol i in the vicinity of the FIAT plant in order 
to march along the roads of Turin~ 
The public security authorities, who had not been 
given prior notice of the meeting or the march ... 
had placed a large force formed of Carabinieri and 
police agents, brought in many cases from towns 
distant from Turin. The enormous number of de-
monstrators who occupied part of Corso Tazzoli and 
were refusing to keep it clear induced the commander 
of the forces of law and order to order the crowds 
away on several occasions between 15.00 and 16.00. 
Most part of the demonstrators, who had already been 
directing i nsu 1 ts at the forces of 1 aw and order, 
resisted, throwing stones at the agents proceeding 
to clearance of the crowds. As the hours passed the 
situation assumed increasingly serious aspects; 
groups of demonstrators set up barricades par-
ticularly in the region of Corso Traiano where they 
had been pushed back by the charges of the forces of 
law and order. In the late afternoon the situation 
became dramatic; vehicles were set alight, shop 
windows smashed and bui I ding materials from nearby 
sites taken to construct barricades. All attempts to 
restore calm were in vain, despite the flow of 
police reinforcements, the firing of tear gas 
cannisters and continuous circuits by police 
vehicles. 
The riots reached their height near the Faculty of 
Architecture of Corso Massimo D/Azeglio and towards 
night spread to the adjacent local authority areas 
of Moncalieri and Nichelino. 
During the numerous and vi o I en t c I ashes very many 
people, about 200, were taken into custody as a 
result of acts of vandal ism, resisting arrest, 
blocking the road or attempting to block the road" 
( 30). 
Lastly, the account of a participant in the riots 
of Corso Traiano: 
"Now I/d like to say a bit about the riot in Corso 
Traiano in July 1969. This was on the occasion of a 
general strike that the unions had cal led for 
housing reform - part of the pattern of the union in 
those days, ca 1 1 i ng workers out on genera 1 strikes 
for reforms. At that time we had given out a leaflet 
suggesting that everyone should meet in front of the 
gates of the FIAT factory, and then have a blg march 
so that we could spread the news and the contents of 
the FIAT struggle into the town of Turin itself. The 
slogans on the banners were: /From the factory to 
the town/. 
On the morn l ng of the strike there were thousands 
and thousands of people in front of the gates. Don/t 
forget that the Mirafiori factory alone employs 
about 55,000 workers. And the police were there in 
force, and took a hard 1 i ne from the start. They 
didn/t want a workers/ march into the centre of the 
city, so they did everything they could to stop us 
forming up. They came in with their riot shields and 
batons, clubbing people and the whole thing turned 
into a riot. 
Anyway we managed to form up the march in the street 
outside FIAT- a street where a Jot of people live 
who work at FIAT. The march started off down the 
street, got as far as 3-400 yards, a crowd of people 
going down the street, no discipline, and in front 
there was a worker with a poster saying: ;What do we 
want? We want everything!/ After 400 yards we found 
barricades set up by the pollee, with armoured 
vehicles and everything, intended to stop us. These 
forces were both poI ice and Carab in 1 er i - and you 
should know that both the pollee and the Carabinieri 
have their own r lot squads. The poI ice have the 
notorious Padova bat ta 11 on, a rea I bunch of 
hardnuts, and the Carabinieri have the special squad 
from the off l cer schoo I at Monca I l er i a 1 I 
volunteers, and anti-communists to a man. 
We met this barricade at about 4.00 in the 
afternoon, and rioting started again. The first time 
the pollee and Carabinieri had managed to clear the 
place. Everybody had cleared off and scattered. As a 
result, we, the students, had thought it was all 
over for the day. So we gathered our forces and went 
back to the Faculty of Architecture to discuss what 
to do next. By the time we got there, the pollee 
were there as we I I , and there was r 1 ot 1 ng aga 1 n, 
with tear gas grenades coming in through the windows 
and everything. 
Now, when we finally got the meeting together, 
people were coming in saying that there were riots 
going on in Mlraflori and Corso Traiano. Of course, 
we didn/t believe them because we thought it was alI 
over. By this time it was 6.00 p.m. and we decided 
to go back there. And the sight that met our eyes 
was incredible. There were thousands of people - old 
people, women, children - just rioting in an area of 
2 k i I ometers around the factory. And those riots 
went on through the night til 1 4.00 a.m., and spread 
right through the Northern zone of Turin. 
This was a very victorious fight. In at least two 
places there were squads of police who surrendered, 
waving white f 1 ags. We had exchanges of prisoners 
with the poI ice. And the weapons were stones and 
petrol bombs, and barricades. Barricades of cars set 
on fire etc.~ (31). 
The following extracts refer, instead. to a few in-
stances of struggle inside the factory during 1969. The 
first is a newspaper report of a strike, cor teo and 
demonstration which took place on October 29th: 
"lt/s been another day of serious violence, brawls 
and acts of vandalism in the big engineering 
factories during the articulated strikes for the 
contract renewal negotiations ... 
The worst events of the day took place at Mirafiori. 
Yesterday morning, during an articulated strike, 
about 250 workers left the various shops brandishing 
iron bars, sticks, railings and steering wheel 
columns. The demonstrators invited other workers to 
follow them and a cor·teo of about 1,500 workers 
formed up and proceeded through the internal roads. 
A 1 eng the way the strikers upturned parked cars, 
broke windscreens and threw iron bo 1 ts. They then 
gathered in front of the administration block and 
shouting appea 1 s and slogans ca I I ed for the office 
workers inside to abandon work. To avoid incidents 
management had the buzzer sound early for the end of 
work. But only a few of the office workers were able 
to reach the gates; the rest were blocked inside by 
the strikers. 
In the meantime the 250 workers of the corteo inside 
the factory had decided to I eave the factory and 
proceed to the car exhibition rooms where the 
opening ceremony was in progress. At the gates they 
were stopped by the pol ice and asked to leave behind 
their sticks and bars. Only if this were done could 
they leave the factory. There was some verbal 
resistance. 
the pol ice 
In the end the sticks were deposited and 
a 1 1 owed the workers through. The 
demonstrators moved down Corso Traiano towards the 
/Valentino/. At the junction with Corso Unione 
Soviet i ca, as they had not been fo 1 lowed by other 
workers from the corteo ... they re-entered the 
factory. It was 11.00 a.m. About 50 demonstrators 
set off for the canteens where they upturned the 
food warmers containing the workers/ lunches. 
Another group of 100 demonstrators set off for the 
bodywork shop. Here they smashed completed bodies 
with iron bars; about 30 are now complete 
write-of fs. The strikers then blocked the assemb 1 y 
lines for the 850 and 600 models. With blows of 
their iron bars they smashed the windscreens of two 
cars and damaged others. Boxes fu 1 1 of bo 1 ts and 
components and heaps of tyres were upturned and the 
materials scattered through the shop ... 
The company reports that during the invasion of the 
palntshop groups of agitators armed with oxy-
acetylene tanks and a blow torch attempted to sever 
the pipes connecting the reservoirs of paint to the 
spray plant ... 
At the beginning of the second shift one production 
line was unable to function due to damage, and could 
only be brought into production after 2 hours. At 
12.15 calm returned to Mirafiori, and in the after-
noon work went on undisturbed in the shops where 
articulated strikes were not called. 
Other incidents occurred at FIAT-Rivalta. Yesterday 
the articulated strike was to finish at 10.00 a.m. 
But at 10.30 the factory"s 6,000 workers abandoned 
work once again. They were incited to this action by 
a group of extremists who went around the various 
shops calling on the workers to strike. The 
demonstrators damaged planted and dented cars in the 
park with blows from their bars. They also entered 
the canteen and overturned the food warmers 
containing the workers" lunches. The Carabinieri 
cIa im that 3 workers were stripped naked by the 
strikers. At the end of the shift a group of workers 
stayed inside the factory to impede the 
recommencement of work activity. The company states 
that production was at a complete standstill in the 
afternoon. 
Another group of workers stayed outside the factory 
where, l n the meant lme, a group of extremists from 
Potere Operaio had gathered. At about 1.00 p.m. a 
coachload of workers from Cumlana arrived at 
Mirafiori. The demonstrators forced the coach to 
stop, surrounded it and let down its tyres. The 
coach was stranded between gates 7 and 9, Mirafiori. 
In the meantime other extremists formed road blocks 
a I ong the rna in road, wh l ch rema l ned c I osed for 2 
hours. 
The sides of the coach, stranded with its t yres 
flattened, were used as a sort of blackboard on 
which the extremists wrote slogans: 'Mirafiori, 
Lingotto we are with you; Rivalta workers in revolt/ 
'Potere Operiao/, /Unity in struggle/ ... 
During the afternoon tension mounted and the news 
reaching Turin trom Rivalta began to cause allarm. 
Some provincial level trade union officials hurried 
along to call on workers not to cede to the provo-
cation of extremists calling for the occupation of 
the factory. At about 4.00 p.m. things quietened 
down. 
At FIAT-Stura a corteo of workers from Spa broke 
down a gate and got into the components shop. At the 
starting motor plant some workers got into the 
administration block through the canteen roof. In 
the subsequent brawls a supervisor suffered severe 
bruising. 
FIAT has made a rough estimate of the damages caused 
by the day/s disorders; from which it seems that 
about 100 cars and car bodies have been damaged 11 
(32). 
The next extract, once again from an eye-witness 
account, is a descclptlon of a one night occupation of 
M i raf i or i : 
"The workers/ response <to a mass lock-out due to a 
small strike by ski lied workers> was to call an 
immediate 8 hour strike. First of all, the workers 
formed up and tried to get through to where the 
white collar workers were still working. They 
smashed up everything in sight ... cars we~e tipped 
off the 1 i nes. . . everything was smashed up. Then 
they decided that they were going home. The police 
arrived in front of the plant - and at this time we 
had an absolutely mad chief of police in Turin 
called Varia. This man came in and ordered his men 
to start shooting their tear gas inside the factory. 
And the workers answer inside the factory was that 
every single car was turned off the 1 ines and 
smashed. You could even hear the noise from outside 
the factory. And there were other people outside the 
factory, throwing stones at the police. 
There was one fine moment, when the police arrested 
a comrade there. They took him and put him in a 
Black Maria. A 1 1 at once, the workers who were 
sitting on the factory wa 11 jumped down into the 
street and went into the wagon and freed the 
comrade. He was handcuffed to a rai 1 inside the 
wagon, but they just tore the rail, and pulled him 
into the factory. Then, so he wouldn/t be recognized 
they gave him a FIAT workers/ overalls ... 
The occupation carried on, and of course, it wasn / t 
easy, because that place has 25,000 workers on each 
shift, and you had a lot of people who didn/t really 
understand what was going on ... they just wanted to 
get home to their wives and kids. But one of the 
best things that happened during that occupation was 
that the workers were able to walk around inside the 
factory and began to know what it looked like. 
Before, nobody really knew anything apart from their 
own sections. And they discovered all sorts of ways 
to get through to other parts of the factory. It was 
a great situation. People were sleeping there; women 
were going in with their blokes; people were fucking 
inside the factory ... and the occupation went on 
through to 5. DO next morning, when the 1 ast 
battalion of workers emerged in the morning fog, 250 
strong <everyone else had gone by that time, 
shinning over the factory walls in the dark>, every 
one of them shouting the s 1 egan / I ot ta dura senza 
paura/- We/11 fight hard, We have no fear/" <33>. 
But the events of 1969 were not, of course, always 
so dramatic. Literally hundreds of brief /articulated/ 
strikes were carried out, nearly always accompanied with 
forms of internal activities: marches, sit-ins, assem-
blies and so on. The last of these /pictures/ is a 
brief, randomly selected, newspaper report of one such 
incident: 
"At FIAT Mirafiori Avio the factory/s four hundred 
white collar workers were unable to get out at lunch 
break: a group of strikers, formed of about 300 
people, had a sit-in in front of the office block. 
Sitting on the ground and on the steps the workers 
blocked the 12.15 exit. The peaceful seige lasted 
unti I 16.15. Only at this time did the demonstrators 
move off allowing the office workers to go and eat" 
(34). 
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CHAPTER V 
THE NEW WAY OF MAKING CARS 
FIAT and the Crisis of the 1970s 
Much has been writ ten in recent years about the 
crisis threatening the car industry, the single most 
important sector in advanced industrial economies by 
reason both of its direct affect as a producer and its 
indirect effect as a consumer. 
The car industry is at the centre of a vast occupa-
tion a I /whee I / inducing emp I oymen t in spheres such as 
the component, distribution, repair and servicing indus-
tries and consuming a iion/s share of all rubber, iron, 
steel, plastic etc. produced. It has been estimated 
that in Western Europe about 25% of workers in a I I 
non-agricultural industries are affected to some extent 
by the car industry <1>. In Italy between 1970 and 1974 
the car industry employed an average of 200,000 people 
(four per cent of the tota I active industria I I abour 
force> to which must be added the 1.8 mil I ion in related 
and affected industries, giving a total of 2 mi II ion 
Jobs ( 2>. 
The decline of this enormously important industrial 
sector is due to a series of relatively distinct fac-
tors. First amongst these is the prob I em of the in-
creasing saturation of the market. 
From the annual growth rates of over 15 % recorded 
in the 1950s the market of the 70s has stagnated to such 
a point that most estimates agreed world demand for cars 
would grow at no more than 3% annually between 1980 and 
1985, with an even I ower growth rate in the European 
market. This, in the face of i ncreasi ngl y strong compe-
tition from Japan and to a lesser extent European-based 
American producers could not but mean bad news for the 
sma I I er European manufacturers. As ear I y as 1975 the 
British Central Pol icy Review Staff forecast a 35% 
over-capacity in the Western European car industry 
leading to intense competition and low profits <3). The 
problem of saturation became even more severe with the 
general dec 1 i ne in buying power in industria 1 i zed 
countries; a second car or the early replacement of an 
ageing model are sacrified first in a general climate of 
economic decline. 
Pessimism about the car industry became acute dur-
ing the severe crisis following the oil price increases 
and the con traction of the o i 1 supp 1 y to the Western 
world in 1973. Between 1972 and 1974 oil prices 
quadrupled <and the effects of this were even more acute 
in Italy due to the unfavourable Lira/Dollar exchange 
rates). For the car industry this meant not only higher 
production costs but also, of course, a drop in demand 
as consumers sought to economize on petrol. In the first 
months of 1974 world demand dropped by about 40% whilst 
production fell by about 11% in the E.E.C. member 
countries, 14% in the U.S.A. and only 2% in Japan <4). 
However, as has been underlined by others (5), the 
long term realization crisis in the industry and the 
short term, though serious, crisis directly related to 
the oi I price rises of 1973 must be seen as separate 
phenomena. In 1976 the car industry had at least 
apparent I y recovered from the o i I crisis and the car 
began /pulling/ again on the international market, even 
experiencing a minor and temporary boom C see fig. 1). 
But the prob I ems of sa tura. t ion were st l l l very much 
present, rocking the foundations of even the giant Ford 
empice, throwing the European industries such as British 
Leyland, FIAT and even the comparatively strong looking 
Volkswagen into acute crisis, and causing an increasing 
concentration among producers, with mergers such as 
those leading to the formation of the European giant 
Peugeot-Citroen-Talbot. 
Although the process of concentration or collapse 
of the weaker producers was considerably slowed by the 
interventions of national states <national governments 
are clearly extremely reluctant to allow their home-
based car industries to die given their enormous 
importance for employment figures, and have generally 
shown themse 1 ves prepared to sustain such industries 
even at vast losses), it became increasingly clear that 
the market would only support a limited number of large 
and high 1 y competitive corporations. The sma 1 1 er 
European companies were handicapped in the increasingly 
bitter contest to remain among the survivors by what is 
known, euphemistically, as ~poor industrial relations~ 
as well as disadvantages in terms of economies of scale 
and research and development finance. The effect of 
these disadvantages shows up clearly in tables I-II and 
fig. 2 setting out production figures and productivity 
for the maJor producers. 
After the big drop in production following the oil 
crisis, the stronger companies were ab 1 e to recuperate 
or nearly recuperate peak levels by 1977, although the 
annual rate of increase was considerably lower than in 
t h e y ears pre c e d i n g the c r i s i s . As can be seen f rom 
tab I e I the two weaker among the major European pro-
ducers, Italy and the United Kingdom - both notoriously 
pI agued by industria I reI at ions prob I ems - underwent a 
steep reI at i ve dec I i ne in the European market over the 
ten years between 1968 and 1978. 
This, then, is a brief overall picture of the si-
tuation of the car industry in the 1970s. The specific 
economic and social context of FIAT/s strategies for its 
labour force in this period can now be drawn. 
Throughout the 1960/s, FIAT/s position in the Euro-
pean car market was extremely secure. It/s strength was 
largely based on the very low price of labour in Italy 
plus high productive rhythms and industrial peace 
achieved through repression inside the factories. As was 
said in a previous chapter, FIAT used this period of 
high profits based on the productivity of a cheap and 
repressed labour force to pursue a policy of im-
perialism. It moved into Spain with SEAT Cat present 51% 
owned by FIAT>, into Latin America <where its big 
production plants profited from an even more repressed 
and badly paid workforce) and began using Italy/s 
special relationship with Eastern European countries, 
due mainly to its large Communist Party, to begin 
producing on licence in Poland, Yugoslavia and at the 
Russian town named Togliattigrad in Italy/s honour. This 
early expansionist policy gave FIAT a head start in the 
st i l 1 expanding markets of the / deve I oping/ countries, 
as wel I as guaranteed supplies of components in case of 
trouble at home <during at least one major strike FIAT 
attempted to ship engines into Italy from Spain and 
e 1 sewhere), and the ava i 1 ab i 1 it y of a cheaper and 1 ess 
recalcitrant workforce. 
In 1970, FIAT was st i 1 1 the strongest car producer 
in Europe. Out of approx i rna te 1 y 6, 660,000 cars regis-
tered in the nine in this year 1,268,000 were Italian, 
and FIAT held about 18% of the European market. Even as 
late as 1974 FIAT sti 11 held first place in the /league/ 
of European car manufacturers. 
However the results of the growing industria! rela-
tions problems in FIAT/s home-based plants were soon to 
make themselves felt. 
As the political and industrial movements of the 
1960s swept through Europe culminating in the Italian 
/hot autumn/ of 1969, FIAT, with its indegenous and 
increasingly politically conscious labour force, was hit 
even harder than other car industries. Whilst the German 
and French industries could rely on Turk, Slav and 
Ita! ian immigrant labour to maintain relative competiti-
veness through high productivity, FIAT was faced with a 
profound and durab 1 e change in the consciousness and 
organization of its workforce, which consisted largely 
of Southern Italians. As Luciano Parlanti put it: "The 
blocked brains suddenly opened up" <6>. Or as Giorgio 
Benvenuto, Secretary General of the UILM preferred: 
" ... the whole concept of authority in the factory was 
put into crisis" <7>. 
Thus FIAT entered the crisis of 1973 even less able 
than its competitors to weather the storm. From 1973 it 
was overtaken successive 1 y by Vo I kswagen, Renau It and 
Ford of Europe, at last ceding even fourth place after 
the formation of the Peugeot-Citroen-Talbot conglo-
mer ate, to take a pI ace among the very weakest car 
prodLJcers, By 1978 FIAT/ s shar-e of the European market 
had dropped to under 10%, and its share of world 
production had deteriorated by more than two percentage 
points to 3.9% C8). AI I this despite heavy investment in 
new plant and technology Csee fig. 3) and compara-
tively low labour costs Con 31st December 1979 FIAT 
workers earned an average of 7,402 Lire per hour - index 
100- against 8,971 Lire- index 121- and 11,375 Lire-
index 154 respectively for French and German car-
workers) C9). FIAT/s productivity in fact dec! ined 
progressively in this period: the number of cars, scaled 
to the 128 model, produced annually per worker dropped 
from 18.4 in 1973 to 13.8 in 1979, figures which compare 
extremely unfavourably with its major competitors. This 
is illustrated in the comparative statistics for 
productivity reproduced in table II and fig. II. As can 
be seen, Italy/s car industry has the worst productivity 
record of al 1 major producers in both absolute and 
relative terms. FIAT/s relative decline in market 
penetration (tab 1 e I I I> was certain 1 y due to its poor 
productivity performance. Over the 1970s wage rates rose 
steeply, the working week shrank <see figs. 4 and 5), 
and a whole series of trade union rights and de facto 
workers/ powers were canso! idated; but most important of 
al 1. however, was the breakdown of authority in the big 
factory. 
The authority of the factory hierarchy and the 
strength of the foremen, so important in the high 
productivity of the years of the /economic miracle/ was 
gradua 1 1 y eroded over the 1 ate 1960s and ear 1 y 1970s. 
Unlike in many other countries, managerial discipline 
cou I d not be rep 1 aced with a manageable trade union 
carrying out the rules of collective bargaining as a 
representative of its membership, given the hi stor i ca I 
weakness of the official trade union movement in the 
Ita! ian factory. 
The End of the Taylorian Dream 
"Mirafiori was the symbol of the future, and anyone 
who talked about the factory took it as their model. 
The reason for this was that this sort of plant, 
based on high levels of division of labour, on 
continuity, on mechanical pacing in the productive 
process, on a numerous and powerful factory hierar-
chy, allowed the maximum degree of exploitation, 
control and stratification of the labour force. It 
seemed that the individual will of the workers had 
been anulled in the big factory ... the scientific 
organization of work, piece rates and foremen 
guaranteed the maximum intensification of work; and 
the maximum extraction of surplus value coupled with 
a maximum social stabi 1 ity were the fundamental 
variables in capitalist behaviour. But this 
/marvellous' mechanism has by now been shattered ... 
For some years now the big factory has no 1 anger 
been able to guarantee all this. In fact, it has 
become a weak point for capital" ( 10). 
The giant factory, from the dynamo of profits and 
productivity it had been in the 50s and 60s, had by now 
become a giant headache for FIAT. 
Table I : Production as a percentage of 
E.E.C. total 
1968 1978 
Italian industry 19.5 14.0 
British 21.0 13.0 
German 31.0 38.0 
French 24.0 31.0 
Table II: Productivity in the automobile industry. 
Index Nos. 1972 = 100 
I 
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 I 
------------+-----+-----+-----+-----+-----1 I I 
I G.B. I 98 91 I 92 I 96 93 I 1--------------1------ ------1------1------ ------1 
I FRANCE I 103 101 I 100 I 124 124 I 1--------------1------ ------1------1------ ------1 
I GERMANY I 107 103 I 112 I 119 126 I 1--------------1------ ------1------1------ ------1 
I ITALY I 95 93 I 83 I 89 88 I 1--------------1------ ------1------1------ ------1 
I SWEDEN I 107 117 I 109 I 97 100 I 1--------------1------ ------1------1------ ------1 
I JAPAN I 106 97 I 107 I 126 135 I 1--------------1------ ------1------1------ ------1 
I U.S.A I 92 88 I 85 I 97 108 I 
I I I I I 
Table III: Percentage of FIAT's car marketing penetration 
I 
I 1968 I 1969 1970 I 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 I 1976 
I I I I I I I 
ITALY I 67.8 I 62.8 55.8 I 57.3 54.7 53.9 53.9 48.6 I 46.5 
I I I I 
I I I I 
EUROPE * I 6.4 I 6.4 6.1 I 6.3 6.0 5.4 5.4 5.6 I 5.2 I I I I 
I I I I 
U.S.A. ** I 2.9 I 3.9 3.0 I 2.9 3.6 3.4 5.1 6.2 I 4.1 
I I I I 
* 
excl. Italy and Spain 
** 
on imports 
Source FIAT 
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In a period in which the car industry was suffering 
from a long term saturation problem, exacerbated by 
declining buying power in the maJor economies, the 
smaller European industries had the worst of the situa-
tion as the productive Japanese and to a lesser extent 
American companies sought market outlets and set up new 
productive bases in Europe. It is the contention here 
that the vi ab i 1 it y of these competitors depended not 
only on their greater financial and productive resources 
but a I so. and perhaps pr inc i pa I 1 y. on smoother indus-
tr-ial relations. The concept of Scientific Management 
may st i 1 i have been function a I in the somewhat ca 1 mer 
context of American industrial relations, but in Italy 
the rigidity implied by the sequential recomposition of 
minutely fragmented tasks had rendered the big factory 
intolerably vulnerable to the expression of working 
class disaffection with work. FIAT had to look for a new 
solution: a /new way of making cars/ which could resolve 
this problem of inflexibility without sacrificing 
economy of scale. 
Work Organization, Technology 
and Control ln the FIAT Auto Group 
The following pages constitute, first and foremost, 
a description of FIAT/s experimentation with various 
forms of work organization in the 1970s, as it will be 
necessary to have a fairly complete idea of the physical 
rea 1 it y of the /new way of making cars/ being exper i-
mented by FIAT before any theoretical analysis of the 
underlying issue of control on the factory floor can be 
made. 
We have now seen that FIAT is a company in which 
confl let and its containment, redirection and control 
have become cruc i a I issues, not on I y because of the 
combative and imaginative tradition of the Ita! ian 
working class, but also as a result of the particularly 
acute economic problems which it faces. The containment 
of con£ I i ct has thus become an issue of surv iva I in the 
car industry as to remain competitive each company must 
reorganize production to get cars off the production 
line as fast and as cheaply as possible. 
A first premise in the ach 1 evemen t of such 
creased efficiency has been the confrontation of 
orders of problems. Firstly, the "defensive" or 
in-
two 
non-
organized and non-class-conscious refusal of work. 
Clearly the monotonous and repetitive work of a modern 
car factory does not evoke a spontaneous desire to 
produce; the i nst i net of most workers is to "escape" 
from the production line as much as possible, an 
instinct which leads not only to the enormous problems 
of absenteeism, but also much 'dead' or non productive 
time during the working day. Such "porousity" is 
manifested not only in institutionalized <and therefore 
programmable> periodic breaks, initially 
management through struggle but by now 
wrested 
almost 
from 
uni-
versally accepted as a necessary evil, but also in non-
programmable moments of respite seized by individuals in 
defence of their physical and mental health, for a 
cigarette or a read of the newspaper, and spontaneous 
reductions of working speed. Secondly, productive time 
lost through active and organized conflict ranging from 
brief, wild cat, stoppages to full scale union backed 
strikes. 
The way in which management chooses to confront 
both the /defensive/ and the more organized farms of 
rejection of factory work and conditions can only be 
understood in the framework of the conditions of class 
struggle both within and without the specific factory. 
Forms of control practicable in Japan would be im-
possible in the British car industry, whilst the 
policies of British Leyland would have no sense in 
Italy. A particular policy of control is born out of a 
particular balance of power between the employer and the 
working c I ass; the emp 1 oyer is forced to re-postu I ate 
his control according to changes in that balance, in a 
continuous process of resolution of the problems posed 
by the imagination and strength of the working class. 
In an earlier chapter I examined how FIAT workers 
in the 1950s were /made/ to work through a pol icy of 
fair I y overt repression, /bribes/ and the 1 arge sea 1 e 
introduction of forms of Taylorism and Fordlsm. This 
sort of control was then undermined by the radica-
lization of the immigrant Southerners during the 1960s 
and dea 1 t a f ina 1 blow by the workers and students 
movement of 1968-69 culminating in the /hot autumn/ of 
1969. 
1969 was crucial for FIAT in that it proved that 
the combination of the use of a /green/ immigrant labour 
force with the sort of terror tactics and anti-union 
activity emp 1 oyed in the 1950s had become much more 
difficult to implement and often even counter-productive 
in the 1970s given the increased strength and unity of 
the trade union movement and the new confidence of the 
working class. A new managerial pol icy had to be evolved 
in I ine with new political and social conditions both 
inside and outside the factory, a pol icy which is 
epitomized in the catch-phrase /a new way of making 
cars/ . 
It can be hypothesized that this new philosophy was 
born in part voluntarily, through an intelligent re-
appraisal of the situation by the management <11), and 
in part because of increasing 1 y strong demands rising 
from the shop f I oor but art i cuI a ted through the trade 
union for: 
1) a democratizing of the factory through a strengthen-
ing of the trade unions on the factory floor, 
2> a greater degree of control over wages and thus 
speeds and rhythms of work, and 
3> a refusal of the /monetarization/ of health risks and 
the demand for a better working environment. 
The strong shop floor feeling for better conditions 
in the factory, then, gave a common denominator on which 
both unions and management could work, and through which 
they could find an uneasy peace. The most unpleasant 
Jobs would be vastly improved or even in some cases 
eliminated, and the factory would become a cleaner, 
pleasanter, quieter place to work; the workers would 
have more control over what they did and how long it 
took them to do it, wage packets wou 1 d be 1 ess sus-
cept i b 1 e to externa 1 f 1 uxes in market conditions etc. 
The rea I it y was to be a I itt I e 1 ess i dy 11 i c than the 
theory, and showed how super£ i cia 1 was the coincidence 
of l nterest between management and workers l n /the new 
way of making cars/. FIAT/s interest ln improving 
conditions in the factory was real only so far as these 
improved conditions could also improve productivity; 
through relieving the climate of tension in the factory 
and using new technology and new work methods to improve 
flexibility and efficiency. During my first visit to 
FIAT in October 1979, for example, the paint cabin 
workers were disputing a 50% cut of the periodic half 
hour break that had been conceded for the noxious 
conditions in which they worked before the introduction 
of new spray tunnels. The improvement of conditions thus 
permitted management considerable savings; and as we 
shall see, when they didn/t, the work experiments were 
shelved. 
The new manager i a 1 direction was, then, at 1 east 
superficially in 1 ine with demands arising from the shop 
floor in the late 60s and early 50s, but its realization 
within the factory was imposed un 1 1 at era 1 1 y by mana-
gement with the aim of increasing efficiency and 
tightening control over production. The face, but not 
the heart of the old authoritarian factory of Valletta/s 
days was changed. This was illustrated well ln my talk 
with Dr. M., a senior member of FIAT/s personnel mana-
gement, who, referring to the changes in the company/s 
management commented: "Once they were all ex-colonels, 
much more, you know, authoritarian. Now they employ 
sociologists I ike me". He went on, however, to say with 
no embarrassment that the unions are not consulted over 
the introduction of the new forms of labour organization 
and techno 1 ogy. A group of Ley 1 and personne 1 managers 
who visited FIAT in 1977 were also to pinpoint this 
duality: "FIAT management style has changed signifi-
cantly from autocratic towards participative. They see 
this change continuing but they do not feel there is a 
need to formalize participation in Italy or FIAT" <12). 
FIAT/s strategy in the 70s can thus be summarized 
as an attempt to turn to its own advantage the forceful 
workers/ demands discussed elsewhere for: 1) democrati-
zation 2) changes in an egalitarian direction of the 
retributive structure 3) improvement of the working 
environment. The resulting strategy has been a 
combination of: 
1) A recognition of the democratic expressions of the 
working c I ass that emerged in /69 <the de 1 egat i, CUB 
etc.) in an attempt to incorporate them with the trade 
unions and render them more predictable and 
control !able. 
2) Changes in the retributive structure which give an 
appearance of satisfying workers/ demands (for example 
for a more homogeneous wage structure reflecting the 
real homogeneity of the work performed> whilst in 
reality tying the unions up in a complicated series of 
individual grading disputes and simultaneously intro-
ducing an enormous degree of mobility /through the back 
door/ as a condition of automatic promotion. 
3) Changes in the physical reality of production to 
improve working conditions whilst attempting to increase 
productive flexibi Jity and reorganize political /hot 
points/ where wild cat disputes threaten production. 
The first of these points receives genera I treat-
ment elsewhere in this thesis. The following sections 
wi I I deal respectively with points 2) and 3). 
/Inquadramento Unico/. Job Rotation and 
Flexible Use of the Labour Force at FIAT 
"FIAT recognizes that large factories are poor from 
the human angle. This is revealed by people/s 
attitudes to their work and the company and often 
manifests through industrial disputes and mal-
practices ... Such a climate reduces the overal 1 
efficiency of the establishment and cannot be 
tal era ted by progressive management. FIAT thought 
part of the answer is to provide jobs which are more 
acceptable to individuals. However, as this often 
entails enlarging the job, a secondary problem 
emerges, that of the requirement to pay more for 
doing more. 
Fortunately FIAT/ s unified grade structure is 
sufficiently flexible to accomodate this problem to 
some degree" < 13). 
Thus the unified grade structure < Inquadr-amento 
unico> provides for /enriched/ and more varied jobs, 
whose <slightly) greater costs to FIAT are, however, 
offset by a br-eakdown in demarcation lines, a much 
higher degree of labour force mobility and a consequent 
more efficient use of the workers available on the shop 
floor at any given moment as well as, debatably, the 
added bonus of reduced industrial relations problems. 
Inquadramento unico was in fact inspired by the 
workers' reJection of the claim that Job evaluation and 
ski II grading were based on scientific criteria, and 
introduced as a result of centrally important battles in 
the late 60s for automatic promotion up the grades. As 
we shall see in the following sections on work organi-
zation and technology, this is only one in a series of 
examples of how management may actually turn working 
class initiatives to their own advantage. 
In Italy a strong 'ski 11 fan', or hierarchy of 
wages and ski l 1 1 eve l s, had been evo 1 vi ng s i nee the 
period of post-war reconstruction. The deve 1 opment of 
this hierarchy was in fact, as we saw, support·ed by the 
workers' parties and the unions in their policy of 
reconstruction before a 1 I e 1 se, as a system of 
incentives was he 1 d necessary for heal thy industria 1 
development. Thus skilled male workers in Northern Italy 
in the leading industrial sectors steadily increased 
their pos i t ion of re 1 at i ve pay pr i vi 1 ege. Periods of 
'wage drift' were followed by an incorporation within 
the skill structure, leading to an increasingly complex 
and hierarchical skill grading system. 
Th l s tendency was further accentuated after the 
great defeat of the working class organizations in the 
1950s, when forms of job eva 1 uat ion spread throughout 
Italian industry <although it was only formally adopted 
at Italsider and ENI >, formalizing and consolidating 
this runaway process. Thus, as the real skil 1 content of 
jobs was gradually degraded and homogenized by the spead 
of Taylorian work methods, forms of job evaluation were 
adopted to create artificial divisions in ski I I based on 
apparently /scientific/ and /quantitative' methods 
designed to measure and /weigh/ elements such as 
responsibi I ity and training for various tasks in respect 
to a base level. The factors taken into account were: 
1) Education levels required for mental preparation to 
grasp training. 
2) Training and professional experience. 
3> Mental ski I ls. 
4) Manual skills. 
5) Responsibi 1 ity for materials. 
6) 
7) 
8) 
II 
II 
II 
II 
tools and machines. 
labour process. 
safety of others. 
9) Mental and visual effort. 
10) Physical effort. 
11> Working environment. 
12> Risks. 
The factors concerning responsibi 1 ity were given 
the greatest weight, factors 5, 6 and 7 accounting for 
about 50% of the total possible score. Thus manual and 
mental ski 11, length of training etc. took a back seat 
to the concept of responsibility for the care and 
running of expensive capital machinery, and a real 
reduction in ski 11 content could be hidden in a new 
h i e r arch y based on the en i gm at i c not i on of 
responsibi 1 i ty. 
The grade structure based on this evaluation was 
extremely complicated. Workers were divided into operaio 
comune <O.C.) or unski lied manual; operaio qual ificato 
<O.O.) or semi-ski 1 led manual; operaio specializzato 
CO.S.) or ski I led manual and impiegato Clmp.) or office 
worker. These classes were further sub-divided into 
various categories. The following table shows the 
various categories and the percentage of workers in each 
category: 
CATEGORY CLASS 
OC2 1-2 
OC1 3-6 
OQ 7-11 
OS1 12-17 
OS2 (1-5) 
Imp 3 (1-5) 
OSI 
OSI (6-10) 
Imp 2 (6-10) 
Imp I <11-13) 
Imp I Super (14-16) 
TOTAL 
(14) 
% of 
Workers 
2.22 
12.26 
33.90 
30.81 
1.00 
89.19% 
PERCENTAGE EMPLOYEES 
Special cats. 
1.51 
2.58 
4.09% 
% of 
Office Staff 
3.34 
9.04 
3.34 
15.72% 
The advantages to capital of such a hierarchical 
system are c I ear. First I y, some of the dangers of an 
increasing homogeneity of the working class, con-
centrated under one roof and becoming every day more 
aware of the similarity of their situations and of their 
potential power if united, could be averted by creating 
false divisions, professional Jealousies and the idea of 
a workers/ career among the working class. Secondly and 
related to this, the interminable individual con-
troversies over grading could disperse working class 
energy, re-directing mass struggles into individual 
ones. This also has the /spin-off/ effect of strongly 
bureaucratizing unions to cope with these formal 
disputes. 
It is understandable then that the workers/ call 
for an abolition of the complicated wage hierarchy and 
for an increased control over wages, manifested through 
slogans such as 11 equal rises for all 11 and 11 automatic 
promotion up the grades 11 , was not at first welcomed with 
open arms by management. 
In the years between 1969 and 1973 the workers/ 
/ i nsti ncti ve / understanding of and opposition to the 
capitalist organization of the labour process was 
perhaps most intensly felt in the modification of the 
grading and retributive structure. In 1968 and 
especially 1969 entire lines and entire teams, sometimes 
even entire shops composed largely of operal comunl 
<unskilled workers> began presenting the Cammlssione 
Interna with long lists of names for promotion, and 
often accompanied them with autonomous stoppages. These 
disputes were directed not only against management but 
against the Commlssione Interna and working class 
organizations that generally refused to back such 
claims, holding that they were not technically 
Justified. The slogan 11 La seconda per tutti, tutti 
qua I if i cat i 11 (Second category for a I I , everybody 
skilled) appeared at Alfa Romeo and FIAT in the spring 
of 1969. The struggle was highly successful. At the 
Miraflori Bodywork <Carrozzeria) section between i97i 
and 1972, the percentage of workers in the /first/ and 
/first super/ categories increased from 2.5 to 3.0%, 
those in the /second/ category from 16 to 30%, wh i I st 
the percentage in the /lower third/ and /third super/ 
categories decreased from 81.5% to 67% (15). Paintshop 
workers, amongst the most militant, had ensured the 
first or second category for 52% of their workers by 
1972 (16). Management perceived this uncontrolled 
egalitarian tendency as a danger that had to be 
relocated within a predictable and normative context, 
even at the cost of compromise with the trade union 
movement. 
S i nee the 1960s the trade union movement. under 
pressure from the rank and f i 1 e, had been discussing 
plans for possible ways of revising the grading and 
retributive structures in a more egalitarian direction. 
It was from these discussions that the idea of 
Inquadramento unico, a single ski 11 structure 
encompassing both blue and white collar workers was 
born. In 1966, Inquadramento unico took its place in the 
negotiating platform for the national engineering 
workers contract. The 1966 negotiations were weak but 
the union demand for the en 1 argement of the number of 
categories was accepted. By increasing the number of 
categories the unions could not hope to solve the issues 
of skill, job evaluation etc., but only mollify 
i nd i vi dua 1 workers by increasing the chances of 
promotion up the ski 1 l grades. 
However, the genera 1 questioning of the reI at ion-
ship between work, mechanization, the use of technology 
and ski I I grades became increasingly more insistent 
during 1968 and 1969. The young 'first generation' 
industrial workers from Southern Italy had little 
interest in protecting ski 11 levels when their un-
conditioned eyes could see that work was pretty much the 
same alI over the giant mechanized factories. Whilst the 
older Piedmontese /union men/ still saw skill grades as 
a working c 1 ass heritage to be defended at a I 1 costs, 
the younger men had no status as a labour aristocracy to 
defend, and saw no reason to maintain it for others in 
the face of increasing deski I ling of work in the 
factory. A sort of impasse was reached. It could hardly 
be hoped that the older, skilled workers predominant in 
the unions wou 1 d give up a 1 1 notions of ski 1 I 
recognition, won through so many hard batt I es in the 
past. But the young immigrants were many, and equa 11 y 
immovable. 
The result was on one side a disi I lusionment with 
the unions by the young workers with an autonomous rank 
and file struggle for a more egalitarian system, and on 
the other some compromise thinking or /leading from 
behind/ by the trade unions. It was this thinking which 
1 ed to the fu 1 1 deve 1 opment of the concept of 
Inquadramento unlco which was to be a unified grade 
structure allowing for promotion on the basis of the 
breadth of work experience rather than the elusive 
concept of ski 1 1 . It was here, then, that the ide a of 
job rotation as a substitute for a I inear worker/s 
career entered the union concept of skill. Rotation was 
conceived as a means whereby the worker cou I d secure 
promotion by learning a number of varied tasks, and as 
such as an attack on the capitalist division of labour, 
as each worker could thus experience the who I e of the 
labour process, up to and including non-manual areas, 
rather than a mere fragment of it. 
The union men were surely honest in their inten-
tions to find a new grade structure which would be both 
more ega l i tar ian and a reflection of real ski l 1 , but 
some were already ha 1 f aware of the pass i b 1 e dangers 
lurking in the idea of Inquadramento unico: 
"In my opinion it's time to analyze what job 
rotation really means, because if job rotation is 
just a 1 i ne worker who moves from one post on the 
line to another, to tell the truth it interests me 
very 1 ittle". 
However, this speaker at the XVth Congress of FIOM 
continues on an optimistic note: 
the issue is to forge a link between the 
question of skil 1 and that of education, to build a 
collective capacity within the working class to 
oppose the capitalist organization of labour ... in 
such a way as to cal 1 into question the whole 
capitalist division of labour inside the factory" 
( 17). 
It was thus that in the early 1970s the combination 
of management fear of the increasing anarchy in the 
factory hierarchy and the union resignation to the 
hopelessness of attempting to defend the traditional 
ski 11 structure gave the conditions for a gradual 
acceptance of Inquadramento unico in Italy as the flames 
of 1969 began to die down. The first agreement came in 
December 1970 at Italsider. By 1971 Inqua- dramento 
un i co figured in sever a I other company agreements, and 
by 1972 it had assumed a central role in the negotiation 
of the national contracts. 
In the engineering industry, the national contract 
incorporating Inquadramento unico was signed ln March 
1973. The relevant section of the contract reads: 
"The workers are to be graded within a single clas-
sification articulated in seven skill categories and 
eight retributive levels with equal minimum monthly 
tabular payments... The single classification 
outlined above does not modify the attribution to 
the workers of special normative and economic 
treatments ... which wil 1 continue to be provided for 
c l er i cal workers, spec 1 a l categor 1 es and <manual> 
workers according to the law. the confedera l 
agreement and the collective work contract" <18>. 
The table below sets out the new categories against 
the corresponding old ones. 
New Categories Categories as given by 1970 work contract 
Ist Op. 5th - Op. 4th 
2nd Imp. 4th - Op. 3rd 
3rd Imp. 3rd - Op. 2nd 
4th Imp. 3rd - op. Ist - CS. 2nd 
5th Imp. 2nd - Op. Ist Super cs. Ist 
5th super Imp. 2nd 
6th Imp. Ist 
7th Imp. Ist super 
Op. <Operaio) = manual worker, Imp. <Impiegato) = clerical 
worker, Cs <Categoria Speciale) = special category worker 
Promotion from the first to the second I eve I was 
automatic on completion of four months of satisfactory 
work. However, promotion form the second level required 
a period of emp 1 oyment of four years and the 
satisfactory completion of a series of tasks. 
Thus, largely due to the pressure from PCI domina-
ted elements in the unions, the concept of skill and a 
'worker's career' was retained in the new grading 
system, even though this was now to be tied to the more 
neutral notion of the length and breadth of working 
experience. 
Inquadramento unico, then, was from the start an 
equivocal notion. It passed into the contract because it 
seemed to be a step towards the sat i sf action of two 
central workers' demands: the elimination of the /false~ 
skill hierarchy based on job evaluation, and automatic 
promotion from the lowest category. It first apppeared 
before the c I imax of workers/ refusa 1 of Tay 1 or ism in 
the factory; submerged again during the 'hot autumn" 
<replaced by a virtual rank and file de facto seizure of 
control over the grading system> and re-emerged in the 
1970s as both unions and management sought to re-
stabilize the situation and re-assert their respective 
spheres of power. It was sought by the unions as it 
a I 1 owed for the retention of the notion of promotion 
based on skil 1, but in a "fairer' more 'objective" 
definition of the horizontal enlargement of the workers" 
knowledge of the productive process. It was accepted by 
management because it gave a breakdown of demarcation 
and increased opportunity for labour force mobility, a 
fact that was overlooked or regarded as unimportant in 
the union analysis. 
Changes in the 
Physical Reality of Production 
The changes in the organization of work since 1970 
at FIAT can be roughly divided into two categories: 
First I y the ex per imen ts designed to a Iter the workers 
attitudes to their jobs, by attempting to reduce mono-
tony through a /richer/ or /larger/ job content, or by 
giving a greater degree of responsibility and autonomy 
to the worker. These changes I have characterized as 
/sociological/ as they are largely based on ideas coming 
out of schoo Is of industria I soc i o I ogy and psycho I ogy. 
Secondly, experiments using both technological and 
organizational changes to bypass or defuse any workers/ 
refusal of work, replacing as far as possible manual 
labour with automated processes, and increasing 
productive flexibility in such a way that disputes 
affecting particular sections wi II not halt all 
/downstream/ production. These changes I have charac-
terized as /technological/. Some experiments, of course, 
attempt to combine both styles, as in, for example, the 
/Dig i t ron/ f ac i I it y . 
The Sociological Style 
FIAT/s flirtation with job enrichment, job enlarge-
ment, autonomous work groups etc. is oddly reminiscent 
of the middle class couple who invite a token black man 
to the dinner party. The experiments have an air of 
being gestures 
quick 1 y i n the 
of appeasement which tend to crumble 
face of hard economic real it y. By now 
FIAT has ceased to even pay 1 ip service to /Volvo style/ 
large scale experimentation with this sort of organi-
zation of work. A FIAT personnel manager remarked to me 
about the semi autonomous work groups at Volvo/s Kalmar 
plant: "It/s just a shop window. Their real production 
comes off traditional assembly lines in other plants". 
In fact, the sociological experiments, as far as 
they were set up, have in almost every case failed and 
have been di smant I ed at FIAT, as they proved not to 
improve production speeds, to be extremly costly and to 
require a great deal of space. Thus Cesare Ann i ba 1 d i , 
the chief personnel officer at FIAT, comments on what he 
describes as a micro-organization of work <that is 
interventions designed to increase the skill content of 
individual jobs>: this sort of intervention seems 
to have exhausted any propulsive capacity for the 
enlargement of its range of application". On the 
question of group work experiments, designed to reduce 
the importance of the figure of the individual skilled 
worker, reduce the hierarchy at work and find space for 
a 1 eve l of autonomy in sma 1 1 decisions concerning the 
work being performed, he is not much more enthusiastic: 
II the organizational reality of productive processes, 
technologies and products is restrictive and makes these 
interventions possible only in limited and relatively 
marginal areas" (19>. 
The fact that experiments with the sociological 
style of intervention in the factory have had no gr-eat 
success and evoked no gr-eat enthusiasm at FIAT Cor- in 
Italy more generally) is not surprising. Such ex-
periments in other countries have normally been carried 
out with a high level of participation and cooperation 
by the trade unions involved; a factor which is totally 
missing in Italy given its traditions of autocratic 
management and highly conflictual working class. As 
Annibaldi remarks: 
the objective of giving space for self deter-
mination through a different organization of work 
risks - in the present state of industrial relations 
in Italy being a retreat forwards. This in so much 
as the example from other countries shows that 
experiences of this sort have concrete possibilities 
of actuation and development in the context of 
industrial relations more attuned to the involvement 
of the trade unions. Because of this, in Italy such 
an issue would have to be confronted in the much 
wider context of different attitudes in relations 
between social parties" <20). 
Without a high level of cooperation and involvement 
by the workers involved, from their moment of conception 
and throughout their rea 1 i zati on in practice, exper i-
ments designed to allow workers a degree of autonomy in 
day to day decision making are almost bound to bring 
on 1 y the disadvantages of the extra costs and space 
demanded, without bringing the advantages hoped for ln 
terms of stronger motivation to work, lower rates of 
absenteeism etc. 
In order to understand better how and why FIAT has 
had little success with this sort of intervention we 
will now turn to an examination of the actual experi-
ments which have been carried out. 
1) Experiments in /Job enlargement/. Example: the FIAT 
126 model at Cassino. 
In the Southern Italian plant at Cassino a large 
scale experiment in /Job enlargement/ was carried out. 
The concept is simple: the number of assembly lines was 
quadrupled, each line being 1/4 of its original length 
and moving at 1/4 of its original speed, thus increasing 
the number of operations to be performed by each worker 
by a factor of 4. 
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This form of work design shows very clearly some of 
the ambiguities that can arise between the cup of the 
sociologists' conception and the I ip of managerial 
actualization. An experiment sold to the unions on the 
basis of its enlarged job content in fact had the 
principal result of enlarged productive flexibility. 
Breakdowns etc. in a four I i ne set up are un I ike I y to 
affect more than one line, leaving three on which 
production can be continued normally. Furthermore, 
absenteeism, one of the biggest management headaches in 
the modern car industry, can be better managed, as 
available workers may be distributed among the various 
comparable work posts in the most efficient possible 
combinations, and the lines moved at independent speeds. 
Four lines may also give a greater degree of flexibility 
of production: the original idea was that different 
mode I vers i ens cou I d pass down each of the 1 i nes, as 
happens at some Ford plants, allowing a greater economy 
of scale and faci 1 itating the alteration of the 
proportions of the models produced according to market 
demand. This was however impossible to realize because 
of techn i ca 1 prob 1 ems of progranuni ng in a re 1 at i ve 1 y 
smal I plant 1 ike that of Cassino. 
In those ways management benefitted enormously, but 
what of the worker and the much vaunted job enlargement? 
It was here that this experiment backfired. Since a 
worker per fermi ng four minutes of work instead of one 
wi 11 require four times as much material to hand, the 
result is that four times as much space is required; and 
space is expensive. A profit orientated firm obviously 
cannot permit this sort of expenditure without a return, 
in this case in terms of reduced absenteeism, porousity 
etc.: and there was I itt I e return <as can be see from 
the production figures included in the diagram, an 
increased number of stations gave no increase in 
production). Apparently four minutes of boring work 
quick 1 y become just as monotonous as four times one 
minute of the same. 
In this context the lines were lengthened and the 
number of operations per worker reduced (job shrinkage?) 
thus maintaining the advantages of flexibility without 
the costs of space wastage. 
2) Experiments in semi-autonomous work 
/islands/ at RIVALTA <body assembly) 
<engine assembly). 
groups: The 
and TERMOLI 
The theory underlying such work groups is that they 
allow workers to participate as a group in the building 
of a large part of a car rather than acting repetitively 
on one small fragment of the whole, thus relieving 
boredom and alienation. 
FIAT has carried out two major experiments with 
fixed work stations <islands) operated by semi-
autonomous work groups. 
At Rivalta in 1973-74 an attempt was made to replace 
the traditional assembly lines for body assembly with a 
series of 14 fixed work stations where teams of workers 
would carry out an extended number of operations on each 
car before sending it on to the next station. The work 
cycle is thus enlarged, and workers are to some limited 
extent freed from the rhythm of work imposed by the 
traditional assembly I ine <the /buffers/ or storage 
spaces between the islands faci I itate this relative 
autonomy)_ With these techn i ca I changes to tradition a 1 
plant FIAT proclaims "the surmounting of Tayloristic 
criteria of sequential linkage on the assembly line" 
( 21). 
Whilst the /island/ system constitutes a substan-
tial change to the traditional assembly 1 ine <see 
diagrams be I ow). the claim wou I d seem a little 
exaggerated. If the operations performed per worker are 
a I itt 1 e more varied. and the buffer storage system 
allows some autonomy from 1 ine speeds, the work is stil 1 
/parcelized/; and output is stil 1 determined externally 
by pressure from /up-' and 'downstream' <which is only 
mitigated. not removed. by the the buffers) and by 
negotiated production targets. 
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The experiment was not a success. Two of the 14 
work stations were made operational for a while and a 
third was put together but never operated. By the end of 
1974 the whole project had been abandoned, However, the 
R iva Ita scheme had been conceived pure I y as an 
experiment, and its failure in economic terms did not 
come as a great surprise. The Rivalta experiment showed 
up two major problems with this kind of technique; 
firstly, as at Cassino, the space required was something 
like four times greater than for a traditional assembly 
I i ne. Second 1 y, the costs i nvo 1 ved in the transfer of 
the car body from station to station were much higher. 
Whilst the autonomous work group experiment at Ri-
valta was experimental and born out of the general push 
to find new ways of working, the islands at Termoli, 
this time for engine assembly only, were designed first 
and foremost for production. Here, a tradi tiona 1 
assembly line was used with the islands connected into 
it. Six islands were created, the first four for engine 
assembly and the last two for quality control. Each work 
post aggregates from nine to twelve minutes of work on 
each engine. 
This form of production has several advantages for 
management. Work on the islands gives the worker a high 
degree of /responsibi 1 ity; for his or her particular 
operations, which can easily be traced back, thus giving 
a psychological and material disposition to good and 
speedy work. However the Termoli experiment, like that 
of Rivalta, was not a success. The plant at Termoli is 
more expensive than the tradition a I 1 i ne and has not 
resu 1 ted in increased productivity. Furthermore, it is 
much more expensive to maintain, and uses more space. To 
quote once again from the FIAT dossier: "In economic 
terms, a comparison with a traditional assembly line 
shows that in relation its greater cost the new system 
does not give any pass i b i 1 it y of recuperation through 
efficiency and productivity" <22). 
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However, FIAT has not yet tota II y abandoned the 
idea of islands. They do have an advantage in that they 
are genera I 1 y preferred by the workers. In fact FIAT 
evolved the Termoli experiment using less techno-
logically sophisticated plant and reducing the wastage 
of space by cutting down the number of operations 
performed per worker from 9 to 12 minutes to about 4 
minutes in a new design introduced in 1980-81. 
3) 1 Job recomposition' seat assembly at CASSINO, 
MIRAFIORI, RIVALTA and LINGOTTO etc. 
/Job recomposition 1 is basically a form of job en-
largement with Job rotation. Whereas in the traditional 
work method a series of tasks are performed by a number 
of different workers often with different skill grades, 
in this form of experiment all the tasks are performed 
by all the workers, who each have the same skill grade. 
In the traditional seat assembly system seats are 
loaded onto a circular overhead conveyor or giostra 
<roundabout>. They are then assembled by four ~category 
two/ workers, quality controlled by a ~category three/ 
worker, and repaired by a sixth 1 Category three/ worker. 
In the new system the whole Job is completed at a fixed 
work station. All workers are now in ~category three/ 
and perform quality control and repair tasks as well as 
assembly. Similar experiments have been carried out for 
cab I e assemb I y, pain twork, pane 1 repairs and areas of 
the foundry, using periodic change-overs around the work 
posts and a unification of skill grades. 
These experiments are inexpensive, requiring little 
or no technical change in the plant involved. They have 
the advantage to management of further eroding the 
concept of job demarcation and to workers Cas wei! as 
the arguable advantage of /richer/ jobs) of promotion of 
a 1 l workers to the highest category ava i I ab I e in the 
series of tasks to be recomposed. 
4) /Job rotation/ - throughout FIAT 
We have already looked at examples of job rotation, 
where workers move from post to post in a sequence of 
work Ce.g. in paintwork from the spraying of the 
undercoat to the spraying of the final coat>. However, 
job rotation in FIAT is not confined to rotation through 
a sequence of connected operations; it is used much more 
widely. Thanks to Inquadramento unlco virtually al 1 
assembly I ine work has become "interchangeable" ln this 
system, allowing 
flexibility in day 
management . an enormous degree of 
to day production decisions. Union 
cooperation in this has been obtained as rotation 
through a number of jobs for defined periods of time 
gives the right to automatic promotion through the 
categories; one of the more urgent of trade union 
demands. I Wi 1 1 do no more than mention job rotation 
here, as it has already been mentioned in the section on 
retributive structure and promotion systems. Suffice to 
remark that the 1969 shop floor demand for /equal rises 
for all" has evolved in an extraordinarily positive way 
for the management of the 1970s. 
Automation and Advanced Technology 
From all that has been said it wi II have become 
clear that the /sociological' style of intervention on 
the organization of work, with the exception of 
interventions such as rotation, which anyway did not 
require any change in work methods, has been largely a 
failure at FIAT. This failure can be explained both at a 
technical level <the costs i nvo 1 ved in the modification 
of plant, the extra space required etc.) and at the 
l eve 1 of the concepts themse 1 ves (it is apparent that 
the workers quickly found their new /enriched/ and 
/enlarged/ tasks just as boring and alienating as 
before, as the interventions were not able to increase 
productivity or decrease absenteeism>. The particular 
context in which such experiments were introduced may 
also have contributed to the failure: FIAT's underlying 
autocratic managerial philosophy means that any 
modifications in the organization of work tend to be 
imposed from above without any involvement by workers or 
their representatives at any stage of their planning or 
realization. 
FIAT, probably to a greater extent than any other 
European car manufacturer, has chosen a different 
strategy as the principal element in the "new way of 
making cars/, a strategy which not only for FIAT but 
also for alI car manufacturers, must be destined to be a 
decisive element in the success or failure of such 
industries. This strategy is the application of new 
technologies towards an automation and robotization of 
the assemb 1 y process in tended to reduce personne 1 and 
increase productive efficiency. As Cesare Annibaldi, 
head of personnel at FIAT, has stated: 
"A line of alternative action along which Italian 
industry has been moving for some time is that of 
the macro-organization of work, consisting in 
interventions on plant with the intention of 
modifying, at times radically, the productive 
arrangement, in the direction of a rep 1 ann i ng of 
work and automation" C23). 
Annibaldi/s remark is echoed by Guido Carli, the leader 
at that time of Confindustria: 
11 Over the last few years we have carried out a 
policy which does not tend to favour employment. 
Given the greater rigidity of the Italian labour 
force, we have preferred investments which tend to 
save on labour and which place greater importance on 
fixed capital, investing in technology much more 
than is generally thought: ln fact after Germany we 
have the most modern and least obsolete machinery in 
Europe" <24>. 
In other words, the main intention of the new technology 
is to reduce as far as possible that troublesome element 
of the workers/ subjective presence on the factory 
floor. 
The application of new technologies, aimed at the 
reduction of personnel, the intensification of pro-
duction, the bypassing of industrial conflict and the 
speeding up of model changes is of fundamental im-
portance for an industrial sector in the throes of a 
cutthroat battle for markets, and developments in the 
fie 1 ds of mi cro-e 1 ectron i cs and robotics <and here I 
leave aside the discussion of the relationship between 
scientific innovation and industrial progress) have made 
this strategy possible. As Nicola Tufarell i ~ head of 
FIAT automobile sector remarks: "Technological inno-
vation is Europe/s choice to improve industrial and 
commercial competitiveness" (25). 
FIAT/s leading position in European automation was 
initially stimulated~ then~ by the need to solve the 
problems caused by its turbulent workforce. This much is 
admitted openly by management: "The engineers involved 
in our automation have capitalized from the kick in the 
teeth they got from the workers in / 69" ( 26), "In our 
country, where we have only a national labour force, the 
ability to organize dissent is much higher. This situa-
tion has accelerated the introduction of new techno-
logies, the only way we have to recuperate productive 
flexibility ... " (27) 
A FIAT Auto group expert explains the particularly 
high level of automation in the bodywork stations 
largely in terms of conflict: "Some of the more signi-
ficant technological innovations at FIAT Auto are 
concerned with bodywork, that is the work which presents 
perhaps the biggest problems for the company ... because 
of the concentration of trade union activity ... " <28). 
The British Leyland report concurs: "FIAT have been 
experimenting in and establishing the beneficial 
outcomes of work in job design and work organization for 
more than five years. Experiments centred on /people 
problem/ working areas initially". Discussing the 
reasons for the introduction of the Auto Assembly 
faci 1 ity for uniting the power train and body <Mirafiori 
131 line) the first given in this report is that: 
"Traditionally Body and Power Train assembly areas were 
sources of Industrial Relations problems within FIAT" 
( 29). 
In fact, the first areas to be automated and robo-
tized were predominantly within the big Northern fac-
tories where industrial conflict was strong <for example 
the welding lines at Mirafiori and Rivalta, engine to 
body assembly at Mirafiori) and where work was par-
t i cu 1 ar 1 y heavy and noxious and hence a 1 so subject to 
frequent industrial action (for example in paintwork, 
where workers worked in narrow fume-fi 1 led tunnels). 
More recently, roughly since 1977, the introduction 
of new techno! ogi es has been extended to the newer, 
smaller Southern plans such as Cassino and Termoli 
Imerese. 
As a result of the introduction of new technolo-
gies, work at FIAT has become in many areas, as the 
unions demanded it should, cleaner, safer and often 
1 inked to human rhythms rather than the machine made 
ones created by the forward march of the assembly line. 
The labour process has also become easier to con-
trol and check (a result of sophisticated information 
technology); more flexible internally and thus less 
1 iable to be blocked by handful Is of workers Cthe double 
and triple 1 ines, buffer storages, and new transfer 
technologies such as the robocarrier); and in some cases 
completely eliminates the need for workers with their 
irritating tendency not to work, to work slowly and to 
produce sub-standard or even sabotaged goods. 
For alI these reasons, then, FIAT invests each year 
more than 200 milliard Lire (approximately £100 mill ion) 
in research, and the same again in techno I og i ca I i nno-
vation. In 1978 Tufarell i revealed that more than 750 
milliard had been spent on the renewal of products and 
plant over the preceding 4 years, and 2000 mil 1 iard more 
would be spent in the following 5 years on product 
innovation (30). 
The Digltron Facility 
The digitron facility, which operates only at the 
Mirafiori plant, was an attempt at a resolution of the 
problems involved in earlier experiments with semi-
autonomous groups, and in effect is a sort of automated 
analogue to the /island/ work method. 
The digitron, like the robogate, employs /robocar-
riers/ computer control led carriers mounted with 
removable power train assembly jigs - which run along 
tracks formed by under-floor induction loops. Approxi-
mately 16 of these robocarriers carry the power train 
units from the /buffer/ storages <capacity 2 times 28 
PTs) to the body to power train unit assembly stations, 
which are arranged in five sections of four stations 
each. The power trains are assemb 1 ed at 24 assemb 1 y 
bases by teams of 4 workers each. 
The PTs arrive at the Body to PT assembly stations 
via the robocarriers. The body is lowered into position 
over the PT and the jig, holding it ready for the 
automated assembly process. Transfer sequencing through-
out the whole system is computer control led by the 
Digital Computer Company System, which is also used for 
monitoring and quality control in the assembly areas Cat 
station 2 there is a mimic electronic display and 
audible warning signal for missed operations or 
rna 1 functions). 
The digitron facility has various advantages and 
disadvantages both for management and for workers. 
A combination of manually operated clearance but-
tons and /buffer/ storage areas freed the workers to 
some extent from pacing by machinery <although time 
1 imits were imposed after extensive T & M analysis). The 
e 1 imi nation of overhead conveyors 1 ed to quieter, 1 ess 
dangerous and better 1 it working areas and the fixed 
stations meant that workers no 1 anger worked in un-
comfortable /raised arms/ positions. Furthermore, work 
was carried out in teams of four, allowing some social 
contact during working hours. The extended working cycle 
seemed not to have much relevance since even management 
reports that after an initial period of learning the new 
system, monotony quickly returned. The digitron led to 
no reduction of personnel; the workers squeezed out by 
automation <e.g. the Auto-assembly facility for uniting 
the power train and body) were easily offset by the 
indirect work created by the system itself - electri-
cians, toolmakers and maintenance workers were in 
constant demand as it was rather prone to breakdowns. 
The digitron was wel 1 accepted by both workers and 
unions, a fact demonstrated by union requests for its 
extension into other plants. 
For management too, the digitron facility had some 
undoubted advantages over the traditional assembly I ine. 
Computer monitoring allowed a high level of control over 
the entire labour process the information system 
automatically controls the speed and routing of the 
robocarriers according to the available information on 
production flows at all points, number of PTs in the 
various buffers, breakdowns etc. The computer guides the 
robocarriers throughout the entire production area 
sending signals along the under-floor 
controls 
PTs and 
i dent if i cation and subsequent 
pa 1 1 ets; rna tches the correct 
induction 1 oops; 
1 oadi ng of the 
PTs and bodies 
and manages the 
areas into which 
using magnetic 
various buffer 
identification 
storages. The 
codes, 
only 
computer control does not completely extend are the work 
stations themselves, where workers may set the pace of 
work independently within the negotiated limits. 
As well as increasing productive flexibi I ity and 
control over production from a purely /technical/ point 
of view, this form of organization of work once again 
served to increase management/s control over its labour 
force. The Mirafiori assembly lines were a /hot point/ 
at FIAT, one of the most highly organized and militant 
areas of the au to group; and the dig i tron experiment 
largely came out of an attempt to resolve the problems 
of the /giant/ factory, necessary for economy of scale, 
but disastrous in terms of industrial relations. It was 
hoped that the use of fixed work stations and assembly 
bays would bring the /human dimension/ back into work in 
the large scale factory by dividing the monster assembly 
lines into smaller working units, whi 1st avoiding the 
problems of low productivity concomitant with other such 
experiments <see Volvo. Kalmar for example), through the 
use of a combination of computer control/monitoring, 
robocarriers and automation. The digitron facility also 
effectively improved material working conditions on the 
shop floor, removing many of the causes of discontent. 
Despite the great advantages of the di gi tron ex-
periment from the technical <computer control of 
production f I ows etc.) and soc i a 1 <reduced industria 1 
relations problems) points of view, the experiment has 
not been an unmitigated success and wi II not be re-
peated, despite trade union requests for its extension. 
The digitron has several major drawbacks. It is very 
expensive; about five times the cost of comparable 
traditional assembly lines. The expected higher produc-
tivity levels have not come about: the capacity of the 
facility is 50 model 131 units per hour <giving 800 
units in the two shift working day) <31), but production 
has remained at about 600 models per day, about the same 
as for the traditional lines the system has replaced 
< 32). There was thus no increase in productivity to 
justify the much greater pI ant cost. Furthermore, the 
plant cannot be used for more than two shifts <even if 
the unions were to allow night work, to which they are 
strongly opposed) as the robocarriers must be recharged 
for a period of 8 hours in every 24. 
Another very major disadvantage of the digitron is 
that unlike the robogate it is model specific. The 131 
model had to be designed specifically for it, and no 
other model could be produced on it. This makes the cost 
of changing or redesigning models virtually prohibitive, 
in a market in which the ability to get new models out 
has become increasingly important. 
Management was openly disaffected with the digi-
tron: Cesare Annibaldi called the new assembly system, 
with its cost of millions of pounds, "a high technology 
toy". Another management representative commented: "It 
needs 4 times more space than tradi tiona I I i nes, and 
this is already one big drawback. And anyway it breaks 
down too often; it's too sophisticated. A car made 
camp I ete I y on the di gi tron wou 1 d cost the earth". A 
journalist describes an incident during a lecture on the 
organization of work at FIAT: "Images of the digitron 
equipment flowed across the screen ... while a voice 
off-screen described the sequence of the various 
operations and the advantages of dlgitron, a FIAT 
manager seated Just behind us mumbled: 'Right, by now 
the Japanese have assembled 7 Toyotas complete with 
mudguards and a hooter'" <33). 
The digitron faci I ity wi 11 not be repeated when the 
131 goes out of production. 
Robots 
Although the development of industrial robots began 
in the 1960s they were used to replace human labour in 
very limited tasks such as the measurement and checking 
of manufactured parts. The potential of robots to per-
form more complicated operations began to be actualized 
on the factory floor only in the 1970s. 
Robots are" ... an extension of a computer into the 
real world - the means whereby a machine capable of cal-
culating, in awful abstraction, the rate of growth of a 
tree, can actually experience that tree by mov!ng around 
it, looking at it and touching it ... " C34). The robot, 
then, as the ~'body~' to join the /intellect~' of the 
computer, is now capab 1 e of camp 1 ex operations such as 
welding and spraying in inaccessible places 1 ike the 
in tern a 1 areas of a car body. As their cost gradua 1 I y 
drops many manufacturers are using them to replace human 
labour in such jobs. Italy, with its two ~'home grown" 
robotics industries COSAI of the Olivetti group and 
COMAU of the FIAT group) has not been slow in realizing 
the industrial potential of robots, and at time of 
writing is Europe~'s third user of them after West 
Germany and Sweden Cal though Japan and the USA are stilI 
streets ahead of their nearest European rivals). 
Robots were first brought into FIAT in September 
1972, when the American UNIMATE welding robots were 
introduced on the 132 line at Mirafiori. 18 robots in a 
double line 40 meters long perform a total of 540 
symmetrical welds. Each robot has a ~'memory~' enabling it 
to learn and repeat tens of operations in logical order. 
The entire line cost 810 million Lire, with the robots 
alone costing 550 mil lion Lire C35). 
Since then robots have been developed for various 
uses other than welding <particularly in the foundries 
and paintshops) and the "last word~' in automation, the 
robogate, has been introduced in the bodywork section at 
Rivalta. 
ROBOT IN USE - FIAT AUTO GROUP - 1978 (36) 
FACTORY DEPARTMENT 
P!liDt§bQI2 Bog~WQ[k 
MIRAFIORI 1st spray N" 6 131 I ine N" 23 
LINGOTTO Lines 242 & 238 
RIVALTA N" 6 RITMO I ine N" 44 
CASSINO N" 6 
<Robogate> 
RITMO lineN" 44 
TERMINI Powder spray N" 4 
<Robogate> 
A I though the first robots used at FIAT, the UNI-
MATES, were of American origin, the more recent models 
<for ex amp I e those in use on the robogate p 1 ant> are 
home grown, designed and produced by the FIAT subsidiary 
COMAU. These mode 1 s, the POLAR 6000s, can incorporate 
the transformer. reducing the number of cables and 
making them more manageable on-line. They have an 
immense freedom of movement allowing them to perform 
extremely complicated welding operations even inside the 
car body. They are moved hydraulically and have static 
memories capable of holding 400 to 4000 elements of 
information subdividable in 8 programmes. They have been 
so 1 d to other European car manufacturers such as A 1 fa 
Romeo, Volvo, Peugeot and BMW. 
However, the role of robots is stl 11 limited. A ro-
bot usually replaces the Jobs of only a few workers and 
thus has a smaller effect on manning than other forms of 
automation. There are also intrinsic technological 
limitations to their use. A FIAT robot expert comments: 
"The nearly complete robotization of the assembly 
I i ne, where tens of thousands of workers work, is 
sti 1 l very distant. The technology needed to realize 
such a huge restructuring st i 1 1 doesn / t exist, and 
we aren/ t able to foresee how and when it wi II. 
Experimentation at the moment is within the rather 
more 1 imited horizon of the extension of the use of 
robots to the paintshops where work is heaviest and 
where FIAT can/t use Yugoslavian or Greek workers as 
they do in the German au tomob i I e industry 11 < 37). 
Thus the chief use of robots has been to rep 1 ace 
human I abour in espec i a II y dirty and arduous tasks, 
where industrial conflict has been a big problem, and 
for which no /Yugoslavian or Greek workers/ are 
available as an immigrant labour force limited in its 
possibi 1 ity of industrial action by its poverty and 
precarious existence on host soil. 
As we I 1 as the roboga te, two robot I i nes are 1 n 
operation in bodywork at Mlrafiori. The 132 Unimate 
line, the first robots to be used at FIAT, has already 
been briefly described. 
The 131 I ine is larger and technologically more so-
phisticated, although it performs a similar function. It 
was designed by M.S.T. <Machine Speclali Torino>, part 
of COMAU, using a more sophisticated version of the 
reliable American Unimate. The line consists of over 20 
robots arranged in stations along a 120 meter line, and 
at 80% efficiency is capable of producing 68 bodies per 
hour <38). Although during a Leyland visit to the plant 
only 310 units per shift were being produced, FIAT 
claimed the 1 ine has an average overall efficiency of 
76-77% <39). The I ine can work on both the two door and 
four door versions of the 131_ 
The bodies are first /stapled/ together to hold the 
parts in approximate position for the welds. They are 
loaded onto the I ine automatically, and are moved 
through the stations on 25 circulating pal lets which are 
returned to the loading station after completing a 
cycle. Three giant /masks/ or multi-welders automati-
cally perform the tacking welds, and the remaining welds 
are then completed by robots. 
Robots are also being used increasingly to replace 
manua 1 1 abour in one of the nastiest and unhea 1 th i est 
tasks possible in a car plant, paint spraying. This job, 
in traditional systems, is performed in confined fume-
til led tunnels or cabins. It has always been one of the 
most problematic areas from the point of view of 
absenteeism and industrial relations. 
The most advanced of the robot paintwork lines is 
the powder spray at Termol i Imerese, where the 126 model 
is entire 1 y sprayed by robots; Termo 1 i was the first 
p 1 ant in the wor 1 d to achieve this. On this 1 i ne, the 
only jobs left for human intervention are maintenance 
and quality control. The special highly resistant paint 
powder, made of very fine positively charged particles, 
is sprayed onto the negative 1 y charged body by 
/anthropomorphic/ robots which simulate the wrist, 
shoulder and elbow articulations of a human arm. After 
spraying, the body passes through a furnace where the 
powder is fused into a layer of polymers forming a 
plastic coating over the body. 
Press Shop Automation 
Both the Mirafiori and Rivalta press shops have 
been highly automated. The first area to be automated 
was the loading of sheet steel into the large press 
I i nes, and this was fo I I owed by the perfection of an 
automatic transfer system between the presses. Once 
again, human intervention is reduced to functions of 
control and maintenance. 
The automatic press lines are very flexible, as 
very different parts can be produced on the same lines 
with only minor adjustments to the machinery. At 
Rivalta, special automatic presses able to carry out the 
complete moulding cycle have now been instal led. 
The Robogate 
The robogate is the most advanced piece of assembly 
technology existing at FIAT and almost certainly in 
Europe. It became famous in England through the te I e-
v is ion commercia I for the Strada showing it in action. 
Its function is the complete automation of car body 
assembly and welding. At time of writing it is opera-
tional on the Ritmo (Strada) lines at the Rivalta and 
Cassino plants. It was developed with the help of COMAU, 
the FIAT robotics sector, and emp 1 oys the POLAR 6000 
robot mentioned earlier. Its two maJor advantages over 
traditional forms of body assembly are firstly the 
extraordinary level of flexibility it allows (both in 
daily production programming and in eventual changes of 
model) and secondly the elimination of workers from a 
particularly /hot point/ of the production process. 
The following description is campi led from: the 
FIAT production Journal Made in FIAT; documents from a 
day study conference of Confindustria, the foremen/s 
paper Qui Capi and a dossier from Maqazzino as well as 
discussions with a FIAT production engineer and a 
personal visit to the plant. 
To begin with I quote from a FIAT document for the 
Confindustria day of study: 
" ... From first sight the new body shop is something 
completely different: a visitor from outside would 
have the fee I i ng of being caught up in a science 
fiction film. Carriers which move around the factory 
with no drivers, robots moving in silence and with a 
precision which allows no margin of tolerance, a 
work area which has become silent and safe as 
overhead loads have been eliminated. AI I hard manual 
work has been completely eliminated: workers are 
there only to check the operation of the machinery 
and intervene in the case of a breakdown". <40> 
The description is fairly valid. The robogate it-
se 1 f emits on I y faint hisses and the odour of we 1 ded 
metal <though the noise from the surrounding areas, from 
the presses, f ina I we 1 ding and the overhead conveyor 
be 1 ts further down the I i ne is so 1 oud you can hard 1 y 
hear the silence of the robogate>. The most immediately 
obvious characteristic of the equipment is the last 
mentioned, the almost total absence of human labour. 
This entire area of the factory apparently operates 
independently from human intervention. A few maintenance 
engineers in d i st i ngu ish i ng maroon over a 1 Is stand 
chatting by one of the stations; but apart from these, 
manual labour has been eliminated from the cycle from 
the moment when the various pane Is come out from the 
presses to be /tacked/ together on the robocarr i ers, 
unti I the welded body rattles away on the overhead 
conveyor for the few remaining manual welds that the 
robots are so far incapable of performing efficiently. 
The plant is piloted by a computer which, as for the 
digitron, regulates the traffic of the robocarriers and 
the se 1 ecti on of the mode 1 -specific pa 1 1 ets and pi 1 ots 
the welding cycle. 
The robocarr i er is i dent i ca 1 to that previous 1 y 
described for the digitron system. It is a simple 
carrier mounted on four wheels, with built-in antennae 
which receive electrical impulses from underfloor cables 
guiding it a 1 ong trackways according to the commands 
from the central computer. 25 of these carriers can be 
used contemporaneously in the present systems. The 
robocarrier collect the correct pallet from one of the 
stores, identifying it by means of an electronic signal. 
The pallet is a metal structure provided with model-
specific clamps which hold the parts of the body in 
position during the various welding operations. The 
floor, side and roof panels are automatically loaded 
onto the pallet, which identifies the particular model 
it carries to the computer throughout the whole process, 
enabling the robots to carry out the different welding 
programmes for the two or five door model as each passes 
through the 'gate'. 
The robocarrier brings its load of pal let and body 
panels to the first robot station, or gate. Two clamps, 
once again specific to the model to be welded, auto-
matically lock the body into position, and the robot 
extends hydraulic /concertina/ arms to perform the first 
/tacking/ welds. The first two stations are identical 
and the body passes through one or the other in-
different 1 y. It then proceeds in sequence to the 
remaining four stations where welding is completed. At 
the end of the we 1 ding process the body is un I oaded 
automat i ca! 1 y on to the conveyors, and the robocarr i er 
either re-enters the eye 1 e direct 1 y or is sent to the 
store to pick up a new pal let if it is to change model. 
It is the extreme flexibility of the robogate sys-
tem which makes it unique in the vanguard of automatic 
car making. If there is a breakdown on one of the 
stations, production is not stopped as the robocarriers 
are simply re-routed through the other stations while 
repairs are carried out. The robots are capable of 
carrying out a vast range of programmes; as an engineer 
commented during my visit: "We could make dishwashers on 
this if we wanted". A FIAT publication enthuses: 
"FIAT can produce 
door versions in 
programmes which can 
the new /Strada/ in its 3 or 5 
any sequence with production 
be varied for each of the two 
In future its flexibility can be body versions ... 
increased, producing a new veh i c I e with the same 
plant with a relatively modest expenditure ... It 
would only be necessary to add the appropriate 
clamps to two stations for alternating use with 
existing ones. An adequate number of new pallets 
would also be necessary ... " <41). 
In fact, the cost of a model change would be ex-
tremely low. Only 20% of the total cost of the plant 
derives from the 1 Specific 1 components; parts which 
would have to be changed with a change of model would be 
the clamps, parts of the pallets, about 30% of the 
welding pincers, and the computer programming. These 
specific too 1 s, once made ready, cou 1 d be changed in 
Just a few hours. This is clearly of great importance 
when the right model in the right place at the right 
time has become a maJor aim of al 1 car producers. 
The extreme flexibility of the robogate system ex-
tends to the point of allowing the production of 
different models in different proportions according to 
demand <a goal already pursued without success, it wil 1 
be remembered, on the quadrup 1 e 1 i nes of the Termo 1 i 
plant>. 
One last factor in productive flexibility is the 
modular arrangement of the plant lay-out. The robot 
we 1 ding gates can be added or removed at convenience 
with very 1 itt 1 e disturbance to the rest of the pro-
ductive arrangement. 
The second maJor advantage of the robogate plant 
is, of course, the elimination of human labour and all 
the problems that it involves. Automation resolves at a 
stroke decades of management headaches about control 
over the labour force, 1 porousity 1 , absenteeism and 
industrial conflict. 
The New Productive 
Arrangement as a Strategy for Control 
It w i 1 1 be seen, then, that the new productive ar-
rangements stimulated by "the kick in the teeth'' of the 
workers/ struggles of 1969 on, and further accelerated 
during the oil crisis of 1973 and the resultant race for 
competitiveness in the car industry, were designed to 
bring about several important results. The first among 
these is a new flexibility, control and supervision of 
the organization of labour. The diverse experiments in 
the restructuring of the 1 abour process a 1 1 have in 
common the intention of re-instating control in the big 
factory through the replacement of the traditional 
assembly lines with more manageable areas whose relative 
autonomy gives a great deal of protection to overall 
production flow, confining the effects of disputes, 
breakdowns and technical stoppages to the single 
sections concerned. 
This restructuring of the labour process has made 
it more difficult for workers to influence production 
effectively with the familiar range of collectively 
organized tactics such as /chequerboard/ strikes etc. As 
well as the relative autonomy of the various parts of 
the productive cycle, an increasing technical complexity 
and centra 1 i zat ion of command over the I abour process 
opposes the workers, making resistance both more 
difficult to organize and less effective. The extensive 
use of computers has facilitated the fragmentation of 
the 1 abour process, a 1 I owing the use of is 1 ands or of 
teams working, at least to some extent, independent 1 y 
from the insistent rhythms of the assembly I ines, but 
LJnder the direct surveillance and direction of the 
information systems. "Exactly because computers increase 
the capacity of centralized corrunand, reinforcing the 
substance of unified control, the firm can take the form 
of decentralization, of islands, of 'free' work, or 
'independent units of production and profit'" <42>. 
A maJor tactic in the general strategy of breaking 
up the labour process into relatively independent 
sections are the buffer storages and rotating polmoni, 
capable of giving several hours of cover during strikes, 
breakdowns or localized production slow down. These 
storages are strateg i ca I I y pI aced around the factory. 
Additional flexibility is given by innovations in 
transfer technology such as the robocarriers, which can 
be re-routed, according to the precise productive 
conditions, via the computers. In other cases lines are 
tripled or quadrupled, once again providing cover for 
stoppages. 
Techno I og i ca I i nnova tl ons have arrune I i orated the 
problems of economy of scale which would have resulted 
from the tendency towards the 'modular' factory. As wei 1 
as the possibi 1 i ty of retaining central control through 
information systems, several of the new technologies in 
use (for example robogate and the automated presses> are 
capab I e of producing more than one mode 1 or part with 
little or no modification of the machinery involved. 
Very long I ines are no longer a necessity when a 
diversity of models can be passed down the same one. 
Alongside the increase in productive flexibi 1 ity 
has come the attempt to replace as far as possible 
manual labour w1th automatic. The most dramatic examples 
of this are the robogate, the automated presses, the 
robotized paint spray and the automatic body to the PT 
unit assemb I y on the 131 I i ne. A I though no worker has 
been directly made redundant as a direct result of new 
technology in his or her department, as retraining for 
new jobs must be made ava i 1 ab 1 e under the terms of 
agreements with the trade unions, clearly jobs are being 
cut by automation. 
The total effect on manning of the new technologies 
is difficult to determine - and this must be in part 
intention a 1 • The united engineering workers union, the 
FLM, estimates that FIAT has reduced its Turinese 
workforce through non-rep I acement of turnover by about 
10 to 12,000 workers a year over recent years <43). 
FIAT/s own figures also reflect an overal 1 drop. 
No of Manual Employees in 
al 1 FIAT/s Italian Factories <44) 
1973 
1974 
1975 
161,900 
156,900 
154, 100 
<The data given for the following years refer to the 
new, larger FIAT holding and are thus not comparable). 
A large proportion of this reduction is, however, 
obviously due to the severe crisis of the industry in 
these years. 
Perhaps more pertinent are the following figures 
showing the drop in employment in various sections of 
the company between 1973 and 1975 <45). 
I 
I I Sept !973 I Sept !975 ! Difference 
1-----------------------1------------ ------------1------------
% 
--------1 
! MIRAFIORI BODYWORK I 18,362 15,587 I -2,715 
I MIRAFIORI MECHANICS 17,163 14,116 I -3,047 
I MIRAFIORI PRESSES 8,704 7,622 I -1,082 
I RIVALTA 17,980 12,988 I -4,992 
MATERF!RRO 1 , 827 1 , 703 -124 
AGES 1,127 1,101 -26 
FERRI ERE 6, 925 7,106 +91 OSA-LINGOTTO 6,697 6,535 -162 
SPA CENTRO 2,613 2,455 -158 
ARIGLIANA 3, 796 4,054 +258 
MrrALLI 416 412 -4 
-15.11 
-17.75 
-12.43 
-27.76 
-2.3 
-2.3 
-2.4 
-4.37 
RICAMBI 1,872 2,125 +253 
TOTAL 88,482 76,714 -11,768 -13. 
It can be seen from these figures that by far the 
greatest percentages of job loss have occurred in 
departments which have undergone the most intense 
restructuring; e.g. Riva1ta and the three Mirafiori 
sections. Once again, however, this cannot be attributed 
solely to automation, as production is also being 
decentralized away from the big factories such as 
Mirafiori and Rivalta to sma1 ler sites in the South. One 
last source of evidence comes from a consultant report 
to management on the organization of work. This document 
gives a total of 1,400 jobs lost in the FIAT auto sector 
between 1971 and 1973 due to "interventions on the 
organization of work"; 750 in Bodywork, 460 in Mechanics 
and 190 in the Press shops <46). Whatever the exact 
figures, however, it is clear that a replacement of 
workers by machine is occurring and w i 1 1 continue to 
occur. 
As wei 1 as eliminating a certain number of workers, 
automation has proved to alter the characteristics of 
the labour force involved. The workers who work with the 
new technology replacing assembly 1 ine workers are 
highly ski 1 led: maintenance workers, toolmakers, 
electricians etc. Training for work, for example with 
the robogate, is intensive: internal electronics courses 
are run at Rivalta for workers holding diplomas from 
high school or the FIAT school Centro di Formazione 
Professionale Giovanni Agnelli; a number of workers and 
foremen are sent on special i st courses for work with 
computer hardware and some foremen have even been sent 
to England for preventive rna in tenance and robot 'first 
aid' courses. An article in the FIAT foremen's paper 
described the robogate maintenance team as follows: 
"'input', 'output', 'software', 'hardware' Those 
who are speaking are neither engineers nor space 
technicians. We are in the computer control room for 
the roboga te and these strange terms 'season' the 
conversation between a group of young workers and 
Oreste Raimondo, in charge of maintenance pro-
gramming. Times change. The stereotype image of the 
resigned and indifferent worker has been destroyed. 
This above al 1 as far as concernes maintenance 
work ... In this key sector technicians in white 
collars and those in overalls have followed almost 
analogous training courses" C47). 
It is of interest that Volvo has also discovered 
that work with robots tends to produce entirely 
different attitudes to the factory, rescueing at least 
this one happy spin-off from the debacle of Kalmar. The 
Economist writes of the Volvo experimentations: " ... the 
experiment was not entire 1 y wasted. Vo 1 vo found that 
employees who work closely with robots <1 ike maintenance 
men) tend to become the most loyal of all, rarely 
missing a day/s work. The company ... says it would now 
apply many of the Kalmar methods in plants without group 
production" <48). 
This /new sort of worker/, then, tends to be consi-
derably less trouble to management. Dispersed around the 
factory floor it is more difficult for them to organize 
themselves and their privileged and high status position 
differentiates them from other workers. More importantly 
st i I I , they seem to deve I op a sense of pride in their 
highly skilled work, and rarely take a day off or take 
part in the /non-work/ so common throughout the rest of 
FIAT. 
FIAT itself stresses this trend in its literature, 
propagating the notion that automation brings in its 
wake a new /professional worker/ with clean hands and 
interesting and varied tasks: 
"On the basis of our experience I can affirm that 
the introduction of automated processes brings a 
growth of ski I I in two directions: on the one hand 
by eliminating or reducing the more simple and 
repetitive work posts they raise the average ski I I 
level; on the other they call for a greater 
know I edge of integra ted production programming and 
control systems... and of plant maintenance, 
bringing the introduction of new ski I Is or the 
enrichment of old ones" <49). 
The number of peop 1 e concerned with rna in tenance, 
programm1ng etc. has in fact risen with 
use of sophisticated equipment - already 
peop 1 e were respons i b I e for qua I it y 
the increasing 
in 1977 11,000 
control and 
maintenance in the Mirafiori engine plant <50). 
However, the appearance of a I imi ted strata of 
highly qualified maintenance and electronics experts is 
on I y one side of the story: on the other side are the 
many more workers who are even more thoroughly de-
ski I led by the new /thinking/ machines; whose inter-
vention in the labour process has become even more 
purely manual and mechanical. The separation between 
concepti on and execution within the labour process is 
not ameliorated but rather made absolute by the 
introduction of numerically controlled devices and 
computerized control of production flow. This /other 
side of the coin/ is expressed, appropriately enough, in 
an earlier issue of the same management publication from 
which the above quotation from Tufarel li was taken: 
"Studies carried out in departments where the 
greater proportion of work activity had been 
automated demonstrate, in fact, that the work of the 
<unskilled) workers had become more monotonous, and, 
further, their chances for promotion were reduced. 
The fact that, in an automated production process, 
work at the operative I eve l is of ten characterized 
primarily by the lack of direct involvement of the 
worker would seem to exclude any possibility of 
/ re-sk i l I i ng/ the tasks" <51). 
Thus l f the average sk l 1 1 1 eve 1 of the who 1 e fac-
tory is pushed up by automation, this Is the result of a 
reduction in the number of unski 1 led workers (pushed out 
by new machinery) rather than a re-ski I 1 ing of the whole 
labour force and may anyway be countermanded by a 
de-ski I ling of remaining workers. Nevertheless, the 
creation of a strata of highly skilled workers and its 
reflection in an absolute reduction in the numbers of 
unski 1 Jed workers is an undeniable result of automation, 
and one which may we 11 prove to be convenient to the 
employer. 
This new class sector, if such it may be called, 
may have made a relevant contribution to the silent 
procession of low level management, chargehands and 
ski I 1 ed workers making up the /march of the 40,000; 
that, as we shal I see later, was an important immediate 
factor in the failure of the decisive strike of 1980. 
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CHAPTER VI 
THE UNGOVERNABLE FACTORY 
"Mirafiori is the biggest city-factory in the world. 
I t i s a huge recta n g I e just outs i de the centre of 
Turin. The short side looks out over Corso Giovanni 
Agnelli, a huge road leading up into the valley of 
Pinerolo. It has a surface area of three mi II ion 
square metres, half of which is covered by the 
plants. The surrounding wall is seven kilometers 
long, broken by thirty two gates. At the beginning 
of the 70s you could read here the slogans of 
workers/ contestation, written in letters one metre 
high and mote: /The only music the bosses can hear 
is the sound of the shut-down machinery/ - /We want 
the sun in Turin too/ - /Agnel li at the presses, the 
workers in the hi 1 Is/. 
Inside Mirafiori there are fifty kilometers of 
railway tracks and two hundred kilometers of over-
head tracks <that is railway tracks suspended in the 
air, along which travel a bit of everything: some 
say that there are even 60 radiators for the old 
/600/ model, forgotten for more than 10 years, which 
no one knows how to get down without stopping the 
whole factory). And there are thirteen thousand 
pieces of machinery <from the simplest to the most 
complicated) and six hundred and sixty six presses 
<the biggest are the size of a small family house 
and make a he! I of a din). 
From this city of iron, cement and machinery up to 
three thousand vehicles a day can come out from six 
in the morning unti I ten at night. Nearly three cars 
a minute, one every twenty seconds. This, anyway, is 
what the FIAT pub! ications say. Today, instead, only 
one thousand five hundred to one thousand seven 
hundred emerge each day, one every thirty five 
seconds. The energy consumed at Mirafiori is about 
that which would be produced by burning two hundred 
and ninety thousand tonnes of oil per year. 
In the past, this city-factory is reputed to have 
held as many as 65 thousand workers, but this figure 
is uncertain. Nor can we be sure how many workers 
there are today. The PCI talks of 57 thousand 
peop 1 e, but according to FIAT there are nearer 59 
thousand. The company explains that in the auto 
sector <mechanics and bodywork) there are 44 
thousand workers today of whom 7 thousand ( 16% of 
the total) are women. There are 10,500 white collar 
workers <of whom two thousand five hundred are 
women). In the foundry there are 900 white co 1 1 ar 
wcrkers ( 250 women) 
<40 women). The total 
and 3. 530 b 1 ue co 1 1 ar workers 
is then 58,930: a fairish size 
provincial city ... Seventy per cent of the workers 
are between 25 and 45 years of age <the percentage 
is more or 1 ess equa 1 for men and women). 20% of 
rna 1 e workers and on 1 y 9% of fema 1 e workers fa 1 1 in 
the twenty-twenty five age group. Approximately one 
in two workers at Mirafiori are between twenty and 
thirty five years old ... Workers above the age of 
forty five are less than nine per cent of the total" 
( 1). 
This was a journal ist/s impression in 1980 of Mira-
fiori, that r-ealization of the haif-mad worid of 
/Smal lcreep/s Day/ dubbed by Agnel I i as /ungovernable/, 
and the setting of a peculiar revolt against work of the 
late 1970s that left management, with all its sophis-
ticated technology and models of work organization, with 
no recourse but the court of law and, eventually, mass 
sackings. 
A Bit of the Outside World 
By the 1 ate 1970s, then, the organization of work 
had already undergone consi derab 1 e mutation, rendering 
less effective the forms of struggle which had become 
traditional within the big Italian factories: /chequer-
board/ and /hiccup/ actions and informal negotiations 
restricted to single departments or line sections but 
effectively making chaos of the work cycle as a whole. 
It wou 1 d, of course, require a further retrospect 1 ve 
study to ascertain the extent to which management/s 
strategy was successful in disarming the working class. 
It may be relevant that these more articulated tactics 
were renounced in the strike of 1980 (briefly covered in 
a later chapter) which took the form familiar in for 
example the U.K., but until then practically unknown in 
Italy, of a mass /everyone out/ strike effectively 
closing the factories for a protracted period of time. 
It w i 1 l be remembered that this form of strugg 1 e is 
difficult to sustain in Italy in view of the lack of 
strike funds, and the strike in fact concluded with a 
near total defeat for the workers. 
In the meantime, however, I wish to report some new 
and surprising behaviours that emerged in FIAT l n the 
late 1970s. 
These behaviours were probably not directly linked 
to the /new way of making cars/ a I though they do 
illustrate the point, central to this thesis, that the 
success of the most carefully laid strategies of mana-
gement is strongly conditioned by the kind of working 
class subjectivity they must confront, and hence by 
whole variety of other historically and geographically 
specific factors. For even FIAT/s most sophisticated 
strategies for control proved inadequate when faced, in 
the late 1970s, by the expression of a new sort of 
presence on the factory floor. 
By the late 1970s, changes in the regulations go-
verning the employment of new workers forced Italian 
companies to take on a more or less random sample of the 
ava i 1 ab I e 1 abour force through 1 i sts of the unemp I oyed 
held at the various job centres. When, in 1978, FIAT 
decided to take on approximately 10,000 new workers 
<perhaps with the intention of relaunching production on 
the basis of the recent large scale investments> it was 
hence forced to absorb a representative selection of the 
unemployed: including women <about 65% of the new 
intake) and young people for whom the factory was a mere 
stop-gap solution prior to or during the continuation of 
studies <the open university system in Italy allows all 
persons with a secondary school diploma to frequent the 
universities, often on a part-time and/or irregular 
basis, and rarely with financial support). 
The new young workers brought with them in to the 
factory a breath of important events outside: tne mass 
identification of young unemployed, irregularly employed 
and students with the /non-organization/ of autonomia 
( 2). with them came a repostu 1 at ion of the /ref usa 1 of 
work/, ironical attitudes towards the unions and 
workers/ parties and a general disi 1 lusionment with the 
classic working class terrains of struggle. The 
following examples of slogans having some currency at 
the time may render the idea, although they admittedly 
lose something in translation. 
"Has bread gone up? < Noooo .... ! ) Has petrol gone 
up? CNoooo ... !) Have wages gone up? <YEEEES ... ! 
WE/RE TOO WELL OFF, WE/RE TOO WELL OFF)" 
"Now we/re being good, may we talk to the unions 
please?" 
"Fewer houses for the peop 1 e and more nuc 1 ear 
plants!" 
And from the women: 
"Work is not very feminine, give us more sewing 
machines" 
"Giving birth is beautiful and cheers you up; it 
reinforces the family and that/s what/s MOST 
important" 
Some quotations from young FIAT workers wi 11 fur-
ther i 1 lustrate some of the /flavour/ of this new 
element on the factory floor. 
"Anyway, we young ones go in to the factory ... with 
a different kind of experience, a less serious way 
of seeing th1ngs; a bit of the outside world comes 
into the factory with us and even if it doesn/t 
change it, this feeling exists and sooner or later 
it is felt ... Perhaps we/ve got a different way of 
seeing our I i ves, the eight hours we spend in the 
factory are like between brackets, when you get out 
even if you/re a bit tired, you don/t go home. For 
example I buy about two books every week, I/m 
interested in psychology even though for the moment 
I/ve got no intention of going to university. Many 
of the others are already at university, I think a 
1 ot of them a 1 ready have dip i omas or study in the 
evenings ... 
We work as workers, but we/re not; I , at least, 
don/t feel 1 ike one, I /m hoping to get out fairly 
soon, and anyway after the first 15 days I/ d 
organized my work as I wanted it, without getting 
too worried about it and no one says anything. On 
the assemb I y 1 i ne where I work for examp 1 e, there 
are no fixed work posts, you can change over, and 
straightaway in the morning there/s a scramble for 
the quietest jobs, they even pI ay cards for it ... 
there/re even those who arrive a few minutes early, 
before six, to get the Job to their taste, and 
there/ s a 1 ways the chance of being fuor i 11 nea <a 
substitute), and in that way you avoid a good bit of 
the work. There are those who use the few minutes/ 
break to choose the work post, and those who try and 
draw it out. All of this allows us to regulate our 
effort to a certain extent, but often at the expense 
of those who were obliged to work more that day. 
( 3) . 
The young; and part l cu 1 ar I y the women, are of ten 
disenchanted not only with the work, but also with the 
working class culture they find inside the factory. A 
woman worker comments: 
"I thought I knew the mythic working class. I've met 
some chauvinists here who look at my arse, who make 
heavy remarks if I tell them I've been singing and 
playing guitar with my friends, who are happy Just 
polishing up their 127s. As soon as I can I'm 
get t i n g out" < 4) . 
This lack of 'seriousness' and identification with 
the factory puzzles the older workers: 
"We hoped the new workers wou 1 d bring with them a 
fresh wave of struggle, but it/s still the old ones 
from ten years back who have to try and convince the 
young ones to stick with us. It's always us, with 
ten, thirty years of factory work behind us, who are 
here during the struggles" (5). 
The older generation who had experienced the strug-
gles of 1969 accuse the younger ones of individualism, a 
privatized and 'American style" attitude towards work. 
The same worker continues: 
the young people have other interests, they"re 
not interested in the factory, you see. They climb 
over the walls <during strikes) you see? And it's us 
o I der ones who have to stand firm, they don" t seem 
to understand that we/re playing for everything here 
in the factory: our working rights. They know we're 
s t r u gg 1 i n g f or them as we 1 I " < 6 ) . 
Tom, an FLM ful !-timer and another 'sixty-niner' con-
firmed to me: 
"In our days, at election time, 
greater renewal of the delegati, 
there was a much 
now i t ' s d i f f i c u 1 t 
to find a delegato who's worked at FIAT for less 
than two years. The 1 eadersh i p of the FLM is a 1 1 
around the 30 year mark now. We joined the union to 
participate in it, to struggle; now, although they 
still join the union, they see it just as a form of 
guarantee, they see the unions as guaranteeing wage 
rates and so on. There/s been a fall in our sort of 
values alI over the West, I/d say. The young workers 
are much more privatized, more individualistic, like 
the Americans". 
He went on to remark, however, that a 1 though the 
young workers were less interested in direct involvement 
in union affairs, there had not been a drop in the level 
of struggle: 
"I Wouldn't say there/s been a drop in the level of 
participation in struggles. The young are interested 
in different things, they/re particularly interested 
in questions relating to the organization of work, 
there's been a noticeable increase in activity over 
this. They've got a much higher level of schooling, 
they fee 1 the a 1 i en a ti on in the factory much more 
strongly than the older workers. They don't want to 
go on working in the same position for years. They 
very quickly look for a new job". 
The lack of identification with the traditional 
concerns and preoccupations of the older workers has in 
fact led to some interesting trends. A study on FIAT by 
two sociologists revealed that the normal pattern of low 
absenteeism on days of industrial conflict was reversed 
in this period, absenteeism increasing to as much as 40 
to 50% on days of national general actions C7>. 
However, whatever the opinions of some of the older 
militants, there can be no doubt that the young workers 
had an impact on FIAT's ability to control its labour 
force. Not al 1 of the behaviours i 1 lustrated below would 
be accepted by everyone as manifestations of class 
consciousness as in general they arise from attitudes of 
indivual revolt against work and a desire to enjoy life 
rather than work in a factory. On the other hand, 
perhaps this definition of c 1 ass consciousness is as 
good as many others; in the last analysis, the headache 
it provided for FIAT was just as big. 
So big was this headache, in fact, that FIAT even-
tually took the unheard of step of firing 61 workers and 
1 ater taking them to court. Many of the fo 1 1 owing ex-
amples are in fact provided by FIAT's lists of charges 
against the 61. 
The /New/ Forms of Disaffection with Work 
Ref usa 1 of the Factory Hierarchy. The fo 1 1 owing quotes 
are translated from an extensive interview with a 
foreman, who desired to remain anonymous for fear of 
r"epr- i sal : 
"I/m in the factory from nine to eleven hours a day. 
And every day I ask myself: to do what? You/11 have 
heard of production planning, of quality control? 
Right, that/s my job in the team. I come in at the 
start of the shift, I count the workers who work 
with me, I know that to make a certain production 
target a certain number of men are needed, I know 
that in order to se I I , the product must be trust-
worthy... In other words I carry out the interests 
of the company that pays me. It/s not what I want to 
do, it/s what I have to do. In another era I would 
have said: /It/s my duty/ ... I/ve done this work for 
a long time. Now I don/t do it any more ... 
/Capo/, don/t piss me off or we/ 11 strike. /Capo/, 
fuck off. /Capo/ you/re a bastard watch out because 
I know you, I know where you I 1 ve and I/ 1 I get you 
once we/re out of here. /Capo/, don/t report me or 
else ... We just have to take it ... It/s not gone too 
badly for me, they have not even burnt my car, I 
always park in a different place. 
We foremen have given up. It/s only left for us to 
go into pension, but it/s as i f we already had. I 
know that if the client has brakes which don/t work 
or a scratched piston it/sour fault as wel 1, but in 
these times it/s difficult to behave according to 
the rules ... When someone asks me who I am and what 
I do, I don/t know what to answer. Am I a foreman? 
No, not anymore. I/m just someone who does his work 
badly, or rather, who doesn/t know what his work is" 
( 8) . 
The words of this foreman who is no longer a fore-
man are echoed by others: 
"Look, more than three people working on one body is 
really forbidden. It/s been shown that the work done 
is sub-quality, that confusion results, then the 
whole thing has to be rejected. But the foremen are 
not here to make discipline respected. You don/t see 
the violence but it/s here, everywhere. It/s present 
in the fact that we/ve given up command. We come to 
some agreement and get on the best we can" (9). 
The young workers themselves explain the relation-
ship with the foremen in rather different terms: 
"On the line- says Mario, 22 years old, a worker in 
the Mirafiori bodywork section - there are people 
who quote Foucault, and the creeps explode with rage 
because they haven/ t even heard of him. There are 
the gays. They blow them kisses, and write /long 
live Renato Zero/ on the walls. Others roll a joint 
and laugh as if they were crazed. The feminists, 
too, giggle everytime a man tries to give them 
orders. The FIAT foremen have never seen the workers 
laughing and they get really angry" C10). 
Sabotage. Although difficult to document this seems to 
be fairly common, as in most car firms. It ranges from a 
simple lack of interest in work tagged /cumulative 
sabotage/ a practice based on a sort of negative 
cooperation which, adding /absent mindedness/ to /absent 
mindedness/ in the working and quality control of a 
semi -worked art i c I e, progressive I y reduces it to 
waste. . . < 11) to acts requiring a greater degree of 
dedication and imagination: "at Rivalta, in the paint-
shop a new form of sabotage with a highly artistic value 
has been invented, the result being a series of multi-
coloured 128s which would have pleased and excited Andy 
Warhol but did less for Agnelli despite his well known 
passion for modern art" <12). 
There are also more traditional forms of sabotage: 
the incorporation of a minor but irritating defect into 
the finished vehicle, / lnexpl icable" equipment break-
downs and so on are widespread. So is a more pure 1 y 
vandal lstic form, resulting for example in rows of shiny 
cars with broken windscreen wipers. Of a different sort 
again is the damage sometimes done to buildings during 
violent cartel interni and internal strikes. 
Violence. In its lists of charges against the 61, FIAT 
cites a total of 29 episodes of violence occurring du-
ring the course of corte i 1 ntern 1 and demonstrations. 
Three of the sacked workers, nicknamed the ;red kerchief 
band" because of their habit of cover 1 ng the 1 r faces 
with red scarves during demonstrations, are accused of 
hav l ng been "armed with iron bars" and of committing 
"acts of violence on foremen and office workers" during 
cartel on the days of the 6th and 11th July, 1979. 25 of 
the sacked workers are accused of l nt imi dating workers 
not participating in the cartel. Another is accused of 
forcing foremen and office workers to carry banners and 
placards and lead the cortei. 
The 'exuberance' of the cortei and demonstrations, 
as we I 1 as the practice of fore i ng foremen and office 
workers to lead them are confirmed in other reports: 
"There are two sorts of demonstration c 1 ose to the 
hearts of the young workers: the silent procession 
of 50-100 which suddenly, unanimously, suspends work 
in one shop and walks through into another breaking 
glass and cases; or the big, carnavalesque and 
violent procession in which they advance beating 
keys against car panels and herding the foremen 
ahead with kicks in the behind. In both cases the 
demonstrations are against and outside the control 
of the unions" (13). 
Of 35 charges of verba 1 and non verba I i nt imi da-
tions most reduce to simple insults to foremen who were 
the subject of epithets such as jackal, clown, slave, 
idiot and turd. Some more sinister remarks were 
reported, however: "we' 11 shorten your legs for you", 
"I've never seen so many people so happy to die young", 
"Our organization knows your car number plates and 
address" . 
Unilateral Reduction of Work. Under this expressive 
sub-heading FIAT 1 i st ed 48 accusations, most of wh l ch 
concern late arrival, premature departure and negli-
gence. One worker is accused of having "frequently 
abandoned the work post and worked insufficiently with 
resu 1 ts of the poorest qua 1 it y" . Another worker 
apparently responded to a reprimand for sub-standard 
work with the words: "Just the fact of getting up in the 
morning and coming into work amp I y covers the wages I 
get". 
Forms of this /revolt against work/ are described 
in other reports: 
"Non-work; something peculiar but real. At any 
moment the people intent on work, screwing in bolts 
and assemb I i ng mudguards are few. Many others are 
walking up and down the line with the slightly 
distracted air of one marking time. Every 7-8 meters 
there are benches, I ike those in pub I i c gardens, 
where an old worker reads the /Gazette delle Sport/ 
a youth younger than 20 I eafs through strip 
cartoons, and two girls chat in low voices" (14). 
The Organization of Non-Union Struggles. This charge 
brought 23 of the 61 in for other accusations, 3 of them 
being held responsible for the organization of more than 
120 stoppages causing I oss of production and the sus-
pension of work activities on the 1 i nes. 26 of the 61 
are under the extremely serious charge of "participation 
in armed groups 11 , six of them allegedly propagandizing 
armed nuclei within the factory. 
/Creative/ Activities. FIAT accused one worker of having 
"abusively occupied an area close to the shop where he 
worked, and using it habitually to cook food destined 
for an alternative restaurant". Another worker stood 
accused of "abandoning his work post, sometimes for long 
periods of time, during which he sold table-cloths and 
sheets". 
The practice of some workers of leaving their posts 
to sel i things aroud the factory is also confirmed from 
other sources. The following is taken from an interview 
with a 56 year old maintenance worker: 
"Do you know 
Porta Portese 
for 
<a 
ex amp I e , that 
huge street 
Mirafiori 
market in 
is I ike 
Rome>. 
Everything/s sold here, 
that on I y because they 
factory. 
apart from locomotives, 
couldn/t get one into 
and 
the 
Contraband tobacco, tights, biros, ties, food. I 
know someone who comes in in the morning with 30 
brioches and during the break, he goes round selling 
them. And among the sacked workers there/s one who 
cooked food in the press shop: the alternative 
canteen he called it, at 2000 Lire C£1> a meal" 
( 15). 
Having Fun in the Factory. One symptom of the breakdown 
of discipline in the big factory has particularly 
fascinated and scandalized the press and public. It is 
apparently fairly common to find used prophylactics 
I ittering empty car bodies: 
"Some years ago a personne 1 chief was shocked to 
hear that a man and a woman worker had been dl a-
covered making I ave on the back seat of a 130 (Do 
you know what I mean? A 130! Our flag-ship, a 3 
litre engine!> Now this sort of thing is not in the 
least surprising. One tries not to see, but the 
evidence is there: c I osed doors, coup I es dis-
appear i ng for minutes on end, condoms abandoned on 
the floors" <16). 
And in another interview: "Yes, of course there are 
those who screw. Now there are a I ot of women in the 
factory, and when straw is left near fire ... " (17). 
Although reported in the press with a certain eye 
for scandal and the natural focus of that profession on 
sex and violence, these new behaviours also had a real 
effect on the quality of work within the factory, 
resulting in very ample job timings and a relaxed rhythm 
within the factory. 
Inside Mirafiori I, too, saw the /park benches/ 
where workers read newspapers or talk among themselves; 
the 1 ittle groups aggregated around the vending ma-
chines; workers smoking disinterestedly by idle ma-
chines. I stood and watched while hooks lowered the side 
pane 1 s in to p 1 ace on the f 1 oor l ng and two workers un-
hurriedly clipped them for welding then turned away to 
sit or talk for a seeming eternity before the line moved 
on and the next set of hooks and panels slowly 
descended. My guide/s explanations were simple: 
"They have about 40 minutes break a day each, on 
average, which they can take when they want ... But 
there is a certain number of substitute workers- we 
cal 1 them/jolly workers/, who take over, so you see 
there is an informal control over the break-time 
they take. And as you see, the work timings are not 
very fast. Workers can choose whether to take a 
rest, perhaps smoke a cigarette, between pieces, or 
whether to accumulate time and take a longer break 
later on". 
When I later commented on the relaxed production 
rhythms inside the factory to a group of delegati and 
trade union ful !-timers at the Quinta Lega (fifth 
branch) of the FIM, it caused a great deal of mirth. 
"Yes - commented one of the older delegati - that~s a 
sign of our strength, we~re proud of it". They went on 
to explain the increasing control the workers have 
gained over production rhythms since 1969. 
"Before, the Southerners, who were new to the 
factory, wou 1 d get very nervous when the time and 
motion men would come round with their stop-watches. 
Now, of course, the attitude is completely dif-
ferent, they have to be gratefu I if they see any 
work at all. In some cases the T and M men have to 
negotiate with the delegates to catch them working". 
A further example of this sort was recounted to me 
by a young foundry worker taken on at FIAT~s Carmagnola 
plant in 1978 and elected as delegate after a few 
months. Carmagnola is a relatively small plant, having a 
workforce of about 1500 workers, in the countryside 
outside Turin. Conditions in a foundry are amongst the 
heaviest and most unhealthy to be found in industry and 
until shortly beforehand the workforce had been composed 
largely of local agricultural labourers keeping up small 
farm holdings in a system of /double work/ and frequent-
] y absenting themse 1 ves during harvesting and sowing 
seasons whi 1st sti I l managing to maintain below 
average 1 eve l s of absentee l sm, These workers tended to 
put up very little resistance to the near infernal 
conditions in the foundry and a peacefu I and pater-
nalistic system evolved. As the young worker told me: 
11 They used to accept a 1 1 the heavy work. It was a 
big problem for management when the young workers 
came in; they/d say - /pick this up? You must be 
kidding/ when the workers from the countryside 
would pick up anything they were told to. The old 
workers had a respectful, timid attitude towards 
management 11 • 
When, in 1978, 150 new workers were employed <a re-
newal amounting to 10% of the total workforce), things 
changed rapidly. One important factor in this was that 
the majority of the new workers were women, who were not 
only legally prevented from doing the third (night) 
shift, then in operation, but also many of the other 
operations required in the work process. The result was, 
naturally enough, a degree of friction, as the men had 
to take on a disproportionate amount of the night shifts 
and heavier work. Interestingly enough, however, this 
friction was overcome in the genera 1 i zed struggle to 
improve conditions for al 1: working conditions were 
genera 11 y improved and in part i cuI ar the shifts were 
reduced to two. The entrance of women in the factory was 
thus used as a successful /lever/ in negotiations, lead-
ing, after a prolonged period of struggle, to greatly 
improved conditions for alI. 
The example of these young workers thus shows how a 
simple attitude of rebe11 ious intr-ansigence, a 'cevoit 
against work/, even when not located in the context of 
trade union mi I itancy or formal negotiations, was able 
to defeat even the most complex, technologically 
sophisticated and carefully designed organization of the 
labour process. The situation of /ungovernability/ in 
the factory, in fact, eventua II y forced FIAT to the 
older and more straightforward strategy of repression, 
first with the sacking and exemplary trial of 61 of the 
workers, and later with mass lay-offs, so definitively 
closing this peculiar parenthesis in the history of 
working class struggles and the evolution of the labour 
process at FIAT. It is also important to note that this 
open resort to fear tactics was made possible by a more 
general repressive climate in Italy, in which anti-
terrorist policies had effectively /criminalized/ large 
sectors of the non-pari iamentary left: for reasons of 
space, however, it is unfortunately impossible to treat 
this wider connection of the strategies of individual 
capitals to the State and its judiciary and repressive 
wings. 
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CHAPTER VII 
WHERE ARE THE WORKERS? 
EVOLUTIONS IN THE OFFICIAL LEADERSHIP 
"Scalfari: Are you pleased about the EUR line? 
Giovanni Agnel li: I'm extremely pleased about it, but un-
fortunately it hasn't broached the factory gates yet. Lama 
knows this and it's a thorn in his flesh too" <La Repubblica, 
20 October 1979>. 
Previous chapters have shown how FIAT, as a first 
condition for an increase in productivity, has attempted 
to reinstate control and authority on the shop floor. As 
we have seen, three main strategies have been employed 
in this attempt. These are: 
1) Changes in the organization of work aimed at securing 
not only an intensification of production rhythms, but 
also a greater degree of flexibility in the use of 
labour and plant and a greater control over the labour 
process as a whole. 
2) The decentralization of production away from the 
giant Northern factories such as Mirafiori and Rivalta 
to smaller, modern and more /governable/ centres such as 
Cassino and Termoli Imerese in the South. 
3) There-proposal of the direct disciplinary and autho-
ritarian management style which had been broken by the 
struggles of the late 1960s - early 1970s. This strategy 
has manifested itself in many ways, but is particularly 
clear in the dual aims of the waves of sackings of the 
late 1970s which were directed not only at the elimi-
nation of surplus labour force, but also hit selectively 
to rid the factory of /disruptive/ elements, and issue a 
general threat to the su[·v i vors. 
The Governed Factory 
By the 1980s, these strategies appeared to have en-
Joyed considerable success. 
The use of the sack and cassa integrazione with no 
guarantee of re-employment, the block on turn over, 
early retirement etc. resulted in an enormous reduction 
of the workforce, a reduction which has almost exclu-
sively affected the North. This reduction/redistribution 
is unlikely ever to be reversed. There was also a very 
clear change - at least for FIAT for the better - in the 
climate inside the factory. Conflict, at least tempo-
rarily, had abated. An illustration of this comes with 
the fact that management/s normally lengthy daily 
reports on industrial relations problems had, according 
to a foreman, been reduced to a few pages or become 
actually unnecessary. 
Although it is too early, of course, to talk of a 
permanent /return to governabil lty/ in the big factories 
of the North, the climate of fear which was produced by 
the employers/ heavy attack gave FIAT the breathing 
space it needed on the one hand to reinforce authority, 
largely in the form of the foremen, and on the other to 
use the new work systems to the fu 11, habituating the 
work force to 1 eve Is of productivity which wou 1 d have 
been out of the question before. Giovanna Sordello, a 
woman worker sacked from the Carmagnola Foundry <Teksid) 
put it 1 ike this: 
the situation in the factory has become very 
heavy: exploitation has been increased through work 
speed-ups, there is an atmosphere of fear and 
resignation amongst the workers, in part due to the 
mounting arrogance and increasing use of repressive 
systems by the foremen ... Even in the CdF (factory 
counci 1) nearly al 1 the surviving delegates are 
feeling hopeless and disillusioned, and management 
is having an easy time getting its line implemented, 
even if this means ignoring previous agreemen ts 11 
( 1). 
Another testimony of the new situation in the 
factory comes this time from a foreman from Mirafiori: 
11 Up unti I last Autumn 30,000 people worked here. Now 
there are 20,000, one third less. And believe me, it 
wasn/t the /little virgins" who were the first to 
go. We/ve got rid of those who caused trouble ... Now 
Mirafiori is Just a factory 1 ike all the others in 
the rest of Europe, in Germany, in France. Things 
have changed to the point that when we do the 
evening production account we can hardly believe it. 
Having lost about one third of the workers we were 
expecting an enormous drop in production, but 20% 
more cars than we had foreseen are being assembled .. 
( 2). 
The figures for the months following the "crack-
down/ support the wide 1 y acknowledged ta 1 k of a new 
climate in the factory. Absenteeism dropped from an 
average of 15-16% for the first 6 months of 1980 to 5-6% 
in October-November, to under 4% in January 1981, and 
levelled out at about 5%. But more extraordinary still 
are the production figures for the first few months of 
1981: despite the 20% reduction in the 1 abour force, 
production dropped by a mere 5%! 
But where are the organizations of the working 
c 1 ass in a 11 this? Why is capital/s project for 
industrial reconstruction and the restoration of command 
in the factory passing with so little opposition? Why 
has no clear working class response emerged? 
The largest part of the responsibility for the 
working class/ failure to develop a theoretical and 
political response to capital/s proJect must lie with 
the trade union organizations, which appear to have 
assumed the role of a consultant doctor advising on the 
necessary course of treatment for sick industry. 
Working Class Demands: 
the Anti-Capitalist Content 
To say this merely raises another question: what 
mechanisms under 1 ay the b 1 unten i ng of the opposi tiona 1 
thrust of the working class - which included some layers 
of its organizational expressions - of the late 60s and 
70s? Before going on to an examination of the trans-
formation of a trade union which, at least at those 
levels in close contact with the rank and file, was 
capable of sustaining and encouraging the imaginative 
and intransigent struggles of those years, I would like 
to pause to examine the real content of these struggles. 
This is important for the demonstration that the current 
failure of the unions to find an interlocutor in the 
working class has its roots not only in a simple process 
of stagnation, fatigue or even bureaucratization 
<although this too plays its part>, but in a deliberate 
disownment of the oppositional content of the working 
class demands. 
Starting from the 60s the working class began to 
unmask the real, ideological nature of Scientific 
Management and oppose it. A series of extremely 
important victories - which capital could not afford -
were won as a result of this opposition. These were: 
the statute of workers/ rights; the reduction of the 
working week to 40 hours without loss of pay, the right 
to 150 paid hours off work for education, the abolition 
of overtime and piece rates, equal index linked rises 
for a 1 1 workers, the reform of pension schemes, the 
concession of large wage rises <particularly to the 
lower skill grades> in all the major industrial sectors, 
and so on. The si tuat l on in the factory had changed 
radical I y and to many it must have seemed that the 
peremptory power of the padrone had been smashed once 
and for all. 
But already by this point FIAT management had rea-
lized that, as much as it hated the idea, the only way 
to reach a compromise with its workers <the full satis-
faction of whose demands would have meant the complete 
overturning of the capitalist organization of work> was 
to reinforce the role of the trade unions as the only 
possible mediator. Thus, in order to avoid complete 
disaster FIAT was forced to the unwilling concession of 
recognition to the unofficial organizational expressions 
of the c 1 ass struggle which had emerged during th l s 
period. 
This was the starting point for a series of complex 
mechanisms that prepared the terrain for the even tua I 
taming of the working class response, however partial, 
uneven and fluctuating. 
The unions had been to some extent radicalized by 
the struggles of the late 60s. The shop floor level of 
the union was strongly democratized, in practice 
becoming indistinguishable from those it /represented/, 
so quickly were new delegati and factory councils 
appearing and disappearing according to the needs of the 
moment. In this way the whole of the local union 
structure tended to be pushed forward onto new terrains: 
terrains which were of real and immediate relevance to 
the workforce, and union theory and practice was 
gradua I I y permeated by issues such as the organization 
of work which until then had been largely foreign to it. 
This permeation was to outlast the period of fluid and 
span taneous ere at ion and recreation of the 1 ower ranks 
of the union hierarchy, and be carried by the newly 
official delegati etc. into union policy even in the 
ear 1 y stages of the perhaps i nevi tab 1 e sc 1 eros is which 
was short I y to set in. Thus as management began to 
accept the institution of the delegati, recognizing them 
as a necessary evil if the demands of the working class 
were to be mediated and controlled, it was also forced 
to accept an initial questioning of its unilateral right 
to determine the labour process within the factory. 
This is evidenced by the first few annual contracts 
negotiated after the /hot autumn/ of 1969. 
The FIAT company agreement of 1971, for examp I e, 
amongst other things established that: The company would 
place at the unions/ disposal alI the relevant in-
formation <work speeds, number of personne 1 required, 
any effects on the working environment etc.) on new 
machinery, work methods or modifications of existing 
ones before putting them into action, thus permitting a 
much higher degree of control by the workers over 
working conditions and env 1 ronment. The same agreement 
also recognized a committee for the negotiation of line 
speeds and work rhythms in genera 1 . The 1972 Nat i ona 1 
Engineering Workers/ Contract, as well as agreeing wage 
rises which were tendentially equal for al 1, allowed for 
a series of workers/ checks on the working environment 
to be carried out independent 1 y from the company; the 
definition of maximum levels of potentially damaging 
factors <chemicals, heat etc.), which were to be 
control led by the workers or others chosen by them; the 
elimination of various causes of danger or discomfort; 
and the definition of a new and independent role for me-
dical personnel in the factory. The National Engineering 
Workers/ Contract of 1973 established a new grading 
system, the Inquadramento Unlco <see chapter 5) which -
at least on the face of lt reformed the false 
hierarchy of skil Is and placed manual workers on an even 
footing with white col Jar workers. 
Management, then, had been forced into a series of 
concessions which it could ill afford. But on the other 
hand although the labour force for a long time 
remained vigilant, alive to the behaviour of its 
representatives and to management's implementation of 
the contracts- the terrain of the conflict had largely 
returned to the safer one of negotiation between 
management and the representatives of the labour force. 
At the same time other mechanisms, which were radi-
cally to alter the nature of trade unionism in Italy, 
were going into motion. 
The Historic Compromise and the Trade Union 
Movement: the Repudiation of Anti-Capitalism 
The Italian Communist Party <PCI> had seen in the 
growing economic crisis the opportunity to offer itself 
as a credi b I e and hea I thy a I ternat i ve to the decadent 
Christian Democratic dynasty 
scanda Is and the exposure of 
tunity seemed even more real 
perenn i a I 1 y shaken by 
corruption. This oppor-
after the elections of 
1976, in which the PC! came very close to toppling the 
Christian Democrats <DC> from power. The PCI desired to 
renew its image as the only party able to reform in-
dustry and motivate production within a more /Just/ 
social and economic system. But in order to do this -
before it could even hope to mount an effective 
e I ector a I campaign - it wou I d first have to conv l nee 
capital, the Americans and the whole world of its good 
intentions. The PC! redoubled its efforts to demonstrate 
that it did not wish to expropriate industrialists or 
institute anything remotely akin to Soviet or any other 
communism in Italy. Rather it stressed that it would be 
able to 'manage/ the crisis better than the hidebound 
opposition, and achieve the ful 1 cooperation of the 
working classes with a /national interest/ that could be 
identified in a slightly more socialist future. And the 
leadership of the communist dominated CGIL, the majority 
union federation tied closely to the mother party/s 
apron strings natura I I y enough was ca I I ed upon to 
demonstrate the real benefits which industry could gain 
from a communist participation in political power. 
Pointing to the real gains made over the last few years, 
the union leadership called for restraint and patience, 
for time for the cake to grow again - while Party and 
union looked into how it was baked. 
The call for restraint found some immediate res-
ponse. As The Economist put it in 1977: 
"The improvement in Italy/s economy owes much to the 
restraining hand of the communists on Italy/s 
unions. The party/s strongly centralized control of 
the unions, and its growing direct stakes in com-
merce, finance and industry, have helped to ensure 
that Italy/swage restraint, unlike Britain/s, has 
had some sticking power" (3). 
Such a shift by the trade union leadership to the 
overt call for moderation and restraint in industrial 
relations would certainly not have been possible in the 
context of the late 60s, or even early 70s. At that time 
the union bureaucracy was forced by the activism and 
vigilance of its membership to hold to the contents and 
directions of the struggles in the factory. So how was 
it possible now? 
The answer lies largely in the fact that the class 
whose interests the trade unions had grown up to protect 
and defend was undergoing very important changes, and 
the trade union hierarchy not only appeared insensitive 
to these, but was structurally unable to adapt itself to 
them. 
The export of entire production processes abroad 
and the tendential decentralization of those remaining 
into smaller units, ranging from cottage industry and 
boite production at very low wages and apal ling working 
conditions, to small very high technology plants was 
radically affecting the structure of the labour market. 
Those thrown out of work, or unable to find a first job 
in the traditional centres of employment were now 
/getting by/ with part-time, casual or seasonal work -
often in the /submerged economy/; a vast and growing 
sector ln Italy. This applies particularly to the young 
in search of a first job. Unable to find work, or at 
best finding only /precarious/ jobs without contracts or 
guarantees, the young have tended to continue their 
education, a tendency which is facilitated by the fact 
that entrance to university in Italy is open. A new sort 
of proletariat has thus been emerging, one which rather 
than being concentrated in large factories tends to be 
/diffused/ over the country; one wh l ch tends to have 
higher level of formal education; one which at present 
is dominated by the young, who are no longer funneled 
into a /job for life/, but who live from day to day, 
drifting in and out of the submerged economy or making 
ends meet with temporary or part-time work. The 
traditional subject of the trade union the waged 
factory worker guaranteed by a series of rights and 
contracts- is increasingly in a minority in the Italian 
proletariat. The unions are incapable of defending this 
emerging working class sector, not only because the very 
diffuse, fluid and often isolated nature of the work 
makes it impossible for a national and highly cent["'a-
1 ized body to inform, organize and protect the WO["'kers, 
but also because of the eno["'mous diffe["'ence between the 
/t["'aditional/ WO["'king class culture and that of the new 
/diffuse p["'oleta["'iat/. Even those young people who find 
work in factories tend to have a ve["'y di f fe["'en t ["'e-
lationship to WO["'k and to the unions, as we saw in the 
p["'evious chapter. 
This gene["'al and continuing mutation in the cha["'ac-
teListics of the wo["'king class has ["'esulted, in Italy as 
elsewhe["'e, in attitudes va["'ying f["'om puzzlement to 
denial; unions and pa["'ty have lost thei["' traditional 
point of reference, their raison d/etre, and, unable to 
adjust to the new situation have increasingly acted as 
independent, power-seeking agents. Their only justi-
fication for existence seems to have become largely that 
they do exist; and thei["' main purpose in life appears to 
be to consolidate that existence. The ["'esults of this 
loss of a dialectical ["'elationship with the working 
class are clea["' in the debates which have been taking 
place within the union and party hierarchies over the 
last decade. 
The 'New Course' of 1978: 
From Conflict to Cooperation 
In the context of a new political climate in which 
the PC! seemed to have a ["'eal chance of gaining a foot-
hold in government, it was logical that the majority 
union federation, dominated by the party, would seek a 
new image and philosophy which would not be in contra-
diction with the PCI/s pretensions to political power. 
This new climate coincided with the increasing isolation 
of the trade union leadership from the working class 
with the emergence of a new sort of pro 1 etar i at, and 
also with the general debilitation of the working class 
movement which was suffering from the increasing threat 
of unemployment and steadily worsening conditions in the 
crisis ridden factories. 
From the mid 70s then, as we have said, the trade 
unions have been moving towards a new image and philo-
sophy: an image of responsibility- towards the workings 
of the crisis ridden Italian economic and political 
system, and only afterwards towards the interests and 
conditions of the working class; and of maturity- ln 
their analysis of the roots of the crisis and their 
undertaking to /pull together/ with government and the 
employer to find a remedy. 
The transformation occurred gradually, only coming 
to ful 1 public expression at the beginning of 1978, when 
these concepts were first discussed open 1 y l n var l ous 
congresses, discussion documents and trade union 
literature. 
The first official expression of the new philosophy 
of the national trade union federations came on January 
13-14th 1978, with the document of the united union 
federation CGIL-CISL-UIL, prepared by the national 
leadership for discussion in factory assemblies and 
provincial and national conferences of the delegati. The 
document proposed by Pierre Carniti, the national 
secretary of the CI SL - was entitled "proposte per una 
s v o l t a d i p o l i t i c a e con om i c a e d i s v i 1 up p o c l v i i e e 
democrat i co" <proposals for a new course in economic 
policies and for civi I and democratic development>. This 
document was the first and most complete disquisition of 
the theory behind what I a ter came to be known as the 
svolta deli/EUR: the /volte face/ at the EUR congress 
rooms. 
The document opens with a recognition of the crisis 
of capitalism and the declaration of the need for a new 
course in economic poI icy: a course which cou I d rev i-
talize ailing industry and thereby provide the necessary 
conditions for a return to ful I employment. The document 
declares that: 
"The national Federation CGIL-CISL-UIL firmly 
believes that the risk of worsening conditions for 
the workers and people in terms of employment, real 
wages, Job security and social services must be 
parried with a decisive change in economic policy ... 
<In order to rea 1 i ze the obj ectl ve of fu 1 1 emp I oy-
ment> it wi 1 I be necessary to bring about the 
conditions which will enable a return to a high and 
stable economic growth rate ... " <4>. 
However, since it was recognized that new invest-
ment alone would not suffice to bring about this 
obJective of healthy industrial expansion, the union 
stated its intention of exchanging its role of back-seat 
criticism for that of co-driver. In this context it 
promised to remove those obstacles to healthy industrial 
I ife which it had itself sometimes been guilty of 
posing: 
a high and stable industrial expansion wi II 
permit the removal of that complex of defensive 
strategies in which the various social groups, 
sometimes not excluding the trade unions, take 
refuge when faced with the threat of stagnation and 
recession" (5). 
But not only must the obstacles caused by the de-
fensive activities of the working class be removed, but 
real and positive efforts must be made to hasten the 
revitalization of the economy. The federation thus puts 
forwards a series of proposa 1 s for the "new economic 
policy' including: Plans for a policy of systematic 
investment in the South and for selective investment in 
industry, in which priority is to be given to the build-
ing, energy, agriculture and transport and communication 
sectors; new policies for the employment of youth; the 
re-organization of the public sector industries; taxa-
tion reforms; reform of the police force <including its 
unionization>; the reform of the education system 
including the prolongation of compulsory education and 
the closer 'matching" of education to the requirements 
of industry. 
But interspersed with these fairly general calls 
for reform, the trade union made some proposals which 
are, on the face of it, somewhat surprising. 
On the question of wages, the Federation called for 
a new predictability and restraint in the bargaining 
process: 
"The union, confirming that behaviour which it has 
alceady practised in the contract rounds both at a 
national and articulated <company) level over the 
I ast few years wi I I adopt a I i ne fu 11 y coherent 
between its own economic and normative demands and 
the general strategy for the development of 
employment, the improvement of working conditions, 
the unification of the labour market and the 
following of an egalitarian pol icy ... 
This coherent conduct wi II be translated over the 
next three years into a pol icy in the contract 
renewals in which a responsible restraint in wage 
claims, and their priority orientation towards a 
further equalization and towards the improvement of 
the qua 1 l t y of work, w i I I be accompanied by the 
realization of a staggering of the burdens resulting 
from new contracts, and the search for solutions 
which might reduce the repercussions of the growth 
of direct wages on the general cost of I abour ... " 
( 6). 
Wages rises, then, were to be staggered - not only 
to di str i bu te the impact of the burden for emp 1 oyers, 
but also to make them fully predictable to the govern-
ment <and of course, capital), thus facilitating 
efficient economic planning: and anyway were to be 
;responsible; and ;restrained;. In effect, the union was 
proposing a self-imposed wage pol icy. 
More contentious and even extraordinary were the 
proposals put forward under the heading of /labour force 
mobility/, the results of which were discussed earlier. 
In the inter-est of a r-ational and fully efficient use of 
labour-, a complete fluidity of the labour market is 
prescribed, with wor-ker-s mob i 1 e not on 1 y be tween work 
posts within the factory or company, but actually 
between different firms and sectors: 
"The federation reconfirms its orientation on job 
mobi 1 ity: mobi 1 ity in the context of a current 
programme of development is a necessity, both within 
companies and between companies, and even between 
different sectors of economic activity" C7). 
This, given the difficulties which would be invol-
ved in creating a mechanism through which workers could 
be guaranteed a new job before being made redundant from 
the old one, sounds very like a union blessing for lay-
offs. In any case, this renunciation of all forms of 
demarcation is a very handsome gift to the employer. 
The unions/ proposa Is for the mechanisms of this 
mobi I ity were rather vague, but included a reform of the 
law governing job centres and the institution of re-
training courses to ready workers who were expel led from 
one firm or sector for jobs which are optimistically 
expected to open up in other, more vital sectors. 
But this is not all. According to the federation, 
workers who find themselves out of work as a result of 
this policy should not expect to rely on the State and 
employer for subsistance in the form of the Cassa 
Integrazione - roughly the equivalent of our dole - for 
more than a maximum of one year after being made 
redundant. Luciano Lama, in an interview which will be 
quoted more fully later on, warns: 
the whole mechanism of thP Cassa Integrazione 
must be revised from top to bottom. We may no longer 
ob l i ge companies to keep in emp 1 oymen t numbers of 
workers above and beyond those required by their 
productive capacity, nor can we continue to expect 
the Cassa Integrazione to assist the excess labour 
force permanent 1 y. In our document we propose that 
the C.I. should be given to the worker for one year, 
and no 1 onger, except in very exception a 1 cases, 
which must be deliberated on their individual merits 
by regional commissions for job placement ... In 
other words, effective mobi 1 ity of the labour force, 
and the end of the system of permanent 1 y pub 1 i c 
assisted unemployment" (8). 
If Margaret Thatcher suggested it there would be an 
outcry! 
The union also has some surprising plans for the 
state budget, proposing a /cei I ing' of 24 thousand 
mil I lard Lire for the balance of payments deficit. 
Within this ceiling, any changes in the destination of 
pub I i c money must be made towards investment in in-
dustry, a I ong the I i nes of the se I ect i ve investments 
a I ready proposed by the union. In this way, for the 
first time, the union comes out strongly against 
increases in pub! i c spending destined for the 
improvement of social services. 
The federation also notes the deficits in the vari-
ous state subsidized services and commodities <such as, 
for example, transport and energy), and prescribes price 
CJses, along w1th the reform of the~:e sectors, in order 
t0 Leduce these defJctts. 
The document, then, 
traditional 
The three 
trade union 
most crucial 
real i y is the departure from 
thinking that it claims to be. 
elements of the defence of 
working class interests: job security; the pressure for 
higher wages; adequate social services and welfare 
assistance, are almost completely renounced, and they 
are replaced on i y by genera I and idea I i st i c notions of 
trade union participation in a reformed and revitalized 
industrial capital ism. This participation was to be 
realized in part through union participation in company 
decision-making, but more important I y through the 
acquisition of political power by the PCI, whose 
increased weight in the shifting alI lances of the 
Ita! ian government was to be bought with the cease-fire 
in the class war. 
The principle which under! ies the document is, of 
course, the overt recognition and acceptance of the 
basic stabi I ity of the capitalist economic and political 
system, whose recurrent crises are no longer conceived 
as stages towards its inevitable downful. Having deduced 
that the on I y means to improve the conditions of the 
working class is to revitalize capitalism, the union 
turns to an analysis of the latter/s ills, and for the 
first time comes to the conclusion that it itself must 
accept a large part of the burden of responsibility for 
spiral! ing inflation, the collapse of industries and 
mass unemployment. Unemployment and inflation wi II be 
reduced only with recovery from the crisis, and the pre-
c:uncJi!JOii for this recovery IS the restra1nt of working 
ciass demands. As two soc1al historians appreciatively 
comment: 
"What is new about this debate? There are many 
things, but they may be summarized in one single 
concept: The /system/ must no longer be fought and 
obstructed, its stabi 1 i ty must be recognized. It is 
also admitted that it is fruitless to oppose certain 
of the system/sways of functioning. Rather oppor-
tune 1 y, it is understood that the best way out of 
the crisis suffocating Italian society is that of 
reviving mechanisms <such as the mob i 1 it y of the 
workforce) which had been blocked by the impetuous 
growth of the trade union movement between the end 
of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s" (9). 
With the acceptance of capitalism as a stable and 
lasting economic and political system, the union im-
P J i cit I y denies the existence of any inherent contra-
dictions within it. and thus of any necessary conflict 
between the interests of the major classes <denominated 
social groups in the new parlance). Having passed, 
without pause for discussion, over more than a century 
of marxian economic theory, Carniti and the other 
members of the union leadership are free to postulate 
the common interest of capital and proletariat in the 
rev ita 1 i zat ion of industry and the reconquest of inter-· 
nat i ona 1 competitiveness and as its condition and 
precondition, the end of class struggle. 
For the bene£ it of any workers who remained 1 n 
doubt after the release of the admittedly rather 
' 1 :::. t : Cl :; ~' : g e n e ,- c; i s e c: l e L d. r y o f t h e m a J or i t y f e de r a t 1 o n . 
the CGIL- clarified the rec;l mean1ng of the theoretical 
anci practical 'about turn· embodied 1n it in an inter-
view with La Repubblica some ten days latec. This 
tnter:-vtew. tr-om which will quote quite fr:-eely, 
illustrates vecy we! the significance for the working 
class of the union's 'new course' of 1978: 
"La _Repubbl Jca: You have said Cthe trade union) 
pol icy document contains a point r:-elating to the 
workers' behaviour. Do you mean the sacrifices the 
workers are be1ng cal led on to make? 
Luciano Lama: Yes, this is what i Vs r:-eall y all 
about: the union is proposing a pol icy of sacrifice 
to the workers. Not marginally important sacrifices, 
but substantial ones. 
L.R.: And this is the point which has given rise to 
conflict? 
L.L.: Yes. This is natural, of course". 
Lama proceeds to explain that until the problem of 
unemp I oymen t, then running at 1 mi I 1 ion 600 thousand, 
has been resolved, a! I other objectives - including the 
conditions of those in work -will have to take second 
p I ace ; and t h i s i s where the sac r i f i c e s w i I I be n e-
cessary. He shows no embarrassment when La Repubb I i ca 
presses him later to explain these sacrifices in 
concrete ter:-ms: 
" L . R . : Let ' s go 
Many people say 
back 
that 
to the question of mobility. 
this word se['ves to hide a 
rather- thr-eatening ceaiity, that Js, iay~offs. You 
believe that a lot of companies have a labour- force 
in excess of the1r productive necessity? 
L. L. : There are a great many companies which are 
over-manned ... We/re talking now in terms of many 
tens of thousands of workers. This creates a very 
serious human and moral prob 1 em, as in Ita 1 y 
economic development is stagnant and workers who 
have 1 est their jobs have the we l founded tear of 
not finding another one. And a 1 so because it is 
nearly a 1 ways the big companies, whose plants are 
situated in important urban centres: this increases 
the social and pol it i cal problems involved. We are 
anyway conv i need that imposing excess manning on 
companies is suicidal. The I tal ian economy is being 
driven to its knees as a result of this pol icy. For 
this reason, whi 1st all of us realize the difficult 
nature of the prob I em, we bel i eve that companies 
shou I d have the right to lay off workers when a 
state of crisis is ascertained. 
L.R.: You furthermore propose that the Cassa 
Integrazione should not be made available to workers 
for more than one year. Why? 
L.L.: Because we don/t want to transform productive 
work into welfare benefits. And also, often workers 
on the Cassa In tegraz i one find another job, in the 
b I ack economy, contemporaneous 1 y benet it i ng from 
the wage made available from the Cassa. Such 
phenomena are fair I y w l despread, espec i a 1 1 y in the 
North. And they must cease ... " 
Lama remains adamant that sacrifices by the working 
class, espec 1 a I I y 1 n the shape of renouncing any pre-
tension to Job protectionism, provide the only possible 
so 1 u t i on t o t h e e con om i c c r i s i s and thus , i n the 1 on g 
run, employment: 
"L.R.: Do you think a shortening of the working week 
could be a solution? 
L.L.: It might contribute towards one, certainly. 
But let's not forget that this country ranks amongst 
those with the fewest effective working hours 
amongst evolved industrial countries ... The tendency 
amongst alI capitalist countries is towards a 
shortening of the working week, but other countries 
must reach our level before we can move on again. I 
repeat: our prob I ems can on 1 y be reso 1 ved with a 
healthy industrial development. 
L.R.: Thus with capitalist accumulation? 
L.L.: Yes, capitalist accumulation, 
planned by the state and directed 
maxi mum poss i b i e growth of occupation. 
line" <10). 
carefully 
towards the 
This is our 
Dissent to the /new course/ among the various components 
of the federation was limited. The strongest /attack/ 
came from the traditionally radical engineering workers 
union, the FLM; but although this union questioned some 
of the practical proposals contained in the document, it 
I eft the genera I I og i c of the /new course/ undisturbed. 
Rather than a straight 1 imitation of new pub! ic 
spending they favoured increased taxation of the higher 
tax brackets to pay for social services etc. and argued 
strang 1 y that the subs i di za t ion of some services and 
corrunodities should be maintained. On the question of 
mob i 1 it y, they voiced reservations on the ide a of a 
comp 1 ete deregu 1 at ion of the emp 1 oyer/ s power to expe 1 
labour and dip into the labour market as they pleased, 
although they did not really dig in their heels for job 
security. According to the FLM, mobility should be 
allowed, but should take place within a framework of 
processes of negotiation surrounding industrial 
reconversion and restructuration. They also came out 
against the idea of the creation of /job agencies/ to 
promote this mobility, claiming that these would in 
reality be simply /parking lots/ for the unemployed. On 
the question of wages they argued that a staggering of 
wage increases could only be foreseen for specific 
negotiating platforms and only with the consensus of the 
workforce. In general they came out against the idea of 
national industry-wide contracts, favouring articulated 
negotiations leading to specific company agreements. 
However the FLM was successful in pushing through only a 
few of the ammendments it wanted at the final congress. 
The next important confirmation of the /new course/ 
came from the Communist Party convention on workers/ 
participation, organized by the Gramsci Institute and 
the Lombard Centre of Documentation and held in Milan on 
4th-5th February 1978. The apparently academic theme of 
the convention was immediately bel led by Gianfranco 
Borghini, regional <Lombard) secretary of the PC!, in an 
introductory speech restating the case for the union/s 
/new course/ : 
"We must fu 1 1 y understand and ready curse 1 ves to 
confront a!! the problems posed by the crisis, 
beginning with the most difficult, those relating to 
a relaunching of accumulation on a new basis, to the 
reconversion and widening of the productive 
apparatus and to the increase of product i v l t y and 
revitalization of industrial concerns" C11>. 
In this convention, the PC! reaffirmed its new 
/sensitivity/ towards the needs of industry, particu-
larly towards sectors in crisis. The need for a re-
structuration of production through a wide-ranging 
techno log i ca I renewa 1 and the increase of productivity 
in order to recuperate international competitiveness was 
under I i ned. This process wou 1 d 
include the mobility of the 
also, 
labour 
it was foreseen, 
market and the 
decentralization of some productive processes. 
Following the union federation/s lead, the PC! for 
the first time at this convention theorized working 
class struggles as a real (although not exclusive> cause 
of the economic crisis. Having admitted this, the next 
1 ogi ca I step for the PC! was that the necessary pre-
condition for the /renewal/ of the country and the 
reformation of the bases of economic development was the 
containment of confl ictual ity. Workers would have to 
recognize their interest in hea 1 thy industria 1 growth, 
and throw their energy and imagination into this 
objective rather than into /defensive activities/ 
deleterious to the company. The mechanism for this new 
community of interest in productive renewal was to be 
workers/ participation, in the form of /productive 
conferences' which would unite workers, technicians, 
white col Jar workers and management and deliberate 
decisions ranging from investment to technological 
renewai. Such bodies would render confl let superfluous 
as: 
once this objective has been achieved <even if 
this must be through struggle), the workers must 
then assume their own respons i b i I it y, in the sense 
that their behaviour taken as a whole must be such 
as to guarantee not on 1 y that these decisions are 
realized, but above all that they are realized with 
a conservation of efficiency, productivity and 
economic viability 11 <12). 
The debate within the unions on the /new course/ 
officially concluded with the famous assembly of the EUR 
delegates, from which the /new course/ took its common 
name, the EUR about-turn. The final document ratified by 
the assembly did not substantially differ from Carniti/s 
original proposals, although some of the FLM/s ob-
jections were included, resulting in a qual ificatlon, in 
the sense of the FLM/s obJections, for example of the 
I ines on mobility and wage increases. 
The /new course/ of 1978, was thus, as it affirmed 
itself to be, a clear about-turn in union thought and 
practice. The debates within the union and party during 
1978 produced an entirely new theorization of the role 
of working class union and party. The defence of class 
interests - Job security, improved wages and working 
conditions, better social and welfare services and so on 
- was no longer to be pursued with an antagonistic, 
con f l i ctua I approach; with struggles against I ay-of f s, 
and strikes over wages or working conditions. Instead, 
the stabi I ity of the capitalist system was to be fully 
recognized, and workers themselves were to cooperate and 
participate in the revitalization and reform of this 
system for the common good of alI. 
The obvious effect of the union preoccupation with 
the state of industry and general economic planning is 
that it lost contact with the every day problems of the 
workers on the factory floor. While the union leadership 
was concentrating on the general maladies of the eco-
nomy, the rank and file, with its specific and immediate 
problems, was slipping out of its control. The every day 
shop floor need to confront the issues, such as wages, 
work speeds, Job security, the introduction of new 
techno 1 ogy and so on, which most c 1 ose 1 y concern the 
workers during the eight hours they spend in the factory 
each day, was by now outside the scope and seeming) y 
even the comprehension of the trade union leadership. 
The general secretary of the FLM, Enzo Mattina, noted 
with some surprise in an interview with The Times that: 
"Our members are turning their attention inwards to 
the factory floor. They are directing their efforts 
at salary negotiations, working conditions and other 
easily identifiable local problems. 
This has 1 ead to 
floor and national 
that all sorts of 
agreements between 
exist" <13). 
a growing gap between the shop 
leadership. For example, we know 
local and completely unofficial 
shop stewards and management 
But the /growing gap/ noted by Mattina is hardly 
surprising when the unions/ maJor concern had become the 
resolution of capital/s economic crisis and the new 
battle cry of the union leaders was productivity and 
efficiency, even at the price of worsening conditions on 
the shop floor. By now this subservience of immediate 
shop floor concerns to the goal of economic renewal was 
evidenced in virtually every public statement made by 
members of the union leadership; but a couple of 
examples wil 1 serve to illustrate the point. Lama, at a 
national conference on FIAT cal led by the PCI in 
November 1980 is typical in his statement that: "Today"s 
obJectives are not on I y those of improving wages and 
intervening in the organization of work, but are also 
concerned with productivity and efficiency" <14>. 
Marianetti, speaking at the assembly of the union 
federation CGIL-CISL-UIL in Rome on 4th November 1980 
confirms: 
"The biggest knot to be untied now is how an ex-
pansionary policy may be reconciled with a steadily 
falling demand. There is a transition here which 
cannot be short-cut: we must assume clear choices of 
productivity, competitiveness, efficiency; in short, 
the returns possible from work. And these themes 
cannot be faced if we remain dug into the trenches 
of inflexibi 1 ity" <15). 
The calls for increased productivity and the end to 
/ inflexibi 1 i ty" in the workers" 
lated into concrete terms with, 
attitudes were trans-
for example, the calls 
to give up advances a I ready made in the direction of 
r-eduction in working hours as part of the so I uti on to 
unemployment, a popular workers/ demand. Enzo Mattina, 
talking to La Repubblica: 
"The union has been too ideological over these 
problems, the time has come to say, for example at 
FIAT, that if we have to, we're ready to keep the 
plants open throughout August... and to keep them 
working on Saturdays, Sundays and national holidays" 
( 16). 
And Giorgio Benvenuto adds: 
11 Don/t look on the Saturday holidays as one of the 
biggest gains of the last years" <17). 
The mass use of absenteeism, a form of struggle 
which, as we have seen, had become extremely diffuse, 
also came under fire from the leadership. The union 
proposed a much tighter control of the 'work shy', 
suggesting unannounced visits by doc tors to the houses 
of absentees. Enzo Mattina went further, publicly 
supporting the ide a of a bonus to be given to non-
absenteeists <an idea launched following the acceptance 
in late 1980 of a 50,000 Lire <roughly £25) monthly 
bonus for attendance by 50% of the workforce of a small 
engineering factory, the Eredl Gnutti). Mattina approved 
the plan with the comment that: "It's just the intro-
duction of a regulation to penalize anomalous behaviour" 
( 18). 
But perhaps most telling of al 1 has been the union/s 
attitude of acritical approval of management/s strategy 
for the restruc tura t ion of the car industry, inc 1 udi ng 
the 1ncreasing use of new technologies and work organi-
zations in the context of smaller decentralized plants. 
In close agreement with FIAT/s propaganda on the 
subject, the new technologies are being put forward as 
uniquely beneficial to workers, capable of producing a 
/new quality of 1 ife/ in the factories through the 
abolition of repetitive, boring, heavy and dangerous 
Jobs, the reduction of environmental risk - noise, heat, 
fumes etc., and the genera 1 improvement of the working 
environment <1 ight, ventilation etc.). According to the 
union the problems of absenteeism, diffuse conflict and 
general disaffection with work could be largely solved 
with new technologies conceived as a transcendence of 
the assemb I y 1 i ne which wou 1 d provide new, more in-
teresting and higher skilled Jobs in maintenance, pro-
gramming etc. The union/s lack of analysis of the real 
problems involved with new technologies was expressed in 
comments such as this fairly typical one from Raffaele 
Morese, secretary of the FLM: 
"For a union which does not limit itself to regu-
lating the price of labour power, but wants to 
determine the qua 1 i ty and quant 1 ty of work i tse 1 f, 
the problem of going beyond the assembly line is a 
great challenge to take on" <19). 
The cal 1 for the faster introduction of new modular 
technologies into the factory was first made official in 
the FLM/s proposal for the 1980 contract presented in 
May of that year: 
liThe path we must press for is that of investment in 
new technologies which may produce with the 
realization of wide economies of scale- a product 
combining low consumption and durability. A product 
which wi I I be bui It using techniques which transcend 
the assembly line and machine paced work, and give 
an organization of work which is more flexible and 
better adapted to new needs, and which provides a 
positive response to the pressures from the new and 
old working class" <20). 
In a document on the prob I ems of the au to sector 
drafted shortly before this, the FLM delegati were also 
enthusiastic about the use of new technologies, calling 
for, among other things, the extension of experiments 
already under way, such as modular engine assembly and 
alternatives to the assembly line in final assembly. But 
this document was a little more qualified in its 
approva I , recognizing some of the dangers imp 1 i cit in 
restructuration: 
"The relationship between the organization of work 
and machinery is certainly central. We must not 
forget the fact that the solutions of flexibility 
and productivity, insistently proposed by FIAT, 
cannot be realized outside of this relationship. But 
it is completely unrealistic ... to think of over-
coming the basic inflexibility of the present 
mechanical solutions at FIAT <mechanized I ines) with 
a flexibility which is obtained who! ly at the 
expense of the workers. . . rendering them /nomads/ 
rather than mobile within the factory" <21). 
But the reservations concerning mobl 1 lty and Job 
security expressed by the delegati had virtually dis-
appeared from union language by the early 1980s, to be 
replaced by a fulsome approval which was appreciatively 
noted by the right wing financial Journal Mondo 
Economico. 
"The pr inc i pa 1 function of the robot, at 1 east as 
far as FIAT is concerned, is, then, the rep 1 acemen t 
of the generally discontented and /absenteeist/ 
workers without angering the trade unions, in fact 
actually obtaining their praise." 
And later: 
" ... the unions in Italy, at least up to now, have 
never pitched themselves against robot i za t ion and 
automation. The FIAT experience and others prove it 11 
( 22). 
The unions wholehearted and naive approval of new 
technologies contrasts rather strangely with Luciano 
Lama/s simultaneous contemptuous dismissal of the 
popu I ar s 1 ogan, once embraced by the unions 11 Lavorare 
meno, 1 avorare tutti" <Less work, everyone working) as 
/illusory and simplistic/. 
The unions have extended their general approval of 
FIAT/s plans for restructuration to cover the process of 
decentralization to smal 1, high technology and more 
governable plants. At the PCI national conference, 
attended by large numbers of union executives, the vice 
president of the Communist Party members of senate, 
ColaJanni, stated: "We need a I ine which can tie the 
interests of the company to those of the working class 
and the country in general. As far as FIAT is concerned, 
it shou I d bu i I d sma I I er and therefore more governab 1 e 
and productive factories ... " 
The nation a I and provincia 1 1 eadersh ips of the fe-
derations have thus behaved with increasing i nsens i-
tivity towards the real problems of the working class at 
FIAT and elsewhere; the problems, that is, of conserving 
work posts, earning a living wage in a period of intense 
inflation, and of developing a strategy to gain some 
control over the introduction and use of new techno-
logies and work methods. Unsurprisingly, this lack of 
contact with the immediate interests of the working 
c I ass has resu I ted in an increasing ali en at ion of its 
membership, an alienation which manifests itself in many 
ways. 
Absentee Leadership and /Individualism/: the Unofficial Struggles 
The increasing lack of commitment to and involve-
ment in the unions in the late 1970s, especially among 
the latest recruits to FIAT, has already been discussed 
in the chapter entitled /The Ungovernable Factory/. Here 
we saw how the working class inside the factory had 
increasingly chosen forms of struggle which are not only 
outside of the control of the trade unions but are often 
actually disclaimed by them: the violent cortei intern!; 
the refusal to keep up with the prescribed work rhythms, 
the mass use of absenteeism and so on. The use of forms 
of struggle which were not endorsed by the unions was in 
fact extremely widespread. Pietro Marcenaro, in his 
introductory speech at the convention "Vecch i e Nuov i 
Operai alia FIAT" COld and New Workers at FIAT) 
explains: 
"Over the last few years participation in strikes by 
FIAT workers has maintained an extremely high level, 
despite the over-genera I it y of the union pI at forms 
and the frequent lack of concrete results. This 
potential for struggle, which is not satisfied by 
the agreements, the workers use every day inside the 
factory in a network of informal conquests. The 
intervals between the i nst i tutl ona I struggles are 
f i I 1 ed by a daily initiative which is changing the 
material face of the factory. Clocking in at the 
beginning of the shift before changing, leaving the 
work post before the buzzer signals the end of the 
shift, 1 eav i ng the shop f 1 oor to move around other 
shops and many other rights practised by the workers 
are not sanctified by any contract, by any 
agreement, by any law, but anyway constitute some of 
the conquests which the workers hold most dear" 
( 23). 
This informal conquest of power is confirmed in the 
few words, reported earlier, of the delegato I inter-
viewed at the 5th Lega. Commenting on the conquest of 
relaxed production rhythms at Mirafiori; he said: "Yes, 
that's a sign of our strength, we're proud of it". 
The union has on the who 1 e fa i 1 ed to understand, 
much less take part in leading, these 'i nforma I' 
struggles of the working class, tending to write them 
off as the 'individualism' of youth. The following 
extract from an FLM bulletin shows the puzzlement of a 
union faced with a class which is clearly ready to 
fight, and yet refuses the hegemony of the traditional 
organizations of the working class movement: 
"<The involvment of youth) in the union/s initia-
tives and struggles is not ru I ed out, in the sense 
of their clear opposition to the logic of the 
bosses, but often in the cultural environment of the 
youth of this country a mentality negating the 
factory as a terrain of struggle and dreaming 
impossible utopian solutions has prevailed, and this 
relationship to the concrete conditions of the 
working class may translate itself into solutions of 
individual defense <a certain use of sickness pay, 
the desire to escape from the factory etc.) and not 
of collective transformation" <24). 
The power of the union structure inside the factory 
varies quite widely, in fact, depending largely on the 
desire and ability of shop floor representatives to 
connect with the workers and their struggles. However, 
one factor seems common to all the shops: the tendency 
to /use/ the union as far as this is possible, but to 
/go beyond it/ in the negotiation or de facto appro-
priation of informal rights. This instrumental approach 
to the unions was expressed to me by T., the FLM 
official responsible for FIAT: "<The workers) still Join 
the union, but conceiving them as a form of guarantee -
they see the unions as guaranteeing wage rates and so 
on ... " 
Most of the time, then, the re J at i onsh i p of the 
greater part ot the rank and f i I e to the union struc-
tures was one of genera I adherence to the union I ed 
struggles, while conducting their own, /informal/ ones 
for rights and control in the factory, without reference 
to the official structures. However, this peaceful 
coexistence of ten tended to be strained, part i cuI ar 1 y 
during maJor union led contract negotiations, when the 
workers/ suspicion of their provincial and national 
representatives of ten man i tested i tse If not on I y with 
extensions of the struggles wei I beyond the point 
endorsed by the unions, but in outbreaks of frustration 
and violence against any trade unionist seen as putting 
the brakes on. Giancarlo Santi I li, of the Colletlvi 
Operai of Mirafiori, Rivalta and Lingotto, describes and 
explains one such moment: 
"The struggle exploded in June/July, and not 
because, as someone said yesterday, the workers had 
understood the nature of the con tract <which 
inc I uded the c 1 ause on mob i 1 l t y) but because they 
were really sick of that sort of agreement, of what 
was going on; and once again the workers surprised 
those who were proposing symbo 1 i c roadb I ocks /to 
inform the people/; who were trying to promote 
equally symbolic pickets, by their very hard forms 
of struggles. I don/t think 1/m saying anything new 
when I talk about trade unionists or trade union 
officials who had to run away from the blocks after 
they tried to say they should be symbolic, and not 
rea 1 mass barricades, as the workers wan ted. The 
people from the union can confirm about the stones 
they feit flying around them. This is not a new 
thing; things like this have happened very often at 
FIAT ... " < 25) . 
The decisive struggle at FIAT of autumn 1980 pro-
vides an illustration of the unions/ general failure to 
gain the consensus of the workers and give a consistent 
direction and lead to their struggle in the course of a 
major battle with FIAT over lay-offs. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
THE HOT AUTUMN IN REVERSE: 
SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 1980 
By 1980 the time was ripe for FIAT to wage a deci-
sive battle on the workers/ power base in the factories, 
in the knowledge that the official trade union organi-
zation, pledged to the salvation of the economy, could 
only play a weak and vacil latory role in defence of the 
FIAT workers. 
On the return to work after the summer hoi idays, at 
the beginning of September, tension in the factory was 
high. Management had for some time been crying crisis, 
and already, throughout the summer, FIAT had been 
carrying out a selective pol icy of redundancy. Very many 
more workers were in the /I imbo/ of the Cassa 
Integrazione; and it was clear that this was only a 
beginning. 
On Friday, 5th September, Cesare Ann i ba 1 di - the 
chief personnel manager - announced that FIAT needed to 
lay off a further 24,000 workers, of whom one half would 
never be re-employed, or at the very least put them on 
the Cassa Integrazione for 18 months from 1st October. 
In this way FIAT hoped to reso 1 ve its over-production 
problem, reducing production by about 25% over the next 
year and a half. And in the meantime, as a press release 
from management headquarters in Corso Marconi stated: 
"We can look into how production might be re-organized". 
FIAT/ s p 1 an, then, was to reduce manning in the 
factory immediate 1 y and proceed to a further· techno-
logical and organizational restructuration for an 
eventual relaunch of its products. 
Its hand forced by the threat of redundancies on a 
massive scale, the union found itself in a difficult 
position. The tension in the factories made it obvious 
that the workers were not prepared to swa I I ow eas i 1 y 
another defeat. Over the preceding year they had already 
seen the col lapse of the struggle for the reinstatement 
of the 61, the acceptance of a 0. 50% "tax" imposed on 
wages for a "solidarity fund" for industries in crisis, 
and the lack of reaction to the sacking of 1500 workers 
for "persistent absenteeism". Now. faced with the threat 
of mass 1 ay-offs, the a 1 ready uneasy atmosphere had 
become explosive. 
The tension in fact began to manifest itself as 
soon as the factories re-opened after the summer break 
in a series of actions including strikes and 
demonstrations in various of the Turinese plants. 
However, the FLM had already agreed to the concept 
of 'external mobility" -a euphamism for lay~otfs- not 
on I y in the guide I i nes theorized in the "new course", 
but in practice, in clause 4 of the engineering workers/ 
contract signed on 15th July 1979 <1>. 
This clause defined the conditions for a system of 
'mobility". Workers expelled from one company during 
periods of "productive restructuration, reconversion and 
company crises of particular social importance" would be 
put on a list for preferential employment by other 
companies in the scheme. Workers who did not accept the 
offer of the job at an equivalent ski 11 level in a 
company operating within 50 km of the local authority in 
which they resided would not be entitled to a wage from 
the Cassa Integrazione after the termination of the 
period for which it was originally authorized. Workers 
not receiving job offers would be compulsorily retrained 
to qualify for the work that was currently available in 
the system of companies involved in the scheme. 
Since the signing of the contract the idea of a re-
novation of industry with the full participation of the 
unions in decision making had proved to be totally 
unrealistic, especially given the climate of repression 
and renewed attacks on jobs by the employers. Clause 4, 
the unions hastened to explain, had not been intended to 
be experimented on such a large scale; or, it should be 
added, in the context of such clear cut management 
prerogative in the operation of its mechanisms. But, 
however embarrassing, the c 1 ause had been approved and 
signed, and it put the unions in an extremely ambiguous 
situation at the negotiation table. 
Desperate to mediate the situation and if possible 
avoid a direct confrontation, the FLM reaffirmed its 
willingness to allow FIAT a free hand to manage the 
crisis in any way it could without resorting to the 
sack, offering internal mobility, a freezing of turn-
over, early pensioning and retraining courses to match 
ski lis to the avai !able work. Various union officials, 
including Pio Galli - the national secretary of the FLM 
- even went so far as to declare that, on condition that 
the crisis wou I d not be used as an excuse to reduce 
1 abour force permanent 1 y, the union was not a priori 
prejudiced against /externai mobi 1 ity/. 
The Hour of the Lion 
But despite the union/s desire to avoid confronta-
tion and its willingness to go more than half way to 
meet management, FIAT was intransigent. A strike would, 
in fact, arne! iorate its immediate problem of over-
production and besides this, perhaps an open conflict, 
in this period of weakness of the working class 
organization~ might actually break the militants/ power 
within the factory and allow the restoration of 
productive order. FIAT thus had little to lose and 
everything to gain by entering into a test of strength 
with the organizations of the working class- a match in 
which the winner could reign undisputed in the factory. 
And so, despite the conciliatory attitude of the unions 
and the urging of the government which needed an 
immediate and happy ending to the dispute - FIAT pressed 
ahead with its plans for the mass lay-offs. 
FIAT was not only intransigent over the need for 
the lay-offs but manifestly displayed its determination 
to smash the workers/ power base in the factory by 
dismantling wherever possible their moments of 
organization. 
When, later, the letters advising workers of their 
suspension from work began to pour through the letter-
boxes of Turin, this strategy became clear. 
The 24,000 lay-offs left unscathed the smal I plants 
of Desio and Termini Imerese, where the saleable Panda 
is produced. The lay-offs were concentrated in the big 
plants uf Turin; where, in almost every case, the more 
strongly organized sections of the factory and the more 
politically aware individuals were hit. A journalist for 
La Repubbl ica reports: 
"Yesterday, a trade union offici a I from the 
Quinta Lega, Mirafiori, told me that after seeing a 
dozen of the suspension 1 etters he cou 1 d predict 
with near certainty the names of those to be 
suspended in the other shops, because instead of 
objective criteria, linked to the crisis of over-
production of certain models, .an /ad personam/ 
choice was being operated, 1 inked to the I eve I of 
political and trade union involvement of the 
individual workers" C2). 
In many shops the suspens i ens smashed the in terna I 
trade union organization, leaving whole shops Ci.e. Shop 
72, Mirafiori Bodywork) or individual shifts <i.e. the 
press shop night shift> virtually bereft of delegati. 
The delegati belonging to the PCI and PDUP were 
particularly favoured for redundancy. Other people to be 
singled out were those who had been able to form 
informal 1 inks between delegati and the rank and file, 
espec i a I 1 y among the women. Women who had been par-
ticularly visible in the assemblies and cortei interni 
were almost inevitably on the suspension lists. Women, 
in fact, particularly those taken on in the new intake 
from 1978, were the worst hit by the lay-offs, about 60% 
of the total number of the redundancies involving women. 
The figures quoted by the trade union speak for 
themselves on FIAT's strategy: whilst the ratio between 
de 1 egat i and rank and f i 1 e workers is about 1:70, the 
percentage of delegati layed off was enormously higher 
than could be expected from a random selection. At 
Mirafori 145 delegati in the Commissione Interna were 
made redundant, at Rivalta 67 and at Lingotto only 9, 
a I though a I most a I I the workers enro I I ed in the PCI 
section received letters of suspension. 
FIAT claimed that the workers to be made 'mobile' 
could be absorbed in local industry, provincial building 
programmes and public works- a claim which they backed 
up with reams of statistics and data of which the unions 
were justifiably suspicious, given not only the general 
crisis but the probability that many more dependent 
industries would fail or have to reduce their workforces 
in the wake of a reduction in production by FIAT. 
The Occupation f~om the Outside 
The unions were left with no alternative. On Wed-
nesday, 10th September 1980 talks broke down, and Cesare 
Annibaldi, the chief of personnel, announced that 
procedures for the lay-offs would be set in motion that 
day, or at latest the next. 
At Rivalta, Lancia di Chivasso and Mirafiori Body-
work unofficial strikes were immediately cal led and 
pickets were formed. The struggles of the workers of 
Danzig in course in Poland were frequently invoked. The 
events occurring contemporaneously in Poland were, in 
fact, to become a sort of symbol of the hard and in-
transigent struggle the FIAT workers knew was to come. 
In contrast to the almost revo 1 uti onary fervour, 
fanned by the news from Danzig, already manifested by 
the workers and mi 1 itants of the larger FIAT plants, the 
CGIL was at best luke-warm. On this same day, Pierre 
Carniti told La Repubblica that the FLM did not want a 
/frontal struggle/ with FIAT and affirmed that the 
union/s path should be the use of the /solidarity fund/ 
for industry in crisis set up with the 0.50% tax on 
wages to /manage/ a part, however smal I, of the economy. 
But the trade union leadership had been pre-empted. 
By now the choice between cooperation or confrontation 
was no longer theirs to make. On the following day, the 
11th September, the 3 hour strikes ca I 1 ed by the union 
were prolonged to the end of the shift at most plants 
and cortei of angry workers were formed. The incoming 
shifts took up the struggle in their turn: the 37 day 
long seige of FIAT had begun. 
The form the struggle took was completely new for 
the FIAT workers, and in fact for the !tal ian working 
class. Perhaps because of the inspiration from Danzig, 
perhaps because of the many insults that had been 
swallowed, but mostly because it seemed the only 
possible response to the high-handed and aggressive 
attitude taken by management, the struggle quickly took 
the form of an all out strike with 24 hour picketing of 
all gates, amounting, as one union leader put it, to: 
"an occupation from the outside". The lack of strike 
funds which had previously determined a more articulated 
form of struggle was surmounted first by the spontaneous 
aid of the people of Turin, who brought food and wine to 
the picket 1 i nes, and I a ter with an emergency campaign 
to raise money for the strikers and their families. The 
strikers settled in for a long seige: on one gate a 
notice appeared stating "We are now accepting bookings 
for the Christmas dinner" (3). 
Deeply worried by the events at FIAT, the govern-
ment was intervening in the dispute. The Minister of 
Work, Foschi, proposed a compromise: the various 
measures already proposed by the union - the freeze on 
turn-over, early retirement, internal mobi I ity etc., 
should be tried until the 30th June 1981, and if these 
failed to resolve FIAT/s problems, the question of 
external mobi 1 ity could be looked at again. The FLM 
accepted the government proposals as the basis for 
discussion, but FIAT contemptuously dismissed them. 
Talks once again broke down. 
By now the dispute had sedimented a complicated 
stratification of stances. FIAT was holding to its guns: 
24,000 to be layed off immediately, at least half never 
to return. Foschi, for the government, vaci 1 lated, first 
tentatively claiming that the workers layed off could be 
re-absorbed in the Piedmontese economy according to the 
statistics produced by FIAT, then later declaring 
himself prepared to resign if the lay-offs were carried 
out. Members of the national leadership of the FLM 
continued to promote the idea of a negotiated external 
mobility into guaranteed posts outside the company, and 
the union as a whole continued to insist on its 
alternative solutions. Meanwhile, the workers assemblies 
passed motions consistently confirming their readiness 
for a "struggle to the bitter end". The following 
motion, passed on the 15th September at Lingotto, is an 
example: 
1) Immediate retraction of the lay-offs. 
2) No external mobility. 
3) No to the Cassa Integrazione at zero hours. 
4) Al 1 negotiations to be held in Turin. 
5) A national general strike <4). 
Similar initiatives followed from factory assem-
blies and consiglloni <mass assemblies) of the other 
plants. 
One of the most striking factors in the struggle 
was, in fact, the workers/ very real suspicion of the 
trade union executive, which became manifest right from 
the start. Worr led by the generous offers made by the 
unions of internal mobi 1 ity, a freeze of turn-over 
replacement, the Cassa Integrazlone and so on, and 
angered by certain members of the executive who were 
felt to be /trying out/ the idea of external mobility, 
one of the first demands made by the workers was on its 
own leadership; for al 1 negotiations to be carried on in 
Turin, where the proceedings could be more easily 
supervised. The mounting suspicion of the workers soon 
transformed into vociferous criticism and sometimes even 
vi o 1 ence against members of the nation a I 1 eadersh i p. At 
a huge assemb I y ca I 1 ed on Wednesday 24th September on 
the M i raf i or i testing track to hear the views of the 
various political voices in the arena, it was not only 
the exponent of Christian Democracy who failed to make 
himself heard above the storm of whistles and slogans, A 
Journalist gives th1s account: 
ir the workers/ anger, of ten degenera t 1 ng in to 
displays of insufferance towards the leaders of the 
trade union movement, in a meeting characterized by 
a mixture of disillusionment and irrational beha-
viour, and the cold welcome given to the secretary 
of the CGIL, Agostino Marianetti, are the most 
obvious features the J ourna I i st might note during 
this confrontation with the political parties, 
which ... developed and concluded in a way which has 
deep I y perp I exed even the most optimistic in the 
ranks of the union leadership" (5). 
The day after, the 25th September and the 16th day 
of the strike, was the day of the engineering workers/ 
national general strike in support of the FIAT workers. 
100,000 people gathered in an enormous demonstration in 
Turin. Once again, union leaders experienced con-
siderable difficulties in making themselves heard. 
Pierre Carniti was given the hardest time, forced by an 
angry and suspicious audience to cone I ude h l s speech 
hurriedly. At the end of the ra 11 y a group of workers 
climbed onto the platform and began to chant: "N~ 
Mobilita, n~ licenziamentl/occupiamo gli stabilimentl" 
<no to mobility, no to the sack, occupy the factories) 
and "ci place di piu/un governo in tuta blu" <we want a 
government in blue overal Is). 
The union leadership/s increasing difficulties were 
not alleviated by the fact that the PCI was rather 
opportunistically taking an increasingly /hard I ine/ in 
the dispute. The following day, in fact, Berlinguer 
Cthen leader of the PCI> was to make his famous 
declaration of support for an occupation of the factory 
( 6). 
In the meantime, the struggle was radicalizing even 
further. The news that the letters of suspension had 
actually been sent off to 22,884 workers coincided with 
the consiglione of Mirafiori held at the Teatro Nuovo on 
3rd September. The assembly, enlarged by contingents 
from other plants, decided on an immediate strengthening 
of the pickets and their extension to alI the gates: the 
factory was now truly under seige, and the gates, 
decorated with huge red and black posters of Karl Marx, 
became the centres of the workers/ meetings and 
discussions. A /people/s canteen" was set up, and a 
coordination centre organized in a coach parked outside 
gate 5 Mirafiori. In the evenings and on Sunday, 
entertainment was organized in the form of plays, shows 
and films. Continuous information centres were set up in 
various parts of the city. 
But at the same time another and very new factor 
was emerging in the complicated dynamics of the 
struggle. Bands of capi <foremen and chargehands> had 
begun attacking the pickets, declaring that they were 
tired of the struggle and wanted an immediate return to 
work and normality. During the night of 8th October, a 
band of about 50 foremen managed to get through gate 0, 
where the picket I i ne was weakest. Severa I picketers 
were inJured in the clash. A short while later a similar 
attack was made on Gate 11 but this time was un-
successful. At Rivalta, foremen succeeded in entering 
the factory, but were forced to evacuate the following 
day, under heavy escort from the pol ice. Later on, 
however, a silent procession of about 6000 foremen and 
office workers marched to the office block at Rivalta. 
It is almost certainly true, as most workers and 
their organizations claimed, that many of these capi 
were bribed by FIAT (7) but it is also true that never 
before had scabs been brave and numerous enough to try 
such tactics, with or without bribes. The very fact that 
the bosses found a terrain available for their tactics 
is symptomatic of the emergence of a /right wing 
mentality' among certain class sectors, a factor already 
hypothesi zed at the end of chapter five. Despite the 
claims of the left, anxious to apologize for the 
apparent class split which led to the disastrous closure 
of the dispute, it would appear that these sectors were 
not confined to foremen and lower management, but also 
included an appreciable number of workers at the highly 
ski I led and waged level. 
But the anti-strike activities of a limited number 
of workers did not, at least in this period, deter the 
struggle of the rest. The national general strike cal Jed 
on lOth October found enormous support all over Italy, 
and over 40,000 people formed a mass rally which marched 
on M irati or i . Pressure from the workers had by now 
forced the national executive of the union into taking a 
much harder 1 i ne, at I east in its rhetoric, in defence 
of the workers/ interests. A group of FIAT workers 
explain in a book written immediatly after the struggle: 
"Benvenuto had to take a much harder I ine faced with 
an attentive square full of people who would not 
a I I ow him to s I i p up. . . In a discussion w i t h a 
worker, to whose query about how the dispute would 
end he rep! ied: /There are two possibi 1 ities, either 
FIAT will give in or we/11 give in/ and the worker 
replied /no comrade Benvenuto, either FIAT wi I I give 
in or FIAT wi II give in/" <B>. 
In the context of this demonstration of the extreme 
solidity of the struggle and of the solidarity with the 
FIAT workers displayed throughout the strike, not only 
by workers from other factories and industries but by 
other class sectors, the conclusion of the struggle just 
4 days I a ter in what was perhaps the most crushing 
defeat for the working class since 1954 seems extra-
ordinary. 
On Tuesday 14th October, the 35th day of the 
struggle, the foremens/ coordinating committee met at 
Teatro Nuovo. At its end, a long, silent procession 
formed up. The /march of the 40,000/, however many of 
them there really were < 9) was on its way. The FIAT 
workers quoted earlier describe the scene: 
"Groups of workers and delegati are ... in the 
streets. In Piazza Castello they shout slogans 
directed against the s i 1 en t demonstration which is 
unravel I i ng towards Via Garibaldi. There are 
strikers in front of the Town Hall too. Coins are 
thrown at the much larger block of foremen. Tension 
is high as the workers b I ock the doors. In the end 
the foremen, despite their greater numbers, roll up 
their banners and go away. They leave their placards 
on the ground, and the workers take them: re-painted 
and with improved wording they could be used again, 
starting with the women's demonstration fixed for 
Saturday: they are good qua I i ty and robust we 
haven/t got any more money: why waste them?" C10). 
But the placards were never to be used. At 10.30 
that same evening, the secretariat of the CGIL-CSIL-UIL 
and the FLM hurriedly met with management, with the 
announced aim of drawing up the guidelines for an 
agreement. 
The following morning the pickets were bigger than 
ever. Rumours were circulating of an injunction to clear 
the pickets, and pol ice intervention was expected. And 
besides, the news of the impending announcement of an 
agreement between unions and management had got around. 
Thus, when in the early afternoon the national TV and 
radio networks announced the arrival in Turin of the 
national executive to refer the proposal for an 
agreement to the Cons i gl i one at an assembly at the 
'Cinema Smeraldo/, a large audience was assured. 
When the union leaders arrived at the cinema, they 
were greeted by an audience which was a 1 ready 1 arge I y 
host i I e and suspicious. The first s I ogans to be heard 
set the tone for the rest of the assembly: 
"Lama, Carniti, Benvenuto, i I posto del lavoro non va 
venduto" <Lama, Carniti, Benvenuto, our jobs are not for 
sa I e). 
"E' ora, e ora di cambi are, 1 a segreter i a se ne deve 
andare" <It's time for a change, the executive must go). 
The worst of the workers' fears were soon conf i r-
med. Perhaps, far from the 'front I ine' in their offices 
in Rome, the union leaders were genuinely convinced that 
the 'demonstration of the 40,000' was a manifestation of 
a maJority desire for a return to work. Or perhaps they 
were simply profiting from it to withdraw from a 
confrontation which, as we have seen, they had never 
wanted and did not expect to win. Whatever the case may 
be, the proposed agreement conceded FIAT pract i ca II y 
everything it had stood out for. As many workers pointed 
out, the same agreement could have been signed at the 
beginning of the struggle more than a month before. 
The agreement did in fact revoke the lay-offs, but 
it allowed the renewable use of the Cassa Integrazlone 
for 23,000 FIAT and Teksid workers from 6th October 1980 
- which was, in fact, FIAT/s original demand. According 
to the agreement, FIAT would not have to re-employ those 
workers who hadn/t found a job until 30th June 1983. The 
agreement furthermore foresaw incentivated voluntary 
redundancy, a block on turn-over, voluntary early 
retirement, internal mobility within the FIAT group in 
the Piedmont region and voluntary retraining courses. 
After their traumatic experience at the Conslgllone 
-which they declared non-valid- the union leadership 
were subjected to even more harrowing episodes of 
opposition, and even violence, by workers at the factory 
gate assemblies called to ratify the agreement. Lama, 
Carn it i and Benvenuto a I 1 had to be hust 1 ed away to 
safety after physical attacks by the angry and 
frustrated crowds of workers gathered to hear them. 
Pierre Carnitl suffered the worst. A Journalist reports: 
o; A group of workers forces Carn it i up aga l nst the 
wal I. Some brandish umbrellas like sticks, while 
others try to hit the general secretary of the CISL 
with their fists. G.F., the young Turinese PCI 
official, decides at this point to get Carniti 
away ... but Just outside gate 18 the workers start 
throwing stones. The I eader of the CI SL incurs a 
slight inJury to his head ... Carniti flees to a 
waiting car. 4 or 5 workers arrive simultaneously 
and stop him from getting in, bodily moving the FIAT 
127 and causing the chauffeur to run for it ... " 
( 11). 
Lama and Benvenuto received similar treatment. At 
gate 3 Lama was met with whistles and cat-calls and a 
barrage of insults. He, too, was forced to flee to his 
car, protected by a group of union officials, after the 
vote. Benvenuto, after admitting that 11 the union 
membership has voted against the agreement 11 ( 12) was 
saved further embarrassment by the provident 
intervention of a police car. 
The vote 
The events at the factory assemblies and the final 
voting reflected the complex course of the struggle: the 
new militancy of organized sections of the /silent 
maJority/ - in fact not a maJority and made up of a new 
I abour aristocracy of foremen, ski 11 ed workers, tech-
n i c i ans and white co 1 1 ar workers - who turned up en 
masse at the moment of the vote to add their weight to 
the /ayes/; the opportunism of a trade union leadership 
determined at any cost, even that of bul !dozing motions, 
to close a conflict which threatened to wound it 
fatally; and the angry reactions of the strikers to the 
closure of the dispute, ranging from violent hosti I ity 
to resignation and confusion. In fact, the final results 
of the voting varied widely from place to place, 
according to the vitality of the struggle, the presence 
of white co I I ar workers and foremen, and the way in 
which the agreement was presented by the unions. 
A clear /yes/ vote was obtained almost exclusively 
in the smaller plants, removed from Turin and the 
epicentre of the struggle, which the mass lay-offs had 
left virtually untouched. The afternoon shift, which had 
had time to recover from the initial impact of the 
desertion of the official trade union and to digest the 
real meaning of the agreement, came out much more 
strongly against it <13>. 
Despite the lack of clarity of the results, a com-
munication issued by the union that evening announced 
that the CGIL-CISL-UIL considered the agreement rati-
fied, and later that night the pickets were dismantled. 
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CHAPTER IX 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this thesis I have argued that the question of 
control over the workforce is of crucial importance to 
the car industry. To maintain competitiveness, not only 
must the product be exact I y sui ted to the market but 
also costs must be sliced to the very I imits. This means 
that there can be no /porous it y / in the I abour process, 
no /non-work/; no moments when labour power, the greater 
part of capital/s investment in a labour intensive 
industry such as the auto sector, stands idle. 
And in order fully to apply labour power, manage-
ment/s control over its labour force must be maximized. 
For decades management/ s major means to achieve this 
goal were the methods of Frederick Taylor"s Scientific 
Management, which had divided up the labour process into 
the smallest possible units and chained the individual 
worker to a single operation or short series of opera-
tions - repeated mindlessly to the insistant rhythms of 
the production process /up/ and /down/ stream. The real 
meaning of Scientific Management: the division of a 
complex task into its simplest elements, the separation 
of conception from execution in these simple tasks and 
thus the expropriation of any intellectual involvement 
or decision-making from the worker, has been amply 
discussed for example in work done by Ranziero Panzieri 
in the 60s <1> and by Harry Braverman in the 70s <2>. 
But management must face not only the problem of 
improving the technical and organizational setting of 
labour to maximize the extraction of surplus value, but 
- <:.• .. H.) -
a 1 so that posed by the subjective actions of its 1 abour 
force, whether these are the conscious, organized and 
collective responses of a /class for itself/, or the 
defensive, i ndi vi dua I actions of the worker who refuses 
to submit his or her will entirely to the logic of the 
machinery and sequential timing. 
This thesis has shown that in Italy this /subjec-
tive element/ among the /factors of production' has 
proved a continuous problem, underlying and determining 
every area of managerial decision-making: from plant 
location, to attitudes (antagonistic or conci I iatory) to 
the organizations of the working class, to technical and 
organizational modifications of the labour process. 
In Italy, the concepts of Scientific Management as 
applied in the factories of the North were not a total 
or even sufficient answer to the problems caused by 
labour. 
During the 1950s management was able to apply suc-
cessfully a strategy of division of labour and mecha-
nization coupled wih a fiercely repressive pol icing of 
the workforce designed to prevent the spread of politi-
cal or trade organizations. They were successful in this 
strategy for a variety of historically specific factors: 
the prioritization of industrial reconstruction by the 
Communist Party and its trade organizations; the fear of 
unemployment; the forms of racism that divided and 
weakened the working class. 
By the 1960s, however, the situation had changed 
both inside and outside the factory. Improved affluence, 
reduced unemployment and, most of a I l , the rebel l i ous 
and anarchistic instincts of the Southern immigrants 
ended the Taylorian dream. 
The giant factories required by the principles of 
the division of labour and mechanization create various 
problems for management. Their sheer size makes it 
d i f f i c u I t t o know , r. on t r o I and p I an a I 1 asp e c t s of the 
labour process simultaneously. The large number of 
workers, alI reduced to a homogeneously /deskil led/ 
condition and gathered under one roof, provide an ideal 
terrain for the development of politicization and 
mi I itancy. The boredom and monotony of the work make the 
notion of pride in work an absurdity, and the workers 
continually look for possible ways to escape it. The 
interdependence of each task in the product i v·e eye 1 e 
with the tasks preceding or following it make the labour 
process easy to b 1 ock even by a handfu 1 of workers -
either by organized action or more spontaneous forms of 
disaffection. At a certain point, under certain 
political, economic and social conditions, the giant 
Taylorian factory is thus likely to become 'ungover-
nable/, as the example of Mirafiori and many others have 
proved. 
In the late 1960s in Italy this /ungovernability/ 
began to manifest itself very strongly. FIAT/s working 
class was in the vanguard of a movement beginning to 
express what was in many ways a direct criticism of the 
Taylorian and Fordist organization of work. 
Throughout the 60s and early 70s the rank and file 
challenged several essential elements of Scientific 
Management. It cha 1 1 enged the wage and ski 1 1 hierarchy 
with the demand for equal rises for al 1, automatic 
promotion to the second category 
parity with white col Jar workers. 
for a 1 I workers, and 
It refused the notion 
of bonuses tied to effort or danger; productivity deals, 
or extra money 
etc. The major 
CONTRATTAZIONE 
for /dirty/ work, danger, asocial hours 
s I ogans of this period were "NO ALLA 
DEL COTTIMO" and "PIU SOLDI E MEND 
LAVORO" C"No to piece rate negotiation", and "more 
money, I ess work" ) . The working c 1 ass at tempted to 
regain the control usurped by the machinery on the 
machine paced 1 ines by demanding delegati or line 
stewards, with the right to information and intervention 
on speeds, rhythms and labour complements. 
What was required was a new technical and organi-
zational setting of labour, a /new way of making cars/, 
able to transcend the form of Taylorism whi Jst retaining 
its basic principle of the separation of conception and 
execution. 
During this period, perhaps not coincidentally, 
left and I iberal ideas on new forms of work organization 
had become fashionable. The assembly I ine with its 
repetitive / parce I i zed/ , machine-paced work was to be 
abolished and replaced with work methods with a /human 
dimension/. In these theories, work would be performed 
in groups at stationary islands. The rhythm of work 
would no longer be determined from outside by the 
rhythms of the machinery, but would be decided indivi-
dua 1 1 y or co 1 1 ect i ve 1 y by the workers themse 1 ves. The 
labour process would no longer be divided into its 
simplest elements, each element to be performed repe-
titive 1 y by a single worker who wou I d never know the 
process in its entirety, but would be /recomposed/ into 
camp l ete eye l es of work. The workers wou I d supervise 
each other rather than work under the au thor it y of a 
foreman or chargehand. A degree of decision-making would 
be devolved back to the workers, with participation in a 
more /open/ system of management. The information which 
guides managerial decision-making would be open to alI. 
Clearly such ideas could not be used wholesale by 
management, 
conditions 
at least not in a capitalist society. Under 
of competition capital must control the 
labour process to control profits; it certainly cannot 
hope to sacrifice productivity in exchange for a 
socially beneficial modification of either production or 
the product, and survive. 
But perhaps piecemeal parts of these theories could 
work? Perhaps elements of the various critiques of 
Taylorism put forward by the workers and the theorists 
cou I d be used to get round some of the i ncreas i ngl y 
acute problems arising under Scientific Management 
itself? 
Throughout the 1970s FIAT experimented with new 
forms of organization of work. Experiments which did not 
give results, i.e. did not, in the last analysis, in-
crease productivity, were soon abandoned, and only those 
concepts which were sti 1 I possibly functional were 
salvaged to be tried out again in another context. Job 
rotation, job enrichment and job enlargement, for 
example, all took on a new meaning in a flexible use of 
the work force, the break-down of demarcation and the 
movement of workers from job to job more or less at 
Wlll. This /TroJan horse/ tactic was also used in the 
introduction of automation: unpleasant or unhealthy Jobs 
were to disappear, the genera i ski l J I eve I in the 
factory was to rise and workers were to be freed from 
machine pacing. But the real result was the absolute 
reduction of human labour and the further subordination 
of human to machine for those who remained. 
The vaunted /new way of making cars/ adopted by 
FIAT was, then, not the transcendence of Taylorism, but 
the crowning of it. It is a sophisticated adaptation of 
the principle: control = productivity to new social 
conditions within the factory and new developments in 
technology outside of it. 
The Taylorian way of making cars relies on 'parce-
l ization' and machine pacing to achieve the separation 
of conception from execution. The 'new way of making 
cars' relies on a new flexibility in the labour process 
combined with the breaking up of the big factory into a 
more modu 1 ar system and an abso I u te reduction of the 
work force through the cep 1 acemen t of human 1 abour by 
machinery, in an attempt to render the factory less 
vulnerable to the subJective and active presence of the 
working class. 
Real control over how much is produced and how has 
been strengthened by: 
<1) The use of advanced computer systems for centralized 
information gathering, surveillance and control of 
complex production flows. These systems can identify and 
follow individual parts and direct their movement all 
the way through the productive cycle, identify and 
signal faults, keep a complete record of production data 
which may then be used to organize production and 
calculate the job timings, labour complements etc. 
requ1red to achieve maximum efficiency - and will even 
keep track of the productivity of individual workers. 
<2) The replacement of traditional assembly lines by a 
system of independent modules. Production in each 
section is rendered autonomous from that in preceding 
and successive sections by buffer stores which contain 
sever a I hours war th of the necessary for production. 
Such a system is much less vulnerable to the control a 
worker may exert over the labour process by blocking it; 
that is by withdrawing labour in one way or another. 
<3) The introduction of a more flexible use of human 
labour power through job rotation and related concepts, 
allowing management a freer hand in deciding how the 
labour power avai !able at any one time wi I I be used. 
It is the contention of this thesis that this radi-
cal reconceptualization of the technical and organi-
zational setting of labour in FIAT was forced on mana-
gement by the particular forms of labour organization 
and class consciousness in Italy. The rebellious nature 
of the working class in Italy was rendered more, rather 
than less, dangerous to ordered productivity by the 
weakness of its official organizations, which at most 
'led from behind' and during many periods actually 
ca I I ed for the restoration of productive order in a 
stakhanovistic attitude deriving largely from that 
'paralysing illusion/ of the major federation of 
partJcipation in political power by the mother party. 
The::;e organ 1 za t ions were never, in any case, ab I e to 
channel and restrain the oppositional thrust of the 
work1ng class in ordered processes of negotiations. The 
situation of /ungovernability/ deriving from this 
combination of a rebel 1 ious working class with weak 
official organizations has resulted in a sophisticated 
and imaginative re-organization of the productive 
process to equa I the strength and imagination of the 
working class. 
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